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Preface
At the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015, the European Union
launched the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Made up of 1.8 billion,
the Fund constitutes a quick response from the EU to the European migrant
crisis, which reached a peak in 2015. In the first place, the Fund is deployed
to bring humanitarian aid to refugees and to assist border operations in the
Mediterranean to prevent further loss of lives at sea and resettle asylum seek-
ers across the EU member states. In the longer run, it aims to tackle the
fundamental causes of irregular migration and forced displacement by creating
employment opportunities, improving basic services, and preventing potential
conflicts in migrants countries of origin. This attempt to manage migration by
governments, especially intending to decrease migration flows from developing
to developed countries, is not a new initiative in the history. The literature
widely documents two categories of policy which are usually envisaged: the first
one is restrictive immigration laws (e.g. selective migration, border control, de-
terrence and forced return migration policies), and the second is development
policies promoted in sending countries to address the root causes of migra-
tion (De Haas, 2007; Kim and Park, 2012). The second category consists of
aid funds, investment and trade liberalization that are believed to raise wage
level in the sending countries and ultimately diminish their people’s incentive
for migration. The most famous example of this development measure which
has ever been documented is the Maquiladora program (1965). The program
created an export-processing zone along the US-Mexican border in order to
slowdown irregular migration of Mexican workers to the US. Its main goals
were later pursued by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
(1994). Similarly, it was argued that through this agreement, expanding trade
and investment in Mexico would reduce migration flow from that country to the
US (Cornelius and Martin, 1993, Aroca and Malony, 2005). However, Martin
(1993) proved that NAFTA rather increased than decreased Mexican migration
flows. This is suggestive of the fact that ad hoc policies could barely influence
migration. We thus have legitimate reason to doubt about the effectiveness of
the aforementioned EU investment program for Africa. Would that initiative
be a drop in the ocean? Would it be swept away by an underestimated however
mightier and unsurpassable driving force behind the migration phenomenon?
Do we fully comprehend all the fundamental determinants of migration, how
big they are and how they can easily be changed? This thesis contributes to
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answer to these questions. It consists of three chapters examining the drivers
of past and future international migration. It attempts to demystify different
factors that cause people to move and to shed light on the most important
ones. It also tests the capacity of the two types of policy in managing migra-
tion. To this purpose, I make use of diverse research tools in economics such as
econometric regression, theoretical modeling, calibration and simulation strate-
gies. The data used comprise various aspects of income, population, education,
geography, policy and international trade.
Chapter One, entitled “Global Migration in the 20th and 21st Centuries: the
Unstoppable Force of Demography”, sheds light on the global migration pat-
terns of the past 40 years, and produces migration projections for the 21st cen-
tury, for the low- and high-skilled groups, and for all relevant pairs of countries.
This chapter is elaborated jointly with Fre´de´ric Docquier, Mathilde Maurel and
Pierre Schaus. First, we build a simple model of the world economy, and we
parameterize it to match the economic and socio-demographic characteristics
of the world in the year 2010. We then conduct a backcasting exercise which
demonstrates that our model fits the past trends in international migration
very well, and that historical trends were mostly governed by demographic
changes. We next describe a set of migration projections for the 21st century.
In line with backcasts, our world migration prospects and emigration rates from
developing countries are mainly governed by socio-demographic changes: they
are virtually insensitive to the technological environment. As far as OECD
countries are concerned, we predict a highly robust increase in immigration
pressures in general (from 12 in 2010 to 17-19% in 2050 and 25-28% in 2100),
and in European immigration in particular (from 15% in 2010 to 23-25% in
2050 and 36-39% in 2100). Using development policies to curb these pressures
requires triggering unprecedented economic takeoffs in migrants countries of
origin. Increasing migration is therefore a likely phenomenon for the 21st cen-
tury, and this raises societal and political challenges for most industrialized
countries.
Chapter Two, a joint work with Fre´de´ric Docquier, Christopher Parsons and
Giovanni Peri entitled “Migration and Development: Dissecting the Anatomy
of the Mobility Transition”, is inspired by the fact that emigration first in-
creases and then decreases as a country experiences economic development.
This inverted U-shaped, cross-sectional relationship between emigration and
development was first hypothesized by Zelinsky’s theory of the mobility transi-
tion. Although several mechanisms have been proposed to explain the upward
segment of the curve (the most common being the existence of financial con-
straints), they have not been examined in a systematic way. In this chater,
we propose two decomposition methods to disentangle the main drivers of the
mobility transition curve to OECD destination countries. Our simple decom-
positions shed light on the role of both microeconomic drivers (i.e., financial
incentives and constraints) and macroeconomic drivers, as well as the skill com-
position of the population. Our double decomposition further distinguishes
between migration aspirations and realization rates by education level. Over-
all, we provide consistent evidence that the role of financial constraints, while
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relevant for the poorest countries, is limited. Rather, a large fraction of the
increasing segment is explained by the skill composition and by macroeconomic
drivers (i.e., by factors that do not change in the short-run).
The last Chapter Three, entitled “The strength of future migration to OECD
countries and the potential impact of policy intervention”, develops a theoret-
ical framework to forecast migration in the dynamic context of development.
It takes into consideration three factors that affect migration: demographic
transition, income evolution and human capital growth. The combinations of
these three factors give rise to different future migration trends in major ge-
ographic areas. The analyses foresee the extent to which OECD destinations
will face an increasing foreign labor supply in the upcoming decades. This
framework also allows to envision the potential outcomes of policies intending
to govern migration, such as border restriction at destination and development
measures aiming at reducing migration pressure from less to more developed
countries. More specifically, in order to predict the effects of income changes on
migration a microfounded model is build based on the most recent knowledge
developed for the theory of the mobility transition in the previous chapter. This
model distinguishes between migration incentives and constraints of low and
high skill populations. In the benchmark scenario as a continuation of the 2010
situation, immigration volume to OECD countries will rise by +18.69% over
a decade. The contribution of demographic growth is substantial. Future mi-
gration will be more skill-intensive. Sub-Saharan African and MENA countries
will experience the fastest growth in the number of outmigrants. Lastly, the
paper concludes that the development levels at which developing countries in
sub-Saharan Africa and MENA should stand in order to reduce the migration
pressure on OECD destinations should be unprecedented.
Overall, the thesis provides consistent result that migration is an inevitable
phenomenon of the first half of the 21st century. It has been shown to be
mostly governed by macroeconomic forces such as demography, human capital
accumulation and persistent cross-country inequality. Short-term restrictive or
development policies could hardly stop of reverse its rising trend. To some
extent, a more prominent answer would be to better integrate the migrants
into the destination countries, minimize the negative impacts and maximize
the positive outcomes of migration in order to harness a triple-win situation
for the migrants themselves, the destination and the sending countries.
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Chapter 1
Global Migration in the
20th and 21st Centuries:
the Unstoppable Force of
Demography
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On The Fundamental Drivers of International Migration
Abstract1
This paper sheds light on the global migration patterns of the past 40 years, and
produces migration projections for the 21st century, for two skill groups, and for
all relevant pairs of countries. To do this, we build a simple model of the world
economy, and we parameterize it to match the economic and socio-demographic
characteristics of the world in the year 2010. We conduct a backcasting exercise
which demonstrates that our model fits the past trends in international migra-
tion very well, and that historical trends were mostly governed by demographic
changes. We then describe a set of migration projections for the 21st century.
In line with backcasts, our world migration prospects and emigration rates from
developing countries are mainly governed by socio-demographic changes: they
are virtually insensitive to the technological environment. As far as OECD
countries are concerned, we predict a highly robust increase in immigration
pressures in general (from 12 in 2010 to 17-19% in 2050 and 25-28% in 2100),
and in European immigration in particular (from 15% in 2010 to 23-25% in
2050 and 36-39% in 2100). Using development policies to curb these pressures
requires triggering unprecedented economic takeoffs in migrants countries of
origin. Increasing migration is therefore a likely phenomenon for the 21st cen-
tury, and this raises societal and political challenges for most industrialized
countries.
JEL codes: F22, F24, J11, J61, O15.
Keywords: international migration, migration prospects, world economy, in-
equality
1This is a joint work with Fre´de´ric Docquier, Mathilde Maurel and Pierre Schaus. We
thank Christiane Clemens, Giuseppe de Arcangelis, Timothy Hatton, Vincent Vanderberghe,
and Gerald Willmann for their helpful comments and suggestions. This paper was presented
at the conference on “Demographic Challenges in Africa” jointly organized by the French
Agency for Development and the University of Paris 1 Panthe´on-Sorbonne in February 2017,
at the 8th International Conference on “Economics of Global Interactions: New Perspec-
tives on Trade, Factor Mobility and Development” at the University of Bari Aldo Moro in
September 2017, and at the Workshop on “The drivers and impacts of migration and labour
mobility in origins and destinations: Building the evidence base for policies that promote
safe, orderly and regular people’s and labour mobility for poverty reduction and sustainable
development” at FAO Headquarters in Rome in December 2017. The authors are grateful
to the participants for valuable comments. I acknowledge financial support by the European
Commission in the framework of the European Doctorate in Economics Erasmus Mundus
(EDEEM).
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Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction
Figure 1.1: Long-run trends in international migration, 1960-2010
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Between 1960 and 2010, the worldwide stock of international migrants increased
from 92 to 211 million, at the same pace as the world population, i.e. the
worldwide share of migrants fluctuated around 3%. This average share masks
comparatively significant differences between regions, as illustrated on Figure
1.1. In high-income countries (HICs), the foreign-born population increased
more rapidly than the total population, boosting the average proportion of
foreigners from 4.5 to 11.0% (+6.5%). A remarkable fact is that this change is
totally explained by the inflow of immigrants from developing countries, whose
share in the total population increased from 1.5 to 8.0% (once again, +6.5%).
By comparison, the share of North-North migrants has been fairly stable.2
In less developed countries (LDCs), the total stock of emigrants increased at
the same pace as the total population, leading to small fluctuations of the
emigration rate between 2.6 and 3.0%. As part of this emigration process,
the share of emigrants to HICs in the population increased from 0.5 to 1.4%.
Hence, the average propensity to emigrate from LDCs to HICs has increased
by less than one percentage point over half a century.3
2Similar patterns were observed in the 15 member states of the European Union (hence-
forth, EU15). The EU15 average proportion of foreigners increased from 3.9 to 12.2% (+8.2%)
between 1960 and 2010. Although intra-European movements have been spurred by the
Schengen agreement, the EU15 proportion of immigrants originating from LDCs also in-
creased dramatically, from 1.2 to 7.5% (+6.3%).
3Demographic imbalances allow reconciling emigration and immigration patterns. Over
the last 50 years, population growth has been systematically greater in developing countries.
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The underlying root causes of these trends are known (demographic imbal-
ances, economic inequality, increased globalization, political instability, etc.).
However, quantitatively speaking, little is known about their relative impor-
tance and about the changing educational structure of past migration flows.
Furthermore, the very same root causes are all projected to exert a strong
influence in the coming decades, and little is known about the predictability
of future migration flows. This paper sheds light on these issues, addressing
key questions such as: How have past income disparities, educational changes
and demographic imbalances shaped past migration flows? What are the pairs
of countries responsible for large variations in low-skilled and high-skilled mi-
gration? How many potential migrants can be expected for the 21st century?
How will future changes in education and productivity affect migration flows
in general, and migration pressures to HIC in particular? Can development
policies be implemented to limit these flows?
To do so, we develop a simple, abstract economic model of the world econ-
omy that highlights the major mechanisms underlying migration decisions and
wage inequality in the long term. It builds on a migration technology and
a production technology, uses consensus specifications, and includes a limited
number of parameters that can be calibrated to match the economic and socio-
demographic characteristics of the world in the year 2010. We first conduct a
set of backcasting experiments, which consists in using the model to simulate
bilateral migration stocks retrospectively, and in comparing the backcasts with
observed migration stocks. We show that our backcasts fit very well the histor-
ical trends in the worldwide aggregate stock of migrants, in immigration stocks
to all destination countries, and in emigration stocks from all origin countries.
This demonstrates the capacity of the model to identify the main sources of
variation and to predict long-run migration trends. Simulating counterfactual
historical trends with constant distributions of income, education level or pop-
ulation, we show that most of the historical changes in international migration
are explained by demographic changes. In particular, the world migration
stocks would have virtually been constant if the population size of developing
countries had not changed. Solving a Max-Sum Submatrix problem, we iden-
tify the clusters of origins and destinations that caused the greatest variations
in global migration. These include important South-North, North-North and
South-South corridors for the low-skilled, and North-North and South-North
corridors for the highly skilled.
We then enter exogenous socio-demographic scenarios into the calibrated model,
and produce micro-founded projections of migration stocks by education level
for the 21st century. The interdependencies between migration, population and
income have rarely been accounted for in projection exercises. The demographic
projections of the United Nations do not anticipate the economic forces and
policy reforms that shape migration flows. In the medium variant, they assume
long-run convergence towards low fertility and high life expectancy across coun-
The population ratio between LDCs and HICs increased from 3.1 in 1960 to 5.5 in 2010. This
explains why a 0.9% increase in emigration rate from LDCs translated into a 6.5% increase
in the share of immigrants to HICs.
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tries, and constant immigration flows. The Wittgenstein projections rely on a
more complex methodology (see Lutz et al., 2014). Depending on the scenario,
they consist of a set of probabilities to emigrate (or to immigrate) multiplied
by the native population levels in the origin countries (or in the rest of the
world). The size of net immigration flows varies over time and are computed
by sex, age and education level. Future migration flows reflect expert opinion
about future socio-political and economic trends that could affect migration.
From 2060 onwards, it is assumed that net migration flows converge to zero
(zero is attained in the 2095-2100 period). As regards to the skill structure,
it is assumed to be proportional to that of the origin (or destination) country,
implying that skill-selection patterns in migration are disregarded. In contrast,
our migration projections are demographically and economically rooted. They
result from a micro-founded migration technology and are totally compatible
with the endogenous evolution of income disparities.
The economic literature records a limited number of studies that focus on
long-run migration trends and on projections of future migration. Hatton and
Williamson (2003) examine the determinants of net emigration from Africa us-
ing a panel of 21 countries between 1977 and 1995, then subsequently use the
regression estimates to predict African emigration pressure until 2025. They
allow demography to influence emigration directly (via its impact on the youth
share) and indirectly (via its impact on domestic wages). They predict an
intensification of migration from Africa by the year 2025. The main reasons
lie in the rapid growth of young cohort who has greater potential to migrate,
and in the poor economic performance of source countries as a result of de-
mographic pressures. Focusing on the receiving countries’ perspective, Hatton
and Williamson (2011) identify the various drivers of emigration rates from
developing countries to the United States from 1970 to 2004, and then pre-
dict immigration trends up to the year 2034. The study reveals abating signs
of migration from Latin America and Asia to the United States while rising
trend will continue in Africa. The authors conclude that US immigrants will
be more African and much less Hispanic. Similar conclusions are obtained in
Hanson and McIntosh (2016), who show that the African migration pressures
will mostly affect European countries until the mid-21st century. They com-
pare the expanding migration pressure out of sub-Saharan Africa to Europe to
that between Latin America and the United States during the second half of
the 20th century.
The common features of our present study as compared to these aforementioned
papers are the use of past observations and exogenous demographic forecasts
to project future migration. However, our contribution is threefold. First,
in terms of modeling, our paper builds on a general equilibrium framework
to account for the interactions between labor and wage. As a consequence,
labor absorption capacity of each economy is not disregarded in the face of
demographic shock. A similar approach is used in Mountford and Rapoport
(2014) or in Docquier and Machado (2017). Second, the use of a random utility
specification allows to allocate the world labor across multiple corridors as a
function of the relative attractiveness of all destinations. Third, in terms of
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country coverage, our world-economy model includes the majority of countries
in the world (i.e., 180 countries). The simulation results therefore offer a better
overview of future global migration, although we acknowledge that migrant
concentrate in a small number of corridors.
Our general equilibrium projection model produces striking results. In line
with the backcasting exercise, we find that the future trends in international
migration are hardly affected by the technological environment; they are mostly
governed by socio-demographic changes (i.e., changes in population size and in
educational attainment). Focusing on OECD member states, we predict a
highly robust increase in their proportion of immigrants. The magnitude of
the change is highly insensitive to the technological environment, and to the
education scenario. In particular, a rise in schooling in developing countries in-
creases the average propensity to emigrate but also reduces population growth
rates; as far as migrant stocks are concerned, these effects are balancing each
other. Overall, under constant immigration policies, the average immigration
rate of OECD countries increases from 12 to 25-28% during the 21st century.
Given their magnitude, expected changes in immigration are henceforth re-
ferred to as migration pressures, although we do not make any value judgments
about their desirability or about their welfare effects within the sending and
receiving countries. The Max-Sum Submatrix reveals that this surge is mostly
due to rising migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa, from the Middle East,
and from a few Asian countries. In line with Hanson and McIntosh (2016)
or with Docquier and Machado (2007), expected immigration pressures are
greater in European countries (+21.2 percentage points) than in the United
States (+14.3 percentage points). The greatest variations in immigration rates
are observed in the United Kingdom, France, Spain; Canada is also strongly
affected. Curbing such migration pressures is difficult. For the 20 countries
inducing the greatest migration pressures on the EU15 by the year 2060 or
for the combined geographic region of Middle-East and sub-Saharan Africa,
we show that keeping their total emigration stock constant requires triggering
unprecedented economic takeoffs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the
model, defines its competitive equilibrium, and discusses its parameterization.
Section 1.3 presents the results of the backcasting exercise. Forecasts are then
provided in Section 1.4. Finally, Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Model
The model distinguishes between two classes of workers and J countries (j =
1, ..., J). The skill type s is equal to h for college graduates, and to l for the
less educated. We first describe the migration technology, which determines
the condition under which migration to a destination country j is profitable for
type-s workers born in country i. This condition depends on wage disparities,
differences in amenities and migration costs between the source and destina-
tion countries. We then describe the production technology, which determines
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wage disparities. The latter are affected by the allocation of labor which it-
self depends on the size and structure of migration flows. The combination of
endogenous migration decisions and equilibrium wages jointly determines the
world distribution of income and the allocation of the world population.
Migration technology. – At each period t, the number of working age natives of
type s and originating from country i is denoted by Ni,s,t. Each native decides
whether to emigrate to another country or to stay in their home country; the
number of migrants from i to j is denoted by Mij,s,t (hence, Mii,s,t represents
the number of non-migrants). After migration, the resident labor force of type
s in country j is given by Lj,s,t.
For simplicity, we assume a “drawing-with-replacement” migration process. Al-
though one period is meant to represent 10 years, we ignore path dependency
in migration decisions (i.e., having migrated to country j at time t influences
the individual location at time t + 1). In addition, by considering the pop-
ulation aged 15 to 64 as a homogenous group, our model abstracts from the
heterogeneity in the propensity to migrate across age groups, i.e. ignoring the
effect of age on migration.4 Individual decisions to emigrate result from the
comparison of discrete alternatives.
To model them, we use a standard Random Utility Model (RUM) with a deter-
ministic and a random component. The deterministic component is assumed
to be logarithmic in income and to include an exogenous dyadic component.5
At time t, the utility of a type-s individual born in country i and living in
country j is given by:
uij,s,t = γ˜ lnwj,s,t + ln vij,s,t + εij,s,t,
where wj,s,t denotes the wage rate attainable in the destination country j; γ˜
is a parameter governing the marginal utility of income; vij,s,t stands for the
non-wage income and amenities in country j (public goods and transfers minus
taxes and non-monetary amenities) and is netted from the legal and private
costs of moving from i to j; εij,s,t is the random taste component capturing
heterogeneity in the preferences for alternative locations, in mobility costs, in
assimilation costs, etc.
The utility obtained when the same individual stays in his origin country is
given by
uii,s,t = γ˜ lnwi,s,t + ln vii,s,t + εii,s,t.
The random term εij,s,t is assumed to follow an iid extreme-value distribution
4It is often shown that individual aged 15 to 34 are more migratory than older age groups
(Hatton and Williamson, 1998; UNDESA, 2013) due to higher present values of migration in
intertemporal utility function (Hatton and Williamson, 2011; Djajic et al., 2016).
5Although Grogger and Hanson (2011) find that a linear utility specification fits the
patterns of positive selection and sorting in the migration data well, most studies rely on a
concave (logarithmic) utility function (Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, 2013; Beine
et al., 2013a; Beine and Parsons, 2015; Ortega and Peri, 2013).
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of type I with scale parameter µ.6 Under this hypothesis, the probability that a
type-s individual born in country i moving to country j is given by the following
logit expression (McFadden, 1984):
Mij,s,t
Ni,s,t
= Pr
[
uij,s,t = max
k
uik,s,t
]
=
exp
(
γ˜ lnwj,s,t+ln vij,s,t
µ
)
∑
k exp
(
γ˜ lnwk,s,t+ln vik,s,t
µ
) .
Hence, the emigration rate from i to j depends on the characteristics of all
potential destinations k (i.e., a crisis in Greece affects the emigration rate from
Romania to Germany). The staying rates (Mii,s,t/Ni,s,t) are governed by the
same logit model. It follows that the emigrant-to-stayer ratio is given by:
mij,s,t ≡ Mij,s,t
Mii,s,t
=
(
wj,s,t
wi,s,t
)γ
Vij,s,t, (1.1)
where γ ≡ γ˜/µ, the elasticity of migration choices to wage disparities, is a com-
bination of preference and distribution parameters, and Vij,s,t ≡ vij,s,t/(µvii,s,t)
is a scale factor of the migration technology.7 Hence, the ratio of emigrants
from i to j to stayers only depends on the characteristics of the two countries.
Production technology. – Income is determined based on an aggregate produc-
tion function. Each country has a large number of competitive firms charac-
terized by the same production technology and producing a homogenous good.
The output in country j, Yj,t, is a multiplicative function of total factor produc-
tivity (TFP), Aj,t,
8 and the total quantity of labor in efficiency units, denoted
by Lj,T,t, supplied by low-skilled and high-skilled workers. Such a model with-
out physical capital features a globalized economy with a common international
interest rate. This hypothesis is in line with Kennan (2013) or Klein and Ven-
tura (2009) who assume that capital “chases” labor.9 Following the recent
literature on labor markets, immigration and growth,10 we assume that labor
6Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2012, 2013), or Ortega and Peri (2012) used
more general distributions, allowing for a positive correlation in the application of shocks
across similar countries.
7The model will be calibrated using migration stock data, which are assumed to reflect the
long-run migration equilibrium. We thus consider that Vij,s,t accounts for network effects (i.e.,
effect of past migration stocks on migration flows). Additionally, Vij,s,t embeds migration
costs. They represent monetary moving costs, utility-loss equivalents of migration quotas
(similar to tariff equivalent of non-tariff bariers in trade), etc. Migration costs in this study
are treated as exogenous. However in practice, visa restrictions depend on the intensity of
immigration pressures as well as on origin and/or destination countries’ characteristics.
8In fact, there is a slight abuse of terms here as Aj,t implicitly includes capital in supple-
ment to the usual TFP, which is by definition the residual that explains a country’s output
level apart from capital and labor. Therefore, Aj,t is rather a “modified TFP”.
9Interestingly, Ortega and Peri (2009) find that capital adjustments are rapid in open
economies: an inflow of immigrants increases one-for-one employment and capital stocks in
the short term (i.e. within one year), leaving the capital/labor ratio unchanged.
10See Katz and Murphy (1992), Card and Lemieux (2001), Caselli and Coleman (2006),
Borjas (2003, 2009), Card (2009), or Ottaviano and Peri (2012), Docquier and Machado
(2017) among others.
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in efficiency units is a CES function of the number of college-educated and less
educated workers employed. We have:
Yj,t = Aj,tLj,T,t = Aj,t
[
θj,h,tL
σ−1
σ
j,h,t + θj,l,tL
σ−1
σ
j,l,t
] σ
σ−1
, (1.2)
where θj,s,t is the country and time-specific value share parameter for workers
of type s (such that θj,h,t + θj,l,t = 1), and σ is the common elasticity of
substitution between the two groups of workers.
Firms maximize profits and the labor market is competitive. The equilibrium
wage rate for type-s workers in country j is equal to the marginal productivity
of labor:
wj,s,t = θj,s,tAj,t
(
Lj,T,t
Lj,s,t
)1/σ
. (1.3)
Hence, the wage ratio between college graduates and less educated workers is
given by:
wj,h,t
wj,l,t
=
θj,h,t
θj,l,t
(
Lj,h,t
Lj,l,t
)−1/σ
(1.4)
As long as this ratio is greater than one, a rise in human capital increases the
average productivity of workers. Furthermore, greater contributions of human
capital to productivity can be obtained by assuming technological externalities.
Two types of technological externality are factored in. First, we consider a
simple Lucas-type, aggregate externality (see Lucas, 1988) and assume that
the TFP scale factor in each sector is a concave function of the skill-ratio
in the resident labor force. This externality captures the fact that educated
workers facilitate innovation and the adoption of advanced technologies. Its size
has been the focus of many recent articles and has generated a certain level of
debate. Using data from US cities (Moretti, 2004) or US states (Acemoglu and
Angrist, 2001; Iranzo and Peri, 2009), some instrumental-variable approaches
give substantial externalities (Moretti, 2004) while others do not (Acemoglu
and Angrist, 2001). In the empirical growth literature, there is evidence of a
positive effect of schooling on innovation and technology diffusion (see Benhabib
and Spiegel, 1994; Caselli and Coleman, 2006; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2009).
In parallel, another set of contributions highlights the effect of human capital
on the quality of institutions (Castello-Climente, 2008; Bobba and Coviello,
2007; Murtin and Wacziarg, 2014). We write:
Aj,t = λtAj
(
Lj,h,t
Lj,l,t
)
, (1.5)
where λt captures the worldwide time variations in productivity (common to all
countries), Aj is the exogenous country-specific component of TFP in country
j (reflecting exogenous factors such as arable land, climate, geography, etc.),
and  is the elasticity of TFP to the skill ratio.
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Second, we assume skill-biased technical change. As technology improves, the
relative productivity of high-skilled workers increases (Acemoglu, 2002; Restuc-
cia and Vandenbroucke, 2013). For example, Autor et al. (2003) show that
computerization is associated with a declining relative demand in industry for
routine manual and cognitive tasks, and increased relative demand for non-
routine cognitive tasks. The observed relative demand shift favors college ver-
sus non-college labor. We write:
θj,h,t
θj,l,t
= Qj
(
Lj,h,t
Lj,l,t
)κ
, (1.6)
where Qj is the exogenous country-specific component of the skill bias in pro-
ductivity in country j, and κ is the elasticity of the skill bias to the skill ratio.
Competitive equilibrium. – The link between the native and resident population
is tautological: ∑
j
Nj,s,t =
∑
j
Lj,s,t =
∑
i
∑
j
mij,s,tMii,s,t (1.7)
Given our “drawing-with-replacement” migration hypothesis and given the ab-
sence of any accumulated production factor, the dynamics of the world economy
is governed by a succession of temporary equilibria defined as:
Definition 1. For a set {γ, σ, , κ, λt} of common parameters, a set
{
Aj , Qj
}
∀j
of country-specific parameters, a set {Vij,s,t}∀i,j,s of bilateral (net) migration
costs, and for given distribution of the native population {Nj,s,t}∀j,s, a tempo-
rary competitive equilibrium for period t is an allocation of labor {Mij,s,t}∀i,j,s
and a vector of wages {wj,s,t}∀j,s satisfying (i) utility maximization conditions,
Eq. (1.1), (ii) profit maximization conditions, Eq. (1.3), (iii) technological
constraints, Eqs. (1.5) and (1.6), and (iv) the aggregation constraints, Eq.
(1.7).
A temporary equilibrium allocation of labor is characterized by a system of
2× J × (J + 1) i.e., 2× J × (J − 1) bilateral ratio of migrants to stayers, 2× J
wage rates, and 2×J aggregation constraints. In the next sub-sections, we use
data for 180 countries (developed and developing independent territories) and
explain how we parameterize our system of 65,160 simultaneous equations per
period. Once properly calibrated, this model can be used to conduct a large
variety of numerical experiments.
Parameterization for the year 2010. – The model can be calibrated to match
the economic and socio-demographic characteristics of 180 countries as well as
skill-specific matrices of 180× 180 bilateral migration stocks in the year 2010.
Regarding production technology, on the basis of GDP in PPP values (Yj,2010)
from the Maddison’s project described in Bolt and Van Zanden (2014), we col-
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lect data on the size and structure of the labor force from the Wittgenstein Cen-
tre for Demography and Global Human Capital (Lj,s,2010), and data on the wage
ratio between college graduates and less educated workers, wj,h,2010/wj,l,2010,
from Hendriks (2004). When missing, the latter are supplemented using the
estimates of Docquier and Machado (2015). We assume the labor force corre-
sponds to the population aged 25 to 64.
Using these data, we proceed in three steps to calibrate the production tech-
nology. First, in line with the labor market literature (e.g., Ottaviano and Peri,
2012), we assume that the elasticity of substitution between college-educated
and less educated workers, σ, is equal to 2. This level fits well labor market
interactions in developed countries. Greater levels have been identified in de-
veloping countries (e.g., Angrist, 1995). Therefore, we also consider a scenario
with σ = 3. Second, for a given σ, we calibrate the ratio of value shares,
θj,h,2010/θj,l,2010, as a residual from Eq. (1.4) to match the observed wage ra-
tio. Since θj,h + θj,l = 1, this determines both θj,h,2010 and θj,l,2010 as well as
the quantity of labor per efficiency unit, Lj,T,2010, defined in Eq. (1.2). Third,
we use Eq. (1.2) and calibrate the TFP level, Aj,2010, to match the observed
GDP and we normalize λ2010 to unity (without loss of generality). When all
technological parameters are calibrated, we use Eq. (1.3) to proxy the wage
rates for each skill group.
With regards to the migration technology, we use the DIOC-E database of the
OECD. DIOC-E builds on the Database on Immigrants in OECD countries
(DIOC) described in Arslan et al. (2015). The data are collected by country
of destination and are mainly based on population censuses or administrative
registers. The DIOC database provides detailed information on the country
of origin, demographic characteristics and level of education of the population
of 34 OECD member states. DIOC-E extends the latter by characterizing the
structure of the population of 86 non-OECD destination countries. Focusing
on the populations aged 25 to 64, we thus end up with matrices of bilateral
migration from 180 origin countries to 120 destination countries (34 OECD +
86 non-OECD countries) by education level, as well as proxies for the native
population (Ni,s,2010). We assume that immigration stocks in the 60 miss-
ing countries are zero, which allows us to compute comprehensive migration
matrices.
Regarding the elasticity of bilateral migration to the wage ratio, γ, we follow
Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2013) who find a value between 0.6
and 0.7. We use 0.7. Finally, we calibrate Vij,s,2010 as a residual of Eq. (1.1) to
match the observed ratio of bilateral migrants to stayers. In sum, the migration
and technology parameters are such that our model perfectly matches the world
distribution of income, the world population allocation and skill structure as
well as bilateral migration stocks as of the year 2010.
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1.3 Backcasting
Our first objective is to gauge the ability of our parameterized model to repli-
cate aggregate historical data, and to backcast the educational structure of
these flows. Our backcasting exercise consists in using the model to simulate
retrospectively bilateral migration stocks by education level, and comparing
the backcasts with proxies for observed migration stocks for the years 1970,
1980, 1990 and 2000. This exercise can also shed light on the relevance of
technological hypotheses (i.e. what value for σ, κ or  should be favored?), and
on the role of socio-demographic and technological changes in explaining the
aggregate variations in past migration.
There is no database documenting past migration stocks by education level
and by age group. Nonetheless, O¨zden et al. (2011) provides decadal data
on bilateral migration stocks from 1960 to 2000 with no disaggregation be-
tween age and skill groups, which can be supplemented by the matrix of the
United Nations for the year 2010 (UNPOP division). To enable comparisons,
we rescale these bilateral matrices using the destination-specific ratios of the
immigration stock aged 25 to 64 (from DIOC-E) to total immigration (from the
United Nations) observed in 2010. We then apply these ratios to the decadal
years 1970 to 2000, and construct proxies for the stocks of the total stock of
working-age migrants, M̂ij,T,t.
11 We then use the model to predict past stocks
of migrants by education level, and aggregate them Mij,T,t = Mij,h,t +Mij,l,t.
To assess the predictive performance of the model, we compare the (rescaled)
worldwide numbers of international migrants with the simulated ones; coef-
ficients of correlation between Mij,T,t and M̂ij,T,t can be computed for each
period t.
Backcasting methodology. – Historical data allow us to document the size and
structure of the resident population (Lj,s,t) and the level GDP (Yj,t) of each
country from 1970 to 2010. However, data on within-country wage disparities
and bilateral migration are missing prior to 2010. The model is used to predict
these missing variables.
We begin by predicting past wage ratios between college graduates and less-
educated workers. Eq. (1.4) governs the evolution of these ratios. It depends on
the (observed) skill ratio, Lj,h,t/Lj,l,t, on the elasticity of substitution σ, and on
the ratio of value share parameters, θj,h,t/θj,l,t. We consider two possible values
for σ (2 or 3). For a given σ, it should be recalled that we identified the ratio
θj,h,2010/θj,l,2010 which matches wage disparities in 2010. In line with Eq. (1.6),
regressing the log of this ratio on the log of the skill ratio gives an estimate for
κ, the skill biased externality. We obtain κ = 0.214 when σ = 2, and κ = 0.048
when σ = 3.12 Given the bidirectional causation relationship between the skill
11We assume rescaled immigration stocks are zero for the destination countries that are
unavailable in the DIOC-E database.
12The regression lines are log(Rj) = 0.214. log
(
Lj,h/Lj,l
)
+ 0.540 with σ = 2, and
log(Rj) = 0.048. log
(
Lj,h/Lj,l
)
+ 0.540 with σ = 3.
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bias and education decisions (i.e. incentives to educate increase when the skill
bias is greater), we consider these estimates as an upper bound for the skill
biased externality.13
Our backcasting exercise distinguishes between six technological scenarios:
• Elasticity of substitution σ = 2
– No skill biased externality: κ = 0.000
– Skill biased externality equal to 50% of the correlation: κ = 0.107
– Skill biased externality equal to 100% of the correlation: κ = 0.214
• Elasticity of substitution σ = 3
– No skill biased externality: κ = 0.000
– Skill biased externality equal to 50% of the correlation: κ = 0.024
– Skill biased externality equal to 100% of the correlation: κ = 0.048
For each level of κ, we calibrate the scale parameter Qj to match exactly the
wage ratio in 2010. Then, for each year prior to 2010, we retrospectively predict
θj,h,t and θj,l,t using Eq. (1.6), and calibrate the TFP level Aj,t that matches
the observed GDP level using Eq. (1.2). Finally, we use Eq. (1.3) to proxy the
wage rates of each skill group.
Turning to the migration backcasts, we assume constant scale factors in the
migration technology (Vij,s,t = Vij,s,2010 ∀t). We thus assume constant net
migration costs. Plugging Vij,s,t and wage proxies into Eq. (1.1), we obtain
estimates for mij,s,t, the ratio of bilateral migrants to stayers, for all years. We
then rewrite Eq. (1.7) in a matrix format:
(
M11,s,tM22,s,t ... MJJ,s,t
)
m11,s,t m12,s,t ... m1J,s,t
m21,s,t m22,s,t ... m2J,s,t
... ... ... ...
mJ1,s,tmJ2,s,t ... mJJ,s,t
 = (L1,s,t L2,s,t ... LJ,s,t ) .
The matrices mij,s,t and Lj,s,t are known. The latter observations of past
resident populations from 1970 to 2000 are collected from the Wittgenstein
database. The only unknown matrix is that of non-migrant populations, Mjj,s,t.
We identify it by multiplying the matrix of Lj,s,t by the inverse of the matrix
of mij,s,t. Finally, when Mjj,s,t and mij,s,t are known, we use Eq. (1.1) to
predict bilateral migration stocks by education level.
Worldwide migration backcasts. – Aggregate backcasts are depicted in Figure
1.2. Figure 1.2.a compares the evolution of actual and predicted worldwide
13Estimated κ is needed because we do not observe the past levels of the skill premium.
On the contrary, our backasting methodology ignores the elasticity of TFP to the skill ratio
. From Eq. 1.2, the TFP levels, Aj,t, are calibrated to match the observed levels of GDP,
Yj,t, using data for Lj,s,t and the estimated level of θj,s,t.
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migration stocks by decade. For the 180 × 120 corridors, the (rescaled) data
gives a stock of 55 million migrants aged 25 to 64 in 1970, and of 120 million
migrants in 2010. The model almost exactly matches this evolution whatever
the technological scenario (by definition, the model perfectly matches the 2010
data). The six variants of the model cannot be visually distinguished, as the
lines almost perfectly coincide. Although technological variants drastically af-
fect within-country income disparities (in particular, the wage rate of college
graduates), they have negligible effects on aggregate migration stocks. This is
due to the fact that income disparities are mostly governed by between-country
inequality (i.e., by the TFP levels, which are calibrated under each scenario to
match the average levels of income per worker), and that the worldwide propor-
tion of college graduates is so small that changes in their migration propensity
have negligible effects on the aggregate.
Figure 1.2: Actual and predicted migrant stocks, 1970-2010 (in million)
1.2.a. Actual and predicted migrant stocks
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Considering the scenario with σ = 2 and κ = 0.214, Figure 1.2.b compares our
backcasts with counterfactual retrospective simulations. The first counterfac-
tual neutralizes demographic changes that occurred between 1970 and 2010;
it assumes that the size of the working age population is kept constant at the
2010 level in all countries. The second counterfactual neutralizes the changes
in education; it assumes that the share of college graduates is kept constant
in all countries. The third counterfactual neutralizes the changes in income
disparities; it assumes constant wage rates in all countries.
On the one hand, the simulations reveal that past changes/rises in education
marginally increased the worldwide migration stock, while the past changes/
decreases in income inequality marginally reduced it. These effects are quan-
titatively small. This is because the rise in human capital has been limited in
poor countries, and income disparities have been stable for the last fifty years
(with the exception of emerging countries). On the other hand, Figure 1.2.b
shows that demographic changes explain a large amount of the variability in
migration stocks. The stock of worldwide migrants in 1970 would have al-
most been equal to the current stocks (in fact, it would have been 2% smaller
only) if the population size of each country had been identical to the current
level. This confirms that past changes in aggregate migrant stocks were pre-
dominantly governed by population growth and demographic imbalances: the
population ratio between developing and high-income countries increased from
3.5 in 1970 to 5.5 in 2010.
Bilateral migration backcasts. – We now investigate the capacity of the model
to match the decadal distributions of immigrant stocks by destination, and
the decadal distributions of emigrant stocks by origin. Table 1.1 provides the
coefficient of correlation between our backcasts and the actual observations
aggregate at country level for each scenario and for each decade. Figure 1.3
provides a graphical visualization of the goodness of fit by comparing the ob-
served and simulated bilateral stocks of immigrants and emigrants for each
decade. By definition, as the observed past immigration stocks of all ages are
scaled to match the working-age ones in 2010, the predicted immigrant stocks
are perfectly matched in that year. Predicted emigrant stocks for 2010 do not
perfectly match observations but the correlation with observations is above
0.99. For previous years, the correlation is unsurprisingly smaller; it decreases
with the distance from the year 2010. This is because our model does neither
identify past variations in migration policies (e.g. the Schengen agreement in
the European Union, changes in the H1B visa policy in the US, the points-
system schemes in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, guest worker programs in
the Persian Gulf, etc.) nor past changes in net amenities and non-pecuniary
push/pull factors (e.g., conflicts, political unrest, etc.). The biggest gaps be-
tween the observed and predicted migration stocks recorded in our data come
from the non-consideration of the partition of Pakistan from India, the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the end of the French-Algerian war and of the Vietnam
war, the conflict between Cuba and the US. In addition, the model imperfectly
predicts the evolution of intra-EU migration, the evolution of labor mobility to
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Persian Gulf countries, the evolution of migrant stocks from developing coun-
tries to the US, Canada and Australia, and the evolution of immigration to
Israel (especially the flows of Russian Jews after the late 1980 - the so-called
Post-Soviet aliyah). Nevertheless, the scatterplots on Figure 1.3 show high
correlations between the observed and predicted bilateral migration volumes
throughout all decades. The lowest reported R-squared are 0.76 for immigrant
stocks and 0.69 for emigrant stocks in 1970. These numbers reach 0.93 and
0.90 respectively in 2000. This demonstrates that the constant Vij hypothesis
does a good job on average despite big changes in immigration policies in the
past whose restrictiveness was either increasing or decreasing.14 In the former
case, it may be that stricter entry policies have been balanced by increasing
network effects.
Table 1.1: Correlation between backcasts and actual migrant stocks
(Results by year, destination vs origin)
Techn. variants 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Immigration stock by destination
σ = 2, κ = 0.000 0.7653 0.8365 0.9409 0.9801 1.0000
σ = 2, κ = 0.107 0.7650 0.8360 0.9407 0.9801 1.0000
σ = 2, κ = 0.214 0.7649 0.8358 0.9405 0.9800 1.0000
σ = 3, κ = 0.000 0.7649 0.8359 0.9406 0.9801 1.0000
σ = 3, κ = 0.107 0.7649 0.8358 0.9406 0.9800 1.0000
σ = 3, κ = 0.214 0.7649 0.8358 0.9405 0.9800 1.0000
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Emigration stock by origin
σ = 2, κ = 0.000 0.6904 0.7716 0.8616 0.9505 0.9904
σ = 2, κ = 0.107 0.6920 0.7714 0.8612 0.9502 0.9904
σ = 2, κ = 0.214 0.6934 0.7713 0.8608 0.9498 0.9904
σ = 3, κ = 0.000 0.6928 0.7713 0.8610 0.9500 0.9904
σ = 3, κ = 0.107 0.6931 0.7713 0.8609 0.9499 0.9904
σ = 3, κ = 0.214 0.6934 0.7713 0.8608 0.9498 0.9904
As far as the technological variants are concerned, Table 1.1 confirms that they
play a negligible role. The correlation between variants is always around 0.99.
The variant with σ = 2 and no skill-biased externality marginally outperforms
the others in replicating immigrant stocks; the one with σ = 3 and with skill
biased externalities does a slightly better job in matching emigrant stocks.
14In the late 20th century from 1970 to 2000, we document both forms of tighter and
loosened immigration policies in major receiving countries. In Western Europe, the Guest
Worker program came to an end following the 1973-4’s oil crisis. While in the US, a serie
of immigration acts were introduced allowing more entry of family immigrants (the 1990
Immigration Act), legalization of illegal immigrants (the 1986 Reform and Control Act) (see
Clark et al. (2007) for an overview) before immigration policies became restrictive again after
the September 11 attacks in 2001. The third wave of immigration to the Gulf region also took
place during this period after 1971 - year of official independence of GCC countries from the
United Kingdom. Mass industrialization and modernization have led to large importation of
foreign workers.
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Hence, the backcasting exercise shows that our model does a very good job in
explaining the long term evolution of migration stocks; however, it does not
help eliminating irrelevant technological scenarios.
Figure 1.3: Comparison between actual and predicted migrant stocks, 1970-
2010
(Technological variant with σ = 2 and with skill biased externality)
Dyadic immigrant stocks (in logs) Dyadic emigrant stocks (in logs)
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Backcasts by skill group. – As historical migration data by skill group do not
exist, we use our model to backcast the global net flows of college-educated and
less educated workers between regions. We use the scenario with σ = 2 and with
full skill-biased externalities. Assuming κ is large, we may overestimate the
causal effect of the skill ratio on the skill bias. However, disregarding causation
issues, this technological scenario is the most compatible with the cross-country
correlation between human capital and the wage structure: it fits the cross-
country correlation between the skill bias and the skill ratio in the year 2010.
For each pair of countries, we compute the net flow as the difference between
the stock of migrants in 2010 and that of 1970, ∆Mij,s ≡Mij,s,2010−Mij,s,1970.
These net flows form the matrix M. On Figure 1.4, we group countries into
eight regions and use circular ideograms following Kzrywinski et al. (2009) to
highlight the major components ofM. We distinguish between Europe (in dark
blue), Western offshoots (NAM in light blue),15 the Middle East and Northern
Africa (MENA in red), sub-Saharan Africa (SSA in yellow), South and East
Asia including South and South-East Asia (SEA in pink), the former Soviet
countries (CIS in orange), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC in grey),
and Others (OTH in green). Net flows are colored according to their origin, and
their width is proportional to their size. The direction of the flow is captured
by the colors of the outside (i.e., country of origin) and inside (i.e., country of
destination) borders of the circle.
Figure 1.4.a focuses on the net flows of less educated workers. The net flow of
low-skilled immigrants equals 35.2 million over the 1970-2010 period. The ten
main regional corridors account for 79% of the total, and industrialized regions
appear 6 times as a main destination. By decreasing the order of magnitude,
they include Latin America to North America (27.6%), migration within the
South and East Asian region (13%), from MENA to Europe (6.8%), migration
between former Soviet countries (5.2%), migration within sub-Saharan Africa
(5.1%), intra-European movements (4.5%), Latin America to Europe (4.4%),
South and East Asia to Western offshoots (4.2%), Others to Europe (4.0%),
and migration between Latin American countries (4.0%). It is worth noting the
low-skilled mobility from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe is not part of the top
ten: it only represents 3.8% of the total (the 11th largest regional corridor).
Figure 1.4.b represents the net flows of college graduates. The net flow of
high-skilled immigrants equals 27.6 million over the 1970-2010 period. The
ten main regional corridors account for 74% of the total. A major difference
with the low-skilled is that industrialized regions appear 9 times as a main
destination, at least if we treat the Persian Gulf countries (as part of the MENA
region) as industrialized. By decreasing order of magnitude, the top-10 includes
South and East Asia to Western offshoots (19.8% of the total), intra-European
movements (10.7%), migration between former Soviet countries (10.5%), Latin
America to Western offshoots (9.7%), Europe to Western offshoots (6.5%),
South and East Asia to Europe (4.6%), MENA to Europe (3.3%), sub-Saharan
15These include the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
34
Chapter 1
Africa to Europe (3.2%), South and East Asia to the MENA (3.1%), and Latin
America to Europe (2.9%).
Figure 1.4: Global migration net flows, 1970-2010
(Technological variant with σ = 2 and with skill biased externality)
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Major corridors by skill group. – We now characterize the clusters of origins
and destinations that caused the greatest variations in global migration between
1970 and 2010. Using the same matrix of migration net flows as above (denoted
by M and including the J × J net flows between 1970 and 2010, ∆Mij,s), our
objective is to identify a sub-matrix with a fixed dimension o×d that maximizes
the total migration net flows (i.e., that captures the greatest fraction of the
worldwide variations in migration stocks). The Max-Sum Submatrix problem
can be defined as:
Definition 2. Given the squared matrix M ∈ RJ×J of net migration flows
between J origin and J destination countries, and given two numbers o and
d (the dimensions of the submatrix), the Max-Sum submatrix is a submatrix
(O∗, D∗) of maximal sum , with O∗ ⊆ J and D∗ ⊆ J , such that:
(O∗, D∗) =O⊆J ,D⊆J
∑
i∈O,j∈DMij . (1.8)
|O| = o and |D|= d (1.9)
where J = {1, . . . , J}.
This problem is a variant of the one introduced in Dupont et al. (2017) or Le
Van et al. (2014). The difference is that we fix the dimension of the submatrix.
It also has some similarity with the bi-clustering class of problems for which
a comprehensive review is provided in Madeira and Oliveira (2004). To solve
the Max-Sum Submatrix problem, we formulate it as a Mixed Integer Linear
Program (MILP):16
maximize
∑
i∈O,j∈DMij ×Xij , (1.10)
s.t. Xij ≤ Ri, ∀i ∈ O,∀j ∈ D , (1.11)
Xij ≤ Cj , ∀i ∈ O,∀j ∈ D , (1.12)
Xij ≥ Ri + Cj − 1, ∀i ∈ O,∀j ∈ D , (1.13)∑
i∈O Ri = o , (1.14)∑
j∈D Cj = d , (1.15)
Xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ O,∀j ∈ D , (1.16)
Ci ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ O , (1.17)
Rj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ D . (1.18)
A binary decision variable is associated to each origin-row Ri, and to each
destination-column Cj , and to each matrix entry Xij . The objective function
is computed as the sum of matrix entries whose decision variable is set to one.
Eqs. (1.11) to (1.13) enforce that variable Xi,j = 1 if and only both the row
i and column j are selected (Ri = 1 and Cj = 1). This formulation is the
standard linearization of the constraint Xij = Ri · Cj . Constraints (1.14) and
16See Nemhauser and Wolsey (1988) for an introduction to MILP.
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(1.15) enforce the o× d dimension of the submatrix to identify.
Applying the Max-Sum problem to the net flows of low-skilled migrants, we
can identify the 25 origins and the 25 destinations of the Max-Sum submatrix.
These 625 entries of the submatrix account for 64% of the worldwide net flows
of low-skilled migrants between 1970 and 2010.
• The main destinations (in alphabetical order) are: Australia, Austria, Be-
larus, Belgium, Canada, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Greece,
Hong Kong, India, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nepal, the Nether-
lands, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, the United King-
dom, the United States, and Venezuela.
• The main origins (in alphabetical order) are: Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh,
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India,
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
As far as high-skilled migrants are concerned, the set of main destinations
mostly includes high-income countries. The 625 entries of the submatrix ac-
count for 55% of the worldwide net flow of college-educated migrants between
1970 and 2010.
• The 25 main destinations (in alphabetical order) are: Australia, Austria,
Belarus, Canada, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Russia, Saudi Ara-
bia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, the United Arab
Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
• The 25 main origins (in alphabetical order) are: Algeria, Bangladesh,
Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Ro-
mania, Russia, South Korea, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
Aggregate TFP externalities. – Finally, the backcasting exercise allows calibra-
tion of the TFP level (Aj,t) for each country, for each decadal year, and for
each pair (σ, κ). We can use these calibrated TFP levels to estimate the size
of the aggregate TFP externality, . In line with Eq. (1.5), we regress the log
of TFP on the log of the skill ratio, controlling for time fixed effects (captur-
ing λt) and for country fixed effects (capturing Aj). Identifying the size of the
TFP externality is important for conducting the forecasting exercise. Results
are reported in Table 1.2. We identify a significant and positive effect when
the skill biased externality operates fully; the greatest level (0.207) is obtained
in column 1, when σ = 2 and κ = 0.214. Lower levels of  are obtained when
σ = 3 (0.105) and/or when κ increases.
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Table 1.2: Estimating  using panel regressions, 1970-2010
(Dependent = logAj,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σ = 2 σ = 2 σ = 2 σ = 3 σ = 3 σ = 3
κ = 0.000 κ = 0.107 κ = 0.214 κ = 0.000 κ = 0.024 κ = 0.048
log (Lj,h,t/Lj,l,t) 0.041 0.132
∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.063 0.085∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Constant 8.055∗∗∗ 8.493∗∗∗ 8.865∗∗∗ 8.392∗∗∗ 8.490∗∗∗ 8.568∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.254) (0.252) (0.257) (0.256) (0.255)
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.912 0.915 0.918 0.899 0.900 0.901
Nb. obs. 900 900 900 900 900 900
1.4 Forecasting
We now use the parameterized model to produce projections of migration stocks
and income disparities for the 21st century. Availability of population projec-
tion until the end of the century allows us to systematically predict migration
for that entire period. Nonetheless since the accuracy of prediction decreases
with time, we will mainly focus on interpreting results of the medium-term
forecasts (up to 2050). We first define the two socio-demographic scenarios
that feed our model; one has optimistic predictions for human capital while
the other is more pessimistic. We then describe the global trends in interna-
tional migration and income inequality involved in these two scenarios, with
a special focus on migration flows to OECD countries. We finally discuss the
policy options than can be used to curb future migration pressures.
Socio-demographic scenarios. – Our socio-demographic scenarios are drawn
from Lutz et al. (2014), who produce projections by age, sex and educa-
tion levels for all countries of the world. As human capital changes affect
the distribution of productive capacities, income inequality and the propensity
to migrate of people, we distinguish between an optimistic and a pessimistic
scenario (labeled as SSP2 and SSP3, respectively). The authors define SSP2
as a Continuation/Medium Population scenario, which is described as follows:
“this is the middle-of-the-road scenario in which trends typical of recent decades
continue, with some progress towards achieving development goals, reductions
in resource and energy intensity, and slowly decreasing fossil fuel dependency.
Development of low income countries is uneven, with some countries making
good progress, while others make less.” As for SSP3, it is defined as the Frag-
mentation/Stalled Social Development scenario, which is described as followsg:
“this scenario portrays a world separated into regions characterized by extreme
poverty, pockets of moderate wealth, and many countries struggling to maintain
living standards for rapidly growing populations. The emphasis is on security
at the expense of international development.”
The SSP2 and SSP3 scenarios involve international migration hypotheses, which
are not in line with our migration technology. To neutralize these migration
hypotheses, we use the scenario-specific projections of net immigration flows
(Ii,s,t) from Lutz et al. (2014), and we proxy the evolution of the native popu-
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lation (Ni,s,t) by education level from 2010 to 2100. In practice, the dynamics
of the resident population is governed by:
∆Li,s,t = ∆Mii,s,t + Ii,s,t,
where ∆Li,s,t = Li,s,t − Li,s,t−1 is the change in the level of the resident,
working-age population (available at each period), Ii,s,t stands for the net inflow
of working-age immigrants (i.e. immigrants minus emigrants) to country i and
for the education level s, and ∆Mii,s,t = Mii,s,t−Mii,s,t−1 stands for the change
in the number of native non-migrants.
Using official projections for ∆Li,s,t and Ii,s,t, we extract ∆Mii,s,t from this
equation. Remember that the DIOC-E database of the OECD allows us to esti-
mate the size of the native population, Ni,s,2010, and of the native non-migrant
population, Mii,s,2010, for the year 2010. We can thus recursively compute
∆Mii,s,t/Mii,s,t−1 and the level of Mii,s,t for all years after 2010. Assuming
that ∆Ni,s,t/Ni,s,t−1 = ∆Mii,s,t/Mii,s,t−1 (i.e. the growth rate of the native
population equals the growth rate of the native non-migrant population), we
then proxy the evolution of the native population for all years after 2010.
Figure 1.5 describes the two socio-demographic scenarios. Figure 1.5.a com-
pares the trajectories of the worldwide population aged 25 to 64 over the 21st
century. In the SSP2 scenario, the working-age population increases by 31%,
from 3.28 billion in 2010 to 4.29 billion in 2100. Figure 1.5.c illustrates the
evolution of the regional shares in the world population. The breakdown by
region and the choice of colors are similar to Figure 1.4, albeit slightly less
detailed for expositional convenience. The demographic share of OECD mem-
ber states decreases from 19.2 to 14.8% (-4.4 percentage points), and that of
Asia decreases from 54.6 to 40.0% (-14.6 percentage points). By contrast, the
share of sub-Saharan Africa drastically increases from 8.4 to 28.5% (+20.1
percentage points). The shares of MENA countries (+2.3 percentage points),
of Latin American countries (-1.1 percentage points), and of the rest of the
world (-2.2 percentage points) exhibit smaller variations. In the SSP3 scenario,
the working-age population increases by 90% and reaches 6.26 billion in 2100.
Figure 1.5.d shows that the demographic share of OECD member states de-
creases from 19.2 to 8.8% (-10.4 percentage points), and that of Asia decreases
from 54.6 to 45.8% (-8.8 percentage points). The share of sub-Saharan Africa
increases from 8.4 to 27.0% (+18.6 percentage points). Demographically speak-
ing, the difference between these two scenarios is mainly perceptible after the
year 2050, and concerns the shares of OECD and Asian countries.
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Figure 1.5: Socio-demographic scenarios, 2010-2100
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Figure 1.5.b compares the trajectories of the worldwide proportion of college
graduates in the working-age population. In the SSP2 scenario, this proportion
increases by 31.6 percentage points, from 14.7% in 2010 to 46.3% in 2100.
Between 1970 and 2010, the worldwide share of college graduates increased by
2.3 percentage point per year under the impetus of high-income countries; it
increased by 1.9 percentage points per year in developing countries, and by
2.1 percentage points per year in sub-Saharan Africa. For the years 2010 to
2100, SSP2 predicts a rise of 3.5 percentage point per year for the world and
for the set of developing countries, against +0.5 percentage points in Africa.
By contrast, SSP3 predicts a slight decrease in human capital for the world
and for the set of developing countries, and +1.2 per year in Africa. Figure
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1.5.e illustrates the evolution of the regional shares in the world stock of human
capital. In 2100, 40.1% of college graduates are living in the OECD member
states; this share decreases by 17.9 percentage points between 2010 and 2100.
The share of Asia increases from 36.9 to 39.9% (+3.0 percentage points), and
the share of sub-Saharan Africa drastically increases from 3.1 to 18.4% (+15.3
percentage points); the latter change is due to the rising demographic share
of Africa. In the SSP3 scenario, the proportion of college graduates decreases
slightly, from 14.7% in 2010 to 13.0% in 2100. Figure 1.5.f shows that the
human capital share of OECD member states decreases from 40.2 to 20.4%
(-19.8 percentage points). The share of Asia increases from 36.9 to 42.2%
(+5.3 percentage points). The share of sub-Saharan Africa increases from 3.1
to 13.5% (+10.4 percentage points). As far as education is concerned, the
major difference between these two scenarios is the evolution of human capital
in low-income countries in general, and in sub-Saharan Africa in particular.
Global implications. – We turn now to the implications of our two socio-
demographic scenarios for income growth, global inequality and migration pres-
sures. It is important to acknowledge the reverse impacts of migration on pop-
ulation growth in sending countries. They are however not accounted for in this
prospective paper, which takes socio-demographic scenarios as given in order to
analyze their effects on income and migration. In addition to that, the longer
the distance from 2010, the more uncertain are our projections. We can infer
the predictability of our model from the reported coefficients of determination
in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.3, which decrease with time departing from 2010 back
to the past. Moreover, our forecasts do not account for future conflict, global
warming,17 etc.. Compared to these factors that also affect migration, demog-
raphy has higher level of predictability and can be seen as the driver of natural
migration trend. Lastly, in all simulations we consider constant net migration
costs Vij,s,2010, which perform very well in backcasting past migration.
The global income and migration forecasts are depicted on Figure 1.6, which
combines the data for the period 1970-2010, and the model forecasts for the
subsequent years. We distinguish between five scenarios. In the first three
ones, we consider that socio-demographic variables are governed by SSP2, and
we combine it with the three technological variants defined in Columns (1),
(2) and (3) of Table 1.2 (i.e., σ = 2 and technological externalities equal to 0,
50 or 100% of the correlation between productivity levels and the skill ratio).
While keeping SSP2, the fourth scenario assumes σ = 3 and zero technological
externalities(as in Column (4) of Table 1.2). Finally, the fifth scenario combines
SSP3 with σ = 2 and full technological externalities (as in Column (6) of Table
1.2). In all scenarios with or without technological externalities, we assume
an exogenous increase in TFP of 1.5% per year. It is worth noticing that
under SSP3, worldwide changes in human capital are negligible; eliminating
technological externalities hardly modifies the results.
17For instance, Missirian and Schlenker (2017) show that asylum applications increased
when global temperatures rose.
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Let us first focus on income projections. Figure 1.6.a shows the evolution of
the worldwide level of GDP per worker. Under SSP3, the average GDP level
in the year 2100 is 2.4 times greater than the level observed in 2010 (i.e., a
growth rate of 1.0% per year). Under SSP2 and due to the rise in the level of
schooling, the GDP level in 2100 is 3.5 times greater than the level observed
in 2010 (i.e., a growth rate of 1.4% per year). Productivity growth is boosted
when technological externalities are factored in. Assuming externalities are
equal to 50 or 100% of the correlation, the annual growth rate reaches 1.7
and 1.9%, respectively. Finally, assuming a higher level for σ generates very
similar income projections. Figure 1.6.b describes the evolution of the Theil
index between 1970 and 2100. We combine our backcasts and forecasts, and
account for between-country inequality and within-country inequality (between
the college-educated and less educated representative workers, only). Globally,
we show that the Theil index decreases from 1970 to 2010, a phenomenon that
can be due to convergence in the productivity scale factors. Our projections
do not account for convergence forces that are not driven by human capital.
Under SSP2, the model predicts that the Theil index is constant over time, or
is increasing slightly when externalities are included. Under SSP3, we predict
a larger increase in the Theil index.
Figures 1.6.c and 1.6.d depict the evolution of the worldwide proportion of in-
ternational migrants and of the skill structure of migration. Under SSP3, the
proportion of migrants (ranging from 3.6 and 3.9%) and the share of college-
educated (around 30%) are fairly stable. By contrast, under SSP2, progress
in education makes people more mobile. Under constant migration policies,
the proportion of migrants increases from 3.6% in 2010 to 4.5% in 2050 and to
6.0% in 2100, and the share of college graduates increases from 29% in 2010 to
34% in 2050 and to 70% in 2100. It is worth noticing that in Figure 1.6.c the
important gap between the proportions of migrants in SSP2 and SSP3 does not
result from a big difference in terms of migrant volume. In 2010, the working-
age population is estimated at 3.28 billion, it will increase by 2100 to 4.29
billion according to SSP2, and more drastically to 6.26 billion following SSP3.
While using SSP2 we predict a net increase in total migrants between 2010
and 2100 of about 111 million people, this number is a little bit smaller using
SSP3 which is about 82 million. As regards the proportion of the high skill
population, it should be recalled that our backcasts reveal that past changes
in educational attainment were small in developing countries; they hardly af-
fected the trajectory of global migration (see Figure 1.2.b). SPP2 predicts large
educational changes in the coming decades, with strong implications for global
migration. Another remarkable result is that the global trends in international
migration are virtually unaffected by the technological environment; they are
totally governed by socio-demographic changes.
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Figure 1.6: Global income and migration forecasts, 2010-2100
1.6.a. World GDP per worker 1.6.b. Theil index
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We now focus on emigration and immigration rates, separately. Figure 1.6.e
depicts the evolution of emigration rates, defined as the ratio of emigrants to
natives originating from developing countries. The average emigration rate
equals 3.1% in 2010. Under SSP2, it is predicted to reach 4.1% in 2050 and
to be twice as large in the year 2100; under SSP3, it reaches 3.6% only by
the end of the century. As explained above, the emigration rate is governed
by the change in the average level of education in the developing world. Un-
der SSP2 progress in education makes people more mobile (remember college
graduates migrate more than the less educated). Under SSP3 emigration rates
remain fairly stable over time given the slower progress in education. Similar
patterns exhibit in both Figures 1.6c and 1.6e suggesting that the world pro-
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portion of migrants is shaped by emigration rates from developing countries.
Finally, Figure 1.6.f depicts the evolution of the average immigration rate of
OECD member states, defined as the proportion of foreign-born in the total
population. This proportion equals 12% in the year 2010 and it is expected
to increase drastically over the 21st century. Nevertheless, a remarkable result
is that the magnitude of the change is highly insensitive to socio-demographic
and technological scenarios. Under SSP3, emigration rates from developing
countries vary little, but population growth is large. Under the SSP2 scenario,
the rise in emigration rates is larger, but it is partly offset by the fall in the
population growth rates of developing countries. By the year 2100, the share
of immigrants reaches 27.8% under SSP2, and 24.6% under SSP3.
In Figure 1.7, we represent the net flows of low-skilled and high-skilled migrants
over the 21st century. Origin and destination regions are represented by circular
ideograms (Kzrywinski et al., 2009), and we use the same regions and colors as
in Figure 1.4. Net flows are colored according to their origin, and their width
is proportional to their size. The direction of the flow is captured by the colors
of the outside (i.e., country of origin) and inside (i.e., country of destination)
borders of the circle.
Figures 1.7.a and 1.7.b show the net flows of low-skilled migrants under the
SSP2 and SPP3 socio-demographic scenario, respectively. Under SPP2, the
total net flows amount to 32 million. The top-5 regional corridors are intra-
African migration (24.3% of the total), migration from South and East Asia
to the MENA (13.8%), migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe (13.7%),
intra-MENA migration (8.7%), and migration from Latin America to Western
offshoots (8.4%). Outflows from sub-Saharan Africa and South and East Asia
to Europe are large. Under SPP3, the total net flows amount to 60 million and
are greater for all regional corridors. Compared to Figure 1.7.a, Figure 1.7.b of
scenario SSP3 with slower growth and greater fertility rates shows large out-
flows from Latin America to North America and within African regions. The
top-5 regional corridors are Latin America to Western offshoots (16.4% of the
total), intra-African migration (15.3%), intra-MENA migration (11%), migra-
tion from South and East Asia to Western offshoots (21.1%), and migration
within South and East Asian countries (9.3%).
Figures 1.7.c and 1.7.d show the net flows of college-educated migrants under
the SSP2 and SPP3 socio-demographic scenario, respectively. Under SPP2,
the total net flows amount to 79 million. The top-5 regional corridors are
migration from South and East Asia to Western offshoots (21.1%), migration
from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe (10.2%), migration from Latin America to
Western offshoots (10.1%), migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Western off-
shoots (7.8%), and migration from South and East Asia to the MENA (6.6%).
Inflows to Western offshoots and Europe are large. Under SPP3, the total
net flow amounts to 22 million only, but the structure of worldwide migration
is similar than under SSP2. The top-5 regional corridors are migration from
South and East Asia to Western offshoots (24.2%), migration from Latin Amer-
ica to Western offshoots (11.5%), migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe
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(10.4%), migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Western offshoots (8.2%), and
intra-MENA migration (8.0%).
Implications for HI countries. – Table 1.3 provides projections of immigra-
tion rates for the main high-income, destination countries and for constant
immigration policies (remember this hypothesis performed well when produc-
ing backcasting results). Results obtained under the SSP2 socio-demographic
scenario are presented in the top panel; results obtained under SSP3 are pre-
sented in the bottom panel. In both cases, we consider the variant with σ = 2
and full technological externalities, the scenario that is the most compatible
with future educational changes.18 Under SSP2 and over the 21st century, the
proportion of immigrants increases by 21.2% in the EU15 and by 14.3% in the
United States. The greatest variations are obtained for the United Kingdom
(+35.9%) and for Canada (+35.6%). Under SSP3, the average population
growth rates are larger in developing countries, with the exception of Asia.
The proportion of immigrants increases by 24.3% in the EU15 and by 22.4%
in the United States. The greatest variations are obtained for Spain (+27%),
the United Kingdom (+26.2%) and for Canada (+29.8%). Projections for the
coming 50 years are rather insensitive to the socio-demographic scenario.
Table 1.3: Proportion of working-age immigrants by main destination
( Scenario with σ = 2 and full technological externality)
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100 ∆
SSP2, σ = 2 , full technological externalities
EU15 14.5 16.8 19.3 22.2 24.7 36.5 +21.2
France 14.7 18.0 21.0 24.0 26.2 36.5 +21.8
Germany 15.9 17.3 19.3 21.3 22.0 24.9 +9.0
Italy 10.5 11.8 13.1 14.8 15.9 18.7 +8.2
Spain 14.9 16.8 19.2 22.0 25.2 29.9 +15.0
United Kingdom 16.5 19.9 24.2 28.8 32.8 52.3 +35.9
Switzerland 31.4 33.2 35.7 38.8 40.7 51.0 +19.6
United States 17.7 20.4 23.3 25.2 26.7 31.9 +14.3
Canada 24.5 29.4 35.3 40.1 44.3 60.0 +35.6
Australia 28.7 31.2 33.8 36.3 38.4 48.2 +19.4
OECD 11.9 13.7 15.5 17.4 19.2 27.5 +15.6
SSP3, σ = 2 , full technological externalities
EU15 14.5 16.4 18.4 20.7 22.8 38.9 +24.3
France 14.7 17.4 19.4 21.2 22.7 36.3 +22.2
Germany 15.9 17.3 19.3 21.5 23.2 40.0 +24.1
Italy 10.5 11.8 13.2 15.2 17.3 32.1 +21.6
Spain 14.9 16.6 18.7 21.4 25.2 41.9 +27.0
United Kingdom 16.5 18.6 21.3 23.4 25.5 43.6 +26.2
Switzerland 31.4 32.5 34.1 36.1 37.3 49.7 +18.4
United States 17.7 19.8 22.2 23.5 25.3 40.1 +22.4
Canada 24.5 27.4 31.2 33.5 35.7 54.2 +29.8
Australia 28.7 29.9 31.4 32.4 33.5 47.0 +18.2
OECD 11.9 13.3 14.6 15.7 16.9 24.6 +12.7
18Very similar results are obtained when technological externalities are zero, as shown in
Table 1.A1 in the Appendix.
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In line with Hanson and McIntosh (2016) or with Docquier and Machado
(2007), future migration pressures mainly affect European countries, and are
mostly due to rising migration flows from developing countries. To illustrate
this, we use the same Max-Sum Submatrix algorithm as in the previous sec-
tion, and apply it to the matrix of total migration net flows from developing
countries to the 27 members of the European Union between 2010 and 2060;
projections for subsequent years are more uncertain and scenario-sensitive. For
each socio-demographic scenario, we identify the sub-matrix with a fixed di-
mension of 25× 10 that maximizes the total migration net flows.
Under the SSP2 scenario, we obtain the following results (in alphabetical or-
der):
• Main destination countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
• Main countries of origin: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Cameroon,
Dem. Rep. of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya,
Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines,
Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
And under the SSP3 scenario, we have (by alphabetical order):
• Main destination countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
• Main countries of origin: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Bo-
livia, Colombia, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Ghana,
India, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, Turkey, and Uganda.
Under SSP2, migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa and from the MENA
play a key role, as well as the flows from a few Asian countries with large
populations. As the majority of African migrants go to Europe, the EU15
experience greater migration pressures. Under SSP3, this change is mostly
due to immigration from Africa, although the magnitude of this phenomenon
is smaller than under SSP2. However, migration pressures from Asia, from
MENA, and from some Latin American countries are stronger. Clearly, there is
a large intersection of 9 destination countries (see countries in italics above) that
are all member states of the EU15, and for which future migration pressures
are expected to be strong, whatever the socio-demographic scenario for the
coming half century. And there is large intersection of 20 developing countries
(in italics above) that are responsible for such migration pressures, including
sub-Saharan African countries, the MENA countries, and a few Asian countries.
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Figure 1.7: Global migration net flows, 2010-2100
(Technological variant with σ = 2 and with technological externalities)
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The case for Migration Compacts. – In line with the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (United
Nations, 2016), the European Commission has outlined a general line of ac-
tion to cope with the global challenge of future migration (see the European
Agenda on Migration and the new Partnership Framework on Migration). Mi-
gration Compacts have been designed for Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Niger,
Mali, Senegal, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Ethiopia as of 2017; they can also
be implemented in other partner countries. They include a set of measures
to be implemented in the home country, targeting the reinforcement of border
controls, the readmission of migrants who have been denied entry, or a higher
level of economic development. Readmission and border control strategies are
difficult to implement in fragile states. Under the European Migration Com-
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pacts, an investment plan has also been proposed to stimulate employment
opportunities and income in Africa, in the hope of reducing migration pres-
sures. The effectiveness of these Migration Compacts depends on the resources
allocated to their implementation (in comparison to the development targets
to be reached), and on the effectiveness of the measures undertaken.
To illustrate the difficulty curbing future migration pressure, we consider the
intersection of 20 developing countries emerging from our Max-Sum Submatrix
problem (referred to as Compact 1 ),19 or the combined region of sub-Saharan
African and the MENA countries (referred to as Compact 2 ). We consider
these sets of countries as potential partners of a Migration Compact, and we
quantify the homothetic change in TFP (above normal trend) and derive the
consequent GDP annual growth rates required to keep their total emigration
stocks to Europe at their levels of 2010. Our simulations account for all general
equilibrium effects.
Table 1.4 provides the results of these policy experiments, taking the population
size and structure as given. Our discussion mainly focuses on net migration
flows in the next two decades, the period for which socio-demographic variations
between SPP2 and SPP3 are smaller and less likely to be affected by the TFP
changes. In other words, this consideration partially mitigates the issue that
fertility and human capital are endogenously affected by income, which our
model does not account for. Indeed, if TFP and GDP start increasing from 2010
onwards, population growth rates and the skill composition of the labor force
will be gradually impacted. Results obtained for 2030 and after (essentially
beyond one generation) are likely to overestimate the requested changes and
should be treated with more caution.
Under the SSP2 socio-demographic scenario, keeping the stock of the 20 main
origin countries (Compact 1 ) at its level of 2010 requires TFP to increase by
58% in 2020 and by 128% in 2030, compared to the baseline. Under the SSP3
scenario, the required TFP changes amount to 49% in 2020 and by 99% in
2030. Overall, this means multiplying GDP per capita by 2 above the normal
trend over the next two decades. Equivalently, this requires a TFP growth rate
of 5% per year under SPP2 (instead of 1.5% a year in the baseline), and a TFP
growth rate of 4.2% a year under SPP3. In terms of GDP growth, the required
levels are on average twice as high as the baseline levels; in all variants, the
requested annual GDP growth rate is close to 10%. Implementing Migration
Compacts with all sub-Saharan African and MENA countries (Compact 2 )
requires similar changes in TFP and gives rise to similar effects.20
19These include Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Cote
d’Ivoire, Ghana, India, Iraq, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philip-
pines, Senegal, Somalia, Turkey, and Uganda.
20We have also conducted another set of simulations (Compact 3 ) keeping constant the
total emigration stocks of sub-Saharan African countries only. The resulting required TFP
growth rates are much higher than the ones in Compact 2 where growth is fostered in both the
MENA and SSA regions. This shows the capacity of the MENA countries to absorb migrants
from SSA. Thus smaller but simultaneous investment in both regions is recommended to keep
immigration rates in Europe at constant levels.
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Takeoffs of this nature have rarely been observed in the course of history.21
They basically require all SSA and MENA countries to enter the “modern
growth club” during the 21st century. Based on facts from the 19th and 20th
centuries, Benetrix et al. (2015) estimate that joining the club requires an
annual GDP growth rate above 5% over a period of ten years; Jones and Romer
(2010) argue that higher threshold growth rates are needed in the current
period. Still, “explosive-growth” episodes were indeed recently observed in
emerging countries. Taiwan multiplied its income per capita by 5 between
1980 and 2000, and South Korea multiplied it by 7.5 over the same period;
China has increased its income level tenfold since 1990 with an average GDP
growth rate of 8% per year. Similar takeoffs have not been observed in sub-
Saharan Africa. However, Rwanda, which is usually seen as one of the fastest
growing economies in Africa, has increased its income per capita threefold since
the genocide.
Table 1.4: Development policies to limit migration pressures
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2100
I. Socio-demographic scenario: SSP2
Baseline immigration rate to EU15 14.6 16.8 19.3 22.2 24.7 26.8 35.8
Compacts 1 I.a. 20 main origin countries
TFP change: Aj,t/A
Base
j,t 1.00 1.58 2.28 3.19 4.18 5.24 9.73
New immigration rate EU15 14.6 15.6 16.9 18.5 19.5 20.4 24.9
Mean annual GDP growth over decade (Base) 5.17 5.00 4.82 4.58 4.33 3.48
Mean annual GDP growth over decade 10.28 9.59 9.11 8.54 7.99 6.25
Compacts 2 I.b. All sub-Saharan Africa and MENA
TFP change: Aj,t/A
Base
j,t 1.00 1.58 2.28 3.24 4.30 5.51 11.81
New immigration rate EU15 14.6 15.6 16.9 18.3 19.3 20.0 22.6
Mean annual GDP growth over decade (Base) 5.06 4.85 4.67 4.42 4.16 3.34
Mean annual GDP growth over decade 10.22 9.47 9.05 8.48 7.95 6.37
II. Socio-demographic scenario: SSP3
Baseline immigration rate to EU15 14.6 16.4 18.4 20.7 22.8 25.3 38.9
Compacts 1 II.a. 20 main origin countries
TFP change: Aj,t/A
Base
j,t 1.00 1.49 1.99 2.51 3.06 3.67 6.40
New immigration rate EU15 14.6 15.4 16.5 17.7 18.8 20.1 28.1
Mean annual GDP growth over decade (Base) 4.54 4.36 4.17 4.01 3.86 3.3
Mean annual GDP growth over decade 8.95 8.15 7.53 7.05 6.68 5.51
Compacts 2 II.b. All sub-Saharan Africa and MENA
TFP change: Aj,t/A
Base
j,t 1.00 1.49 1.97 2.48 2.99 3.54 5.89
New immigration rate EU15 14.6 15.4 16.5 17.7 18.8 20.2 28.8
Mean annual GDP growth over decade (Base) 4.51 4.25 4.05 3.85 3.67 3.1
Mean annual GDP growth over decade 8.95 8 7.38 6.84 6.42 5.22
Sustaining TFP growth rates of 4 to 5% or real GDP growth rates of 8 to 10%
per year on the spatial scale of a continent and over several decades is unprece-
dented. So far, development policies have not triggered such resounding and
generalized economic booms. Hence, dramatic changes in the effectiveness of
aid are needed if policymakers want to use development tools to reduce mi-
gration pressures (Berthelemy et al. 2009; Berthelemy and Maurel 2010; Gary
and Maurel 2015). In addition, generating these booms in SSA and MENA
would only attenuate migration pressures to Europe, but would not eliminate
them since migration pressures from other countries and regions would still be
observed. Table 1.4 shows that the EU15 immigration rate in 2060 would be
around 20% in all scenarios, compared to 14.6% in 2010. Reinforcing immi-
gration restrictions is another complementary policy avenue. However, it is a
21This was even the case during the Industrial Revolution. Between 1820 and 1900, GDP
per capita rose 2.5 times in Western Europe, and 3.3 fold in the United States (Maddison,
2007). In other words, growth rates were 1.2 and 1.5% a year, respectively.
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priori unclear whether changes in laws and policies can significantly affect the
size of immigration flows. Past restrictions on migration have not prevented
third-country nationals from moving in past decades (it may be recalled that
our backcasts with constant Vij,s,t fit well past migration flows), and have
caused displacements and increasing flows of irregular migrants. Over the 21st
century, increasing migration seems to be an inevitable phenomenon, which
raises important challenges in terms of policy coherence for most industrialized
countries.
1.5 Conclusion
The number of asylum applications lodged in 2015 in EU Member States ex-
ceeded 1.3 million, putting migration policy in the forefront of the global policy
debate. While the proximate cause of the current crisis is the conflict and po-
litical unrest in the Middle East and Africa, the recent trends and forecasts for
the world economy strongly suggest that there may be further episodes of large-
scale migration in the near future, in Europe and in other OECD countries.
Specifically, the underlying root causes of increased migration (demographic
imbalances, economic inequality, increased globalization, political instability,
climatic changes) are all projected to exert a stronger influence in the coming
decades.
Relying on socio-demographic and technological scenarios, this paper produces
integrated backcasts and forecasts of income and bilateral migration stocks
for all pairs of countries. Our model fits very well the trends in international
migration of the last 40 years, and demonstrates that historical trends were
mostly governed by demographic changes. Turning to the migration prospects
for the 21st century, we also find that world migration prospects are mainly
governed by socio-demographic changes; they are virtually insensitive to the
technological environment. We predict a highly robust increase in immigra-
tion pressures in general, and in European immigration in particular. These
migration pressures are mostly explained by the demographic changes in sub-
Saharan Africa and in the MENA countries. Curbing them with development
policies requires triggering unprecedented economic booms in many developing
countries. More than ever, improving the management of migration flows and
the coherence between development and migration policies will represent major
challenges for European countries in the 21st century.
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1.6 Appendix
Table 1.A1: Proportion of working-age immigrants by main destination
( Scenario with σ = 2 and no technological externality)
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100 ∆
SSP2, σ = 2, no externality
EU15 14.5 16.7 19.1 21.9 24.2 34.8 +20.2
France 14.7 17.8 20.6 23.2 25.2 34.8 +20.1
Germany 15.9 17.3 19.2 21.2 22.0 25.1 +9.2
Italy 10.5 11.7 12.9 14.6 15.6 18.2 +7.7
Spain 14.9 16.7 18.9 21.4 24.4 28.8 +13.9
United Kingdom 16.5 19.8 24.0 28.4 32.2 51.0 +34.6
Switzerland 31.4 33.3 35.7 38.8 40.8 50.9 +19.5
United States 17.7 20.6 23.6 25.6 27.4 33.5 +15.9
Canada 24.5 29.4 35.2 40.0 44.1 60.5 +36.0
Australia 28.7 31.1 33.7 36.1 38.2 47.9 +19.2
OECD 11.9 13.7 15.5 14.4 19.2 27.8 +15.8
SSP3, σ = 2, no externality
EU15 14.5 16.3 18.3 20.5 22.6 38.6 +24.0
France 14.7 17.4 19.4 21.2 22.7 36.3 +21.6
Germany 15.9 17.3 19.2 21.4 23.1 40.2 +24.3
Italy 10.5 11.8 13.2 15.3 17.3 32.1 +21.6
Spain 14.9 16.5 18.6 21.3 25.1 41.9 +27.0
United Kingdom 16.5 18.6 21.1 23.3 25.2 42.7 +26.2
Switzerland 31.4 32.6 34.2 36.2 37.4 49.6 +18.3
United States 17.7 20.0 22.4 23.7 25.5 40.4 +22.7
Canada 24.5 27.4 31.3 33.6 35.8 54.1 +29.7
Australia 28.7 29.9 31.4 32.4 33.4 46.6 +17.9
OECD 11.9 13.3 14.6 15.7 17.0 24.6 +12.7
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Migration and
Development: Dissecting
the Anatomy of the
Mobility Transition
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Abstract1
Emigration first increases and then decreases as a country experiences eco-
nomic development. This inverted U-shaped, cross-sectional relationship be-
tween emigration and development was first hypothesized by Zelinsky’s theory
of the mobility transition. Although several mechanisms have been proposed to
explain the upward segment of the curve (the most common being the existence
of financial constraints), they have not been examined in a systematic way. In
this paper, we propose two decomposition methods to disentangle the main
drivers of the mobility transition curve to OECD destination countries. Our
simple decompositions shed light on the role of both microeconomic drivers
(i.e., financial incentives and constraints) and macroeconomic drivers, as well
as the skill composition of the population. Our double decomposition further
distinguishes between migration aspirations and realization rates by education
level. Overall, we provide consistent evidence that the role of financial con-
straints, while relevant for the poorest countries, is limited. Rather, a large
fraction of the increasing segment is explained by the skill composition and by
macroeconomic drivers (i.e., by factors that do not change in the short-run).
JEL codes: F22, O15.
Keywords: Migration, Development, Human Capital, Credit Constraints.
1This is a joint work with Fre´de´ric Docquier, Christopher Parsons and Giovanni Peri.
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Studies for providing data access. I acknowledge financial support from the European Com-
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work. We thank the participants at the Australian Development Economics Workshop 2016,
the 9th International Conference on Migration and Development 2016, the 2016 Ifo CEMIR
Junior Economist Workshop on Migration Research, the 2016 NOVAFRICA Workshop on
Migration and Development and the 91st Annual Conference of the Western Economics As-
sociation 2016, for useful and timely comments.
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2.1 Introduction
Traditional neoclassical models of migration posit that narrowing wage gaps
between country pairs monotonically reduce migration along specific corridors.
In reality, we instead observe an inverted-U shaped relationship between migra-
tion and development in cross-sectional data. Since the seminal work of Zelin-
sky (1971), this is most commonly referred to as the mobility transition curve.
Contrary to the neoclassical predictions therefore, economic development seems
to produce additional emigration from origin countries in early stages of de-
velopment (see de Haas 2007, 2010a, 2010b) as shown in Figure 2.a.2 Adults’
emigration rates to the OECD destination countries increase with economic
development up to a level of income per capita around $6,000 and decrease
thereafter. Figure 2.b shows the density of the world population according to
income per capita. Approximately two thirds of the world population reside
in countries with income per capita levels below $6,000. Taken at face value
therefore, the mobility transition curve suggests that further global economic
development will result in higher volumes of international migration from the
poorest regions of the world. It is no surprise that co-development policies,
those founded on neoclassical principles, have largely proven unsuccessful (see
Clemens 2014; Parsons and Winters 2014).
While various explanations of the observed relationship have been conjectured
in specific contexts — the most common being the existence of credit con-
straints preventing potential migrants in poorer countries from realizing their
aspirations — they have not been examined in a systematic way. Our under-
standing of the underlying mechanisms at play therefore, in addition to the
potential consequences of changes in policies or in the distribution of world
income on international migration remains limited. As argued by Clemens
(2014), “We do not know enough about the mechanisms that create this ob-
served pattern. Theories of the transition are well-developed, though they could
benefit from more formalization and unification in a single framework that can
explain patterns observed at both the macro- and micro-levels.”
This paper focuses on migration flows to OECD countries, which host about
50% of the worldwide adult migrant stock (Artuc¸ et al. 2015); the destination
countries for which the dyadic and skill structures of migration are measured
with the greatest precision.3 We propose a simple methodology to evaluate the
competing theories that are hypothesized to underpin the upward segment of
the observed inverted-U relationship, which consists of three steps. In the first
step, we decompose average emigration rates into several additive components
and investigate the correlations between them and income per capita. We begin
with a simple decomposition that identifies the role of education, to shed light
2Net emigration rates are proxied by changes in emigrant stocks between 2000 and 2010
as a percentage of the resident population in 2000.
3In Appendix A, Figure 2.A1 shows that the inverted-U mobility transition curve also
holds when considering 70 destination countries (33 OECD member states and 37 non-OECD
destination countries) for which data by education level are available in the years 2000 and
2010.
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on the correlation between income per capita, the skill structure of the pop-
ulation and skill-specific emigration rates. We subsequently propose a double
decomposition that instead distinguishes between bilateral migration aspira-
tions and realization rates by education level. In the second step, we estimate
regressions to disentangle the effects of both microeconomic and macroeconomic
drivers of each additive component. Our microeconomic determinants capture
the private incentives to migrate, as well as financial constraints that curb mi-
gration decisions. Our macroeconomic determinants comprise origin-specific
and dyadic migration determinants as identified in the existing literature (i.e.,
socio-demographic and gravity variables as well as migrant networks). Con-
trolling for macroeconomic drivers, we consider the residual effect of income
to reasonably provide an upper-bound of the roles of financial incentives and
constraints. In the third step, we bring together our previous findings and
quantify the role of each driver in explaining the changing slope of the mobility
transition curve at differing levels of income.
Our paper contributes to a 45 year-old literature on the link between migration
and development. Wilbur Zelinsky in his seminal paper (Zelinsky, 1971), devel-
oped the theory of the mobility transition. This descriptive theory, combining
insights from modernization theory and demographic transition analysis, hy-
pothesizes that societies pass through five distinct phases of development, from
pre-modern traditional societies to future super-advanced societies, which are
accompanied by various forms of internal and international migration. The the-
ory predicts an inverted U-shaped relationship between average emigrate rates
and levels of income per capita. This relationship, which we term the mobility
transition curve, has since been established empirically in differing contexts and
variously referred to as: migration curve (Akerman, 1976)), migration transi-
tion (Gould, 1979), migration hump (Martin, 1993), and emigration life cycle
(Hatton and Williamson, 1994). The mobility transition curve has most re-
cently been identified in panel data. Using aggregate stock data for the years
1960 to 2000, Clemens (2014) shows that emigration increases with economic
development at origin until a level of development commensurate with a per
capita income of around $5,000 in PPP terms, while falling thereafter.4
4Clemens (2014) investigates emigration to all destinations, including non-OECD coun-
tries. Comparisons between decades reveal that the $5,000 turning point has only slightly
increased over time. In Appendix A, Figure 2.A1 shows that the turning point corresponds
to a greater level of income when restricting the set of destinations to the OECD member
states.
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Figure 2.1: Emigration rates and development
2.1.a. Nonparametric regressions of emigration rates on income per capita
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2.1.b. Density of the world population by income per capita level
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rates, countries in conflict, country pairs with negative net flows, and country pairs with
realization rates equal to 0 or 1 (see Section 2.3). Average migration rates are calculated
as the difference between migrant stocks in 2000 and 2010, normalized by the population at
origin. The migration data derive from the OECD-DIOC database. Data on GDP per capita
at PPP in 2000 are taken from the Penn World Tables 7.0. Population data in 2000 are
provided by the UN-DESA World Population Prospects 2012.
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The inverted U-shaped relationship between emigration and development as
identified in the data, is not predicted by neoclassical models of migration.
Building upon Sjaastad (1962), this class of models places wage or income
differentials at the heart of rational agents’ decision as to whether to remain
at home or migrate elsewhere. Neoclassical models of migration therefore un-
ambiguously predict that narrowing income differentials between origins and
destinations will (monotonically) reduce the intensity of international migra-
tion. In the neoclassical tradition however, the interplay between incentives
to emigrate and financial constraints, which we term microeconomic drivers
henceforth, can give rise to the mobility transition curve. Increases in per-
sonal income make migration more affordable, while simultaneously reducing
individual’s willingness to migrate. Credit constraints have therefore been pro-
posed as an explanation to the paradox wherein emigration from low-income
regions, those in which many citizens would benefit the most from emigrating
to higher-income regions, is limited.5 There is ample historical evidence of
the role of financial constraints in the 18th and 19th centuries (Hatton and
Williamson, 1994; Hatton and Williamson, 1998; Faini and Venturini, 2010;
Covarrubias et al., 2015). More recently, Bazzi (2013) provides evidence that
financial constraints limit international labor mobility, such that positive agri-
cultural income shocks result in significant increases in international migra-
tion, particularly among villages with higher numbers of small landholders.
Both mechanisms, emigration incentives and constraints (or aspirations and
capabilities), are correlated with income however and are therefore difficult to
disentangle from each other.
Aside from microeconomic drivers, economists and geographers have, for almost
half a century, proposed a number of complementary theories aimed at explain-
ing the observed relationship between emigration and economic development.
A recent survey (Clemens, 2014), lists five alternative classes of theory. (i)
Demographic transitions may result in more youthful and economically-active
populations, which might result in more emigration should they fail to be ab-
sorbed locally into the labor force (see Lee, 2003). (ii) Immigration barriers
abroad, for example visas, are typically lower for citizens of wealthier nations
and for high-skilled workers, meaning that they are more migratory than their
lower-skilled compatriots. Education may stimulate migration aspirations of
potential migrants, while selective immigration policies at destination favor
educated migrants. The impact of development on the skill composition of
migration remains ambiguous however. At early stages of development, im-
provements in education likely increase the success rate of potential migrants.
Since education quality is endogenous with economic development however,
further educational improvements likely reduce potential migrants’ willingness
to move, an effect that is likely compounded by the narrowing educational
gaps between origins and potential destinations. (iii) Within-country income
inequality, since during initial stages of development that are characterized by
5Similarly, de Haas (2010b), proposes to incorporate the notions of agency and individual
aspirations into transition theory, by conceptualizing migration at the microeconomic level
as a function of aspirations (as characterized by an inverted U-shaped relationship) and
capabilities (that increase monotonically with development).
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rising inequality, worse-off individuals feel relatively deprived and seek alter-
native ‘reference’ frames. (iv) Structural transformation due to for example
trade linkages that emerge in parallel with the formation of transportation and
communication networks that may facilitate mobility (see Massey et al., 1993;
Martin and Taylor, 1996; Faini and Venturini, 2010). (v) Information asym-
metry whereby migrants for example, having settled, may provide information
and send remittances to potential migrants thereby reducing migration costs
(see Beine et al., 2010 and 2011).
Another plausible theoretical underpinning for the mobility transition curve
arises from ‘gravity’ or geographic variables that may capture both economic
development and migration costs. Such a mechanism has been understudied
in the literature in this context. Distance from the equator is correlated both
with levels of development (lowest for countries near the equator) and with the
ease of migrating to rich countries (mostly located at the higher latitudes of
each hemisphere). Thus gravity may explain why emigration rates and eco-
nomic development are positively correlated, without implying a causal effect
of development on emigration. Importantly therefore, the roles of both ge-
ography and culture, which jointly affect both migration costs and economic
development need to be accounted for (see Gallup et al., 1999).
This paper is the first to quantify the competing mechanisms that underpin
the mobility transition. We dissect the anatomy of the mobility transition by
simultaneously incorporating all relevant macroeconomic and microeconomic
mechanisms into our empirical model. Distinguishing between skill groups
proves key, since emigration rates differ enormously between skill groups and
many of the underlying mechanisms affect individuals of various educational at-
tainments differently.6 Our simple and double decomposition exercises reveal
consistent results. In particular, we find that microeconomic drivers, while
relevant for the poorest countries, have only limited power in explaining the
upward sloping part of the transition curve. In countries with income per capita
levels below $1,500, financial constraints are the major mechanism preventing
low-skilled workers from realizing their migration aspirations. Nevertheless,
these countries exhibit low emigration rates and only account for less than
10% of the world labor force. In countries with income per capita levels be-
tween $1,500 and $6,000 (representing about 60% of the world population),
the effect of financial constraints is much smaller. The upward segment of the
mobility transition curve is mostly explained by the changing skill composition
of working-age populations at origin in addition to macroeconomic drivers (i.e.,
network size and gravity drivers) that are constant or else adjust very slowly.
In other words, by factors that do not change in the short-run. This suggests
that a rise in income is unlikely to induce large emigration pressures in the
short term (i.e., for a given size and skill structure of the population, and for a
given socio-demographic environment). In the long-run however, a permanent
6For example, greater inequality in less developed nations, strongly affects the incentives
and financial capabilities of less educated individuals. Alternatively, the effect of migrant
networks on migration costs has been shown to be greater for the low-skilled (as shown in
Beine et al., 2010 and 2011).
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rise in income, relaxes other financial constraints and affects other behaviors.
In particular, it increases the share of college graduates and reduces population
growth. Hence, an increase in permanent income induces uncertain effects with
regards the magnitude of emigration stocks, but unambiguously increases the
education level of future migrants.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes our
data and provides aggregate stylized facts on various components of the mobil-
ity transition. In Section 2.3, we describe our simple decomposition method and
highlight the roles of skill-specific emigration rates and of the skill composition
of the working-age population. In Section 2.4, we use a double decomposition
method, relying on proxies for migration aspirations and realization rates by
education level. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data and stylized facts
To disentangle the various potential drivers of the mobility transition curve (as
detailed in the previous section), we construct measures of migration intensity
to OECD member states, by education level, from 123 origin countries, over
the 2000-2010 period. We further distinguish between actual and potential
migration intensities. Actual migrants are those who have left their country of
origin. Potential migrants include those who have left (i.e., actual migrants) in
addition to those who have not yet migrated but express a desire to do so. We
consider potential migration intensity as a proxy for migration aspirations. The
ratio of actual to potential migration, which we term the realization rate, is
used as proxy for the capacity of potential migrants to realize their aspirations.
In this section we describe the data sources used to compute our migration
intensity measures, provide some aggregate stylized facts and discuss some
limitations of the data.
2.2.1 Migration by education level
Data on actual migration flows over the 2000-2010 period are derived from the
Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC ), for the 2000 and 2010
census rounds. The DIOC database documents bilateral migration stocks by
education level from all countries of origin (i = 1, ..., I) to OECD destinations
(j = 1, ..., J). Data from the 2010 census round are described in Arslan et al.
(2014), while the corresponding data for 2000 are presented in OECD (2008).7
We only consider migrants aged 25 and above (as a proxy for the working-age
7It is not possible to conduct our analysis using panel data due to the lack of an education
dimension in the available migration data. Using data on population by skill level would result
in difficulties separating out compositional effects (whereby more educated individuals are
more able to migrate) from incentive effects (in which potential migrants’ desire to move are
a function of the prevailing level of development at origin). Furthermore, any panel study
would need to account for the endogeneity between acquiring education and the prospect of
migration, what is known as the brain gain effect.
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population) and distinguish between migrants with college education (denoted
by h and referred to as the highly skilled) and those with lower levels of edu-
cation (denoted by l and referred to as the low-skilled). For each country pair,
net migration flows are proxied as the difference between the bilateral migrant
stocks in 2000 and 2010. We denote the net flow of migrants from country
i to country j of education level s = (h, l) as Msij . Aggregating these num-
bers across OECD destinations allows us to characterize the size and structure
of net emigration flows to the OECD from all the countries of the world i.e.
M
s
i =
∑
jM
s
ij .
To compute actual migration intensities, we divide our net migration flows by
the resident population at origin in 2000. This requires data on the number
and average education levels of working-age residents (proxied by the resident
population aged 25 and above, which corresponds with our migration data) in
each sending country in our sample. This variable, denoted by Nsi , is taken
from Artuc¸ et al. (2015), which proxies the size of the native population in
country i from which we can extract the proportion of college graduates (σli)
and less educated natives (σli). By definition, we have σ
l
i + σ
h
i = 1. Actual
migration intensities can be measured as msij ≡ Msij/Nsi at the bilateral level,
and as msi ≡ M
s
i/N
s
i on the aggregate. It follows that the average emigration
rate of each sending country is defined as:
mi ≡ σhi mhi + σlimli. (2.1)
Existing studies of the mobility transition curve have identified the cross-
sectional relationship between mi and the level of development at origin, prox-
ied by the log of income per capita (yi). Figures 2.2.a and 2.2.b show the rela-
tionships between each component of Eq. (2.1) and the log level of GDP per
capita in US dollars (y). We consider a sample of 123 countries, excluding small
states with populations below 2.5 million inhabitants, as well as those experi-
encing episodes of conflict. The results are obtained using the non-parametric
Epanechnikov kernel density estimation (see Epanechnikov, 1969).
The skill composition of the population (σs) varies with economic develop-
ment, possibly reflecting the existence of credit constraints that go beyond the
capacity of individuals to finance migration costs. As shown in Figure 2.2.a.,
the share of college graduates in the native population σh rises constantly with
development. This share is 20 times larger in the richest relative to the poorest
countries. In addition, migration rates are always greater among college grad-
uates (mh) than among the less educated (ml), as depicted in Figure 2.2.b. At
low levels of income per capita, positive selection is strong (mh ' 30ml). In
the richest countries, positive selection is much weaker (mh ' 3ml). Hence,
education levels, taken in isolation, likely prove crucial in understanding the
foundations of the mobility transition curve, since the hypothesized drivers
likely affect the mobility of low-skilled and high-skilled individuals differently.
Overall, the college-educated emigration rates
(
mh
)
decrease with develop-
ment, while those of the less-educated
(
ml
)
follow an inverted U-shape.
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2.2.2 Aspirations and realization rates
Our simple decomposition by education level allows us to examine how the
skill composition of the native population affects the mobility transition curve.
In a complementary double-decomposition analysis, we further distinguish be-
tween actual and potential migrants, which enables us to identify the effect
of economic development on migration aspirations and realization rates. We
rely upon the Gallup World Poll surveys, which identify the proportion of non-
migrants expressing a desire to emigrate to another country. The Gallup survey
has been canvassing opinions annually in more than 150 countries over the last
ten years. As well as documenting various individual characteristics (such as
age, gender and education), these surveys also include two relevant questions
on emigration intentions. These questions, posed in 142 countries that rep-
resent about 97% of the world population, were: (i) Ideally, if you had the
opportunity, would you like to move to another country, or would you prefer to
continue living in this country? (ii) To which country would you like to move?
In line with our migration and population data, we only consider Gallup re-
spondents aged 25 and above and distinguish between individuals with college
education or otherwise. We aggregate four waves of the Gallup survey (i.e.,
the years 2007 to 2010) and consider that these four waves represent a sin-
gle observation period. Using (year-specific) sample weights, we compute the
weighted number of respondents to question (i) and the weighted number of
respondents who answered positively to the same question. We then compute
the stock of aspiring migrants by multiplying the 2010 population aged 25 and
over, in origin countries, by the average proportion of individuals answering in
the affirmative to question (i). These aspiring migrants would have increased
the 2000-2010 net flow of actual migrants should they had been given the op-
portunity to emigrate therefore (as in Docquier et al. 2014, and Docquier et
al. 2015). We then use responses to question (ii) to disaggregate the number
of desiring migrants by country of destination. About 10 percent of desiring
migrants failed to mention a desired destination however and these are ignored
then we compute our dyadic shares.
Adding aspiring migrants to actual migration flows, we define the concept of
potential migration flows P sij , i.e. the total migration flows that would have
been observed between 2000 and 2010 if all aspiring migrants had been able
or allowed to emigrate. Aggregating bilateral stocks give P
s
i =
∑
j P
s
ij . Thus,
potential migration intensities, which captures emigration aspirations, can be
measured as psij ≡ P sij/Nsi at the bilateral level and as psi ≡ P
s
i/N
s
i on the
aggregate. For reasons that will be explored later, aspiring migrants can fail to
realize their aspirations, such that we define bilateral and aggregate realization
rates as rsij ≡ msij/psij and rsi ≡ msi/psi . Our decomposition of emigration
rates by skill level, allows us to investigate whether the effect of economic
development on emigration is skill specific and whether it is driven by migration
aspirations or else by realization rates.
The databases described above allow us to differentiate emigration rates by skill
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level and to further distinguish between migration aspirations and realization
rates. The average emigration rate of country i (i = 1, ..., I) can be decomposed
as:
mi = σ
h
i p
h
i r
h
i + σ
l
ip
l
ir
l
i (2.2)
where psi is the proportion of potential migrants in the skill-s population and
rsi is the average realization rate. The product of these two variables gives the
proportion of natives who have realized their migration aspirations (i.e., msi ).
This corresponds to the observed migration rates by skill groups in Eq. (2.1).
Figures 2.2.c and 2.2.d show the relationships between ps, rs, and the log
of GDP per capita in US dollars (y); when considering the same sample of
123 countries and implementing non-parametric Epanechnikov kernel density
estimations (see Epanechnikov, 1969). Figure 2.2.c. shows that migration aspi-
rations decrease with development for both college-educated and less educated
individuals.8 We observe a positive selection in migration aspirations, but this
selection is much weaker when compared to actual migration. At low levels of
development, the average willingness to migrate among the highly-educated is
greater by a factor of four, when compared to the lower-skilled
(
ph ' 4pl). In
the richest countries, the ratio falls to one and a half
(
ph ' 1.5pl). Figure 2.2.d.
describes the relationship between income per capita and the realization rates
of college graduates
(
rhi
)
and the less-educated
(
rli
)
. Overall, the realization
rate of the high-skilled slightly decreases with development. Its slope is not as
sharp as that of the ph curve. The realization rate of the less educated however,
is the only inverted-U shaped component of the decomposition equation (2.1).
At low levels of income per capita, the high-skilled are eight times more likely to
realize their migration aspirations compared to the low-skilled
(
rh ' 8rl). This
ratio falls to 2 at intermediate income levels (around US $5,000) and reaches 3
in the richest countries. Economic development therefore has a greater impact
on realization rates than on migration aspirations.
8Total potential migration, is equal to the sum of those potential migrants expressing
a willingness to migrate (from the Gallup data) and the actual migrants who effectively
migrated between 2000 and 2010.
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Figure 2.2: Nonparametric regressions of the aggregate components of emigra-
tion on income per capita
2.2.a. Shares of college graduates 2.2.b. Emigration rates by education level
and less educated natives
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2.2.c. Migration aspirations by education level 2.2.d. Realization rates by education level
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Notes: Non-parametric regression using Epanechnikov kernel, local-mean smoothing, band-
width 0.5. The migration rates delineated by skill levels are the differences between migrant
stocks in 2000 and 2010, normalized by the skill population of the origin countries. Migra-
tion aspirations rates are calculated as the sum of the number of non-migrants expressing a
willingness to emigrate and the actual migration flows between 2000-2010, normalized by the
origin country populations. Realization rates are obtained by dividing the 2000-2010 migra-
tion flows by the total number of potential migrants. The sample consists of 123 countries.
We omit small states that typically exhibit unusually large emigration rates, countries in
conflict, country pairs with negative net flows, and country pairs with realization rates equal
to 0 or 1 (see Section 2.3). Data on GDP per capita at PPP in 2000 are taken from the Penn
World Tables 7.0.
2.2.3 Data compatibility and sample selection
The Gallup database is a unique and relevant source of information about
migration aspirations. First, it is the only comprehensive source of data on
migration aspirations worldwide or at the global scale. Secondly, empirical
studies reveal that the reported aspirations are correlated with the traditional
drivers of migration.9 Thirdly, there is a high correlation between migration
9Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) show that internal migration intentions depend on in-
dividual wealth as well as contentment with local amenities. The role of local amenities is
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aspirations at year t and actual migration flows at year t + 1 (Bertoli and
Ruyssen, 2017), although actual flows are smaller. Nevertheless, the interpre-
tation of the Gallup questions as well as the combination of data on actual net
flows of migrants and on desired migration raise a number of concerns. This
section discusses five problems associated with the double decomposition and
their implications in terms of sample selection for our analyses in Sections 2.3
and 2.4.
• First, actual migration data capture the net dyadic flow of migrants be-
tween 2000 and 2010, while aspiring migration data are meant to rep-
resent the dyadic stock of individuals who would like to migrate if they
had the opportunity around the year 2010. We consider that the latter
stock also represents the additional flow of migrants that would have been
observed if the opportunity to migrate had been given to each individ-
ual. Hence, the flow of potential migrants P sij corresponds to the total
migration flows that would have been observed between 2000 and 2010
if all aspiring migrants had been able or allowed to emigrate during that
decade (as in Docquier et al. 2014, and Docquier et al. 2015).
• Secondly, aspiring migrants are asked to provide their first-best destina-
tion. Actual migrants however, may have instead migrated to a second-
best location (think about refugees and forcibly displaced persons), some-
thing we ignore by aggregating the two numbers. In particular, the
database includes 3,600 values of realization rates that are equal to one
(2,040 for the high-skilled and 1,560 for the low-skilled). This is equiv-
alent to realizing migration aspirations with certainty, due to the total
absence of sedentary individuals expressing a desire to emigrate in the
Gallup World Polls; while concurrently some migrants actually moved to
that destination. These dyadic observations can be considered atypical
or inconsistent and their reliability is highly questionable. This is be-
cause the absence of aspiring migrants to these countries can arise due to
the small sample sizes used in the Gallup World Polls. Moreover, these
dyads may also comprise small numbers of actual migrants that are in-
accurately measured in the DIOC database. Due to statistical disclosure
rules, small corridors are usually aggregated in regions of origin that are
split out using simple rules. The influence of these atypical observations
on the mobility transition curve is limited. These dyads only represent
3.9% and 9.5% of the low-skilled and high-skilled migrant stocks, respec-
tively.
• Thirdly, our database includes a smaller number of realization rates equal
to zero (73 and 106 dyads for college graduates and the less educated,
confirmed in Manchin et al. (2014), who also find large effects of social networks on the
desire to migrate internationally and locally. Docquier et al. (2014) find that the size of the
network of previous migrants and the average income per person at destination are crucial
determinants of potential migration and that college graduates exhibit greater actual emigra-
tion rates mainly because of better chances in realizing their immigration potentials, rather
than because of a higher willingness to migrate.
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respectively). These result from the total absence of actual migrants
recorded in the desired destination countries. Most of these cases concern
Germany, a destination country for which there is an important lack
of information about the country of origin of immigrants in the DIOC
database. Again, the reliability of these dyadic observations remains
questionable.
• Fourthly, the database includes a number of corridors with zero potential
migrants (i.e., zero values for psij). In particular, the potential bilateral
rate variables psij contain 7.25% of zero values for college graduates and
8.8% for the less educated. The presence of these zeroes may lead to bi-
ased and inconsistent OLS results.10 In addition, realization rates cannot
be computed when psij = 0, as they basically boil down to 0/0.
• Fifthly, the use of contingent valuation surveys to assess migration pref-
erences is open to criticism (see Clemens and Pritchett 2016). One might
indeed argue that some respondents do not express a desire to emigrate
because they interpret “opportunity” in light of the possibilities currently
available to them. These might be limited to a life-threatening trip with
the prospect of a life in the shadow economy at destination.
In the decomposition and empirical analyses below, we limit our sample to
dyads with positive potential migration flows and realization rates strictly
comprises between 0 and 1 (in line with Docquier et al. 2014, or Grogger
and Hanson 2011). Although we eliminate a large number of inconsistent ob-
servations,11 the influence of these dyads on the mobility transition curve is
negligible. Figure 2.3 shows that the mobility transition curve is almost com-
pletely explained by those dyads included in our sample, i.e. 1,409 dyads for
low-skilled migration, and 1,067 dyads for high-skilled migration. In addition,
restricting our sample allows us to use OLS explorative regressions. For com-
parability reasons, we will use the same reduced sample throughout the rest of
the paper. As developed in Appendix F, the alternative option to keep atypi-
cal/inconsistent observations requires using other estimation techniques (due to
the large concentration of zeroes and ones) and leads to many counterintuitive
results.12
10An alternative is to estimate potential bilateral emigration rates with the Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood estimator (PPML) described in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006 and
2011). PPML corrects for the fact that the variance of the error in gravity equations, which
is non-linear, varies across country-pairs (heteroskedasticity); it is consistent in the presence
of fixed effects; it does not exclude these zeroes and thus eliminates sample selection bias.
However, PPML does not apply to realization rates, which exhibit a number of 0/0 and a
concentration of ones.
11Figure 2.A2 in Appendix B compares the distribution of realization rates in the full
sample with that of the reduced sample.
12In Appendix F, PPML regression results are provided. We include observations with
realization rates of 1 and potential migration rates of 0 in Tables 2.A4 and 2.A5.
66
Chapter 2
Figure 2.3: Mobility transition curve under the full and restricted samples
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Notes: The full sample consists of 3,359 corridors of positive total migration flows between
123 origin and 33 destination countries. The restricted sample consists of 1,409 corridors
with realization rates strictly between 0 and 1. Data on GDP per capita at PPP in 2000 are
taken from the Penn World Tables 7.0.
2.3 Simple decomposition: Education levels
Starting from the simple decomposition by education level provided in Eq.
(2.1), we compute the total derivative with respect to income per capita. Given
σli = 1− σhi , this gives:
dmi
dyi
≡ dσ
h
i
dyi
(
mhi −mli
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Skill Composition
+ σhi
dmhi
dyi︸ ︷︷ ︸
HS Migration
+ σli
dmli
dyi︸ ︷︷ ︸
LS Migration
. (2.3)
The total derivative can be expressed as the sum of three additive compo-
nents, labeled as Skill Composition, HS Migration, and LS Migration. In line
with the stylized facts of the previous section, the magnitude of each of these
components is strongly correlated with the level of economic development at
origin (see Figure 2.2). Each positive component can result in the upward seg-
ment of the mobility transition curve, while each negative component is in line
with the neoclassical theory. In particular, the Skill Composition component
is always positive. As income per capita increases, the share of college grad-
uates increases and this mechanically increases the average emigration rate.13
13Note that the literature on migration and development has also identified an effect
of emigration prospects on human capital formation (Mountford 1997). This implies that
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Remember mh ' 30ml in the bottom countries, and mh ' 3ml in industrial-
ized countries. An upward segment of the mobility transition curve could be
observed when the effect of the first term dominates, even if the emigration
rates of each skill group decreased with development (i.e., dms/dy are jointly
negative). Given Figure 2.2.b, we expect the HS Migration component to be
zero or negative, since the high-skilled emigration rate always decreases with
development. The size of this component is limited at low levels of develop-
ment however since σh is small. It becomes non negligible in countries where
income per capita exceeds $6,000. Conversely, the LS Migration component
has an ambiguous sign since ml is an inverted U-shaped function of income per
capita.
The size of the three components of Eq. (2.3) is illustrated in Figure 2.4.a,
which provides the results of non-parametric Epanechnikov kernel regressions
of all three components with respect to the log of income per capita (y). It
typically shows that the Skill Composition and LS Migration components ex-
plain approximately half of the positive slope of the mobility transition curve at
levels of income per capita below $1,000 or else between $4,000 and $6,000. At
higher income levels however (i.e., between $2,500 and $3,000), those income
levels corresponding to the highest values of the slope of the mobility transition
curve, the LS Migration component accounts for around 3/4 of the gradient,
while the Skill Composition component accounts for only 1/4. Figure 2.A3.a
in the Appendix shows that estimating the derivatives of σh, mh and ml with
respect to y separately and aggregating the three components as in (2.1) almost
perfectly fits the (one-step) non-parametric Epanechnikov kernel regression of
m on y.
Macroeconomic versus microeconomic drivers. – As an additional step in dis-
secting the anatomy of the mobility transition curve, we now identify the frac-
tions of dm
s
dy that are due to microeconomic drivers (i.e. financial incentives and
constraints) and macroeconomic drivers (denoted by a vector Xij that includes
socio-demographic variables, gravity determinants and existing migrant net-
works). We implement simple OLS regressions to estimate (and subsequently
quantify) the relative contributions of all factors that the literature has high-
lighted as being potential explanations of the mobility transition. Importantly,
we separately evaluate the impact of all these variables on both high-skilled
and low-skilled emigration rates. Identifying the influence of gravity drivers
and network effects requires our analysis to be conducted at the dyadic level,
as well as controlling for absolute geography, culture and other exogenous de-
terminants of migration flows. Using a quadratic function of income per capita
(in logs), we allow the microeconomic drivers to induce non-monotonic effects
on skill-specific emigration rates. Our regression model can be written as:
msij = γ
s
mXij + a
s
myi + b
s
my
2
i + ε
s
ij (2.4)(
mhi −mli
)
may influence σhi . Beine et al. (2008) empirically demonstrate that this effect
is positive and significant in developing countries, whatever the level of income per capita
at origin. Hence, we assume that this brain gain mechanism does not distort the size of
dσhi /dyi.
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which implicitly assumes that income per capita is a good proxy for the fi-
nancial incentives and constraints of both types of workers. This is in line
with Clemens et al (2008) who demonstrate that the income/productivity of
all types of workers is mostly determined by the locality in which they are em-
ployed. Nevertheless, we also recognize that within-country inequality depends
upon levels of development. In Appendix E, we use within-country inequality
data from Hendriks (2004) to construct proxies for low-skilled and high-skilled
income levels (ysi ) and re-estimate Eq. (2.4). The results are presented in Table
2.A1.
Once estimated, the model implies that:
msi ≡
Js∑
j=1
msij = γ
s
m
Js∑
j=1
Xij + J
sasmyi + J
sbsmy
2
i (2.5)
where Js stands for the average number of destinations with positive migrant
flows from each origin.
We can therefore compute the partial derivatives of skill-specific emigration
rates with respect to income,
∂msi
∂yi
, which clearly differ from the total deriva-
tives that appeared in Eq. (2.1) since most macroeconomic drivers (Xij) are
correlated with income:
∂msi
∂yi
≡ Jsasm + 2Jsbsmyi 6=
dmsi
dyi
≡ ∂m
s
i
∂yi
+ γsm
Js∑
j=1
dXij
dyi
Having controlled for macroeconomic drivers (i.e., all the relevant, origin-
specific mechanisms identified in the existing literature), we consider the resid-
ual effect of income to reasonably provide an upper-bound for the effect of
microeconomic drivers (i.e. an upper-bound for financial incentives and con-
straints).
Finally, to illustrate the role of microeconomic drivers and compare it with that
of the Skill Composition component, the derivative of the mobility transition
curve in Eq. (2.3) can be rewritten as:
dmi
dyi
=
dσhi
dyi
(
mhi −mli
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Skill Composition
+ σhi
dmhi
dyi︸ ︷︷ ︸
HS Migration
+ σli
dmli
dyi︸ ︷︷ ︸
LS Migration
+
dOi
dyi︸︷︷︸
Others
, (2.6)
where
∂msi
∂yi
is computed as the partial derivative of Eq. (2.5) with respect to
yi.
The total derivative can now be expressed as the sum of four additive compo-
nents. The skill-specific partial derivatives (referred to as HS Micro and LS
Micro) proxy financial incentives and constraints for high-skilled and low-skilled
natives, respectively. The last term
dOsi
dyi
= σhi γ
h
m
∑Jh
j=1
dXij
dyi
+ σliγ
l
m
∑Jl
j=1
dXij
dyi
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captures the residual effect of macroeconomic and gravity drivers (referred to
as Others).
Empirical results. – We proceed by estimating Eq. (2.4) using GDP per capita
data (PPP in 2005) international USD (Chain series) in 2000 (yi) from the
Penn World Tables 7.0. The set of explanatory variables (Xij) includes the
following variables:14
• Gravity drivers includes the log of geographic distance between sending
and receiving countries and a set of dummy variables that equal one
should the sending and receiving countries by contiguous, speak a com-
mon language or share a colonial heritage after 1945. These variables are
obtained from the CEPII Dyadic Distance Database described in Mayer
and Zignago (2011). We also include a measure of genetic diversity pro-
vided in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015) as a proxy for cultural distance.15
In addition, we also include a dyadic variable that captures the changes
in the restrictiveness of the migration policy of a destination country j
towards an origin country i between 2000 and 2010. The restrictiveness
index is taken from the Demig database (DEMIG 2015).
• To account for pre-existing migrant networks, we use the total stock of
bilateral migrants from i to j in the year 2000, divided by the native
population of country i in the same year. This variable captures the
probability that a native from country i has a friend or relative in country
j at the beginning of the period. Given the endogeneity of this variable,
we instrument it with its 10-year lag.
• Socio-demographic drivers include: the log of the population size, the
share of the population in country i aged between 15 and 24 in 2000, as
a proxy for the adult population in the age of migration between 2000
and 2010, average weighted import tariffs, as proxies for the degree of
openness of country i and an index of education quality. The shares
of the population aged 15-24 are obtained from the UN-DESA World
Population Prospects 2012. Information on weighted import tariffs derive
from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) as of the year 2000.
This variable is constructed using the average of all effectively applied
import tariffs, weighted by their corresponding trade value.16 The lower
14Figure 2.A4 in Appendix C depicts the cross-sectional relationships between the main
potential drivers of emigration rates and the log-level of income per capita in the origin
country. Descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix G (see Table 2.A6).
15We use the probability that two alleles (a particular form taken by a gene) at a given locus
selected at random from two populations are different (as a proxy for time since isolation)
from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). Genetic distance is based on blood samples and proxies
the time since the two populations shared common ancestors. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015)
find a pattern of positive and significant relationships between genetic distance and various
measures of cultural distance, including language, religion, values, and norms.
16Data for 12 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom) are unavailable.
Under the common trade policy, the EU15 (plus Austria, Finland, Sweden) apply the same
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the import tariffs, the more open a country. Data on education quality
are proxied by the test score results of high school students in maths,
science and reading skills, which are taken from Angrist et al. (2013).
• Each regression includes a full set of destination fixed effects. These cap-
ture the relative attractiveness of all destinations as well as accounting for
immigration policies that do not discriminate between origins. Finally,
the gravity regressions that we estimate, although not formally derived
from an underlying random utility model, nevertheless manifest similarly.
One particular concern in this regard is the potential role of multilateral
resistance to migration (MRM) (see Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Mor-
aga, 2013), which is the observation that the attractiveness of a particular
destination country for potential migrants at origin will likely also depend
upon the relative attractiveness of alternative destinations. To account
for any potential bias that might arise from the existence of MRM, we fol-
low the approach of Baier and Bergstrand (2009), one adapted to the case
of migration as in Gro¨schl (2012) and control for MRM with the inclu-
sion of an additional term capturing the average distance and contiguity
of country i and j with respect to all other migration partners.
Regression results for actual migration rates are presented in Table 2.1. The
standard errors are clustered by country of origin. Columns (L1) and (H1)
include the full set of controls and the log of income per capita (linear specifi-
cation). Columns (L2) and (H2) add the squared level of the log of income per
capita (quadratic specification). Finally, columns (L3) and (H3) represent our
parsimonious specifications comprising significant controls only, in addition to
the log level of income. We run a horse race between several competing theories
underpinning the mobility transition curve. Hence, our parsimonious specifi-
cations are obtained after running backward stepwise regressions starting from
the most complete model. Our decision as to whether include a variable or
not, is based on its p-value (i.e., the variable should be significantly different
from zero at the 5% threshold) and on the global fit of the model before and
after eliminating that variable. The correlations between the log of income per
capita, its square, gravity and socio-demographic determinants prove impor-
tant. In our subsequent counterfactual simulations, we use the estimates of the
parsimonious regressions to minimize concerns of collinearity.17
Our parsimonious model explains 60.5% of the overall variation in low-skilled
migration rates. The only significant variables are network size, the log of
income per capita and its square. A rise in income increases the low-skilled
emigration rate when income per capita is below $1,400. Above this level,
tariff rates to all their imports. The weighted tariffs are therefore not equivalent due to the
differences in import volumes. For the sake of simplicity and given the difficulty of working
with 6-digit commodity lines in order to calculate the exact weighted tariffs for each country
however, we decided to use the average value of the European Union, which is available, for
those 12 countries.
17In each regression, we instrument the network variable in 2000 by its 10-year lag. Partial
R-squared and F-statistics of the first stage IV regressions show a high correlation between
the migration stocks of these two periods.
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low-skilled emigration decreases with development. Our parsimonious model
rather explains 45.2% of the overall variability in high-skilled emigration rates.
On the one hand, the high-skilled emigration rate increases with network size,
linguistic proximity, colonial links and genetic distance. On the other hand, it
decreases with contiguity and with income per capita.18 As further robustness
checks, we run similar regressions in the Appendix (i) with proxies of skill-
specific wages instead of aggregate income per capita (see Table 2.A1), (ii)
when using the full sample and the PPML regression technique (see Tables 2.A4
and 2.A5). The effect of income per capita becomes insignificant when using
a proxy for high-skilled income levels. Using alternative regression techniques
yields qualitatively similar results, confirming the robustness of our benchmark
estimates.
Table 2.1: Determinants of migration rates by dyad
Less educated College Graduates
(L1) (L2) (L3) (H1) (H2) (H3)
Network (% pop.) 0.4535∗∗∗ 0.4511∗∗∗ 0.4504∗∗∗ 0.8648∗∗∗ 0.8616∗∗∗ 0.8806∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Geo. Dist. (log) -0.0005∗ -0.0005∗ -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0036∗∗∗ -0.0036∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Contiguity -0.0018 -0.0014 -0.0123∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.0136∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Com. Lang. 0.0003 0.0005 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Colonial Link -0.0023∗∗ -0.0020∗∗ 0.0486∗∗∗ 0.0490∗∗∗ 0.0484∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Genetic Dist. -0.0001 0.0001 0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population (log) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0013∗ -0.0013∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pop 15-24 (% pop.) 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Import Tariff -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005∗ 0.0005∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Educ. Quality -0.0000 -0.0000∗ -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pol. restr. -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0017 0.0018
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP/cap -0.0003 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0058∗∗∗ -0.0007 0.0129 -0.0025∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
GDP/cap Sq. -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0008
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.0095 -0.0166∗∗ -0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0492 -0.0039 0.0258
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.10) (0.02)
Dest. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MRM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.6072 0.6105 0.6050 0.4571 0.4576 0.4516
N. of obs 1409 1409 1409 1067 1067 1067
Partial R-squared 0.8725 0.8725 0.8828 0.8854 0.8859 0.8864
F-stat 377.4963 376.6303 396.9139 163.1120 166.1433 160.3231
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
OLS regressions estimted on the restricted sample of dyads with realization rates of strictly
between 0 and 1 (see Section 2.3). The sample consists of 1,409 observations for low-skilled
migration rates and 1,067 observations for high-skilled migration rates. All regressions include
destination fixed effects and variables to control for multilateral resistance to migration. Our
network variable is instrumented using its 10-year lag. Standard errors are clustered by
country of origin.
18The counterintuitive sign of the effect of being contiguous may be due to the fact that
our set of destination countries only includes OECD member states and contiguity captures
low income differentials between origin and destination countries. Alternatively, this result
could be interpreted as a border effect when geographic distance is small.
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Figure 2.4: Simple decomposition: education levels
2.4.a. Total derivative with respect to income (as in Eq. (2.3))
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2.4.b. Proxying financial constraints and incentives (as in Eq. (2.6))
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Simple decomposition: a synthesis. – Figures 2.4.b describes the results of our
simple decomposition as in Eq. (2.6). The magnitudes of the Skill Composition
(by construction) and HS Micro (due to the low level of σh at low income levels)
effects are very much in line with those of Figure 2.3.a. Conversely, dissecting
the macroeconomic and microeconomic drivers of the LS Migration curve re-
veals that a large portion of the curve can be explained by gravity and network
effects. In addition, for origin countries below $1,000, the LS Micro component
effect is larger than that of the Skill Composition. Remember countries below
$1,000 account for less than 5% of the world population. For origin countries
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between $1,000 and $6,000 however (i.e., in countries accounting for more than
60% of the world population), the Skill Composition effect exceeds that of the
LS Micro. Overall, this means that financial constraints, while relevant for the
very poorest countries, only have a limited effect on the upward segment of
the mobility transition curve. As far as policy implications are concerned, our
results suggest that in the short run (i.e., for a given skill structure, σs and for
a given set of macroeconomic determinants, O), a rise in income induces only
small effects on low-skilled and average emigration rates. In the long-run, a rise
in income increases σs (i.e., increasing the number of more mobile high-skilled
workers) and affects O (e.g., lower population growth), which increases the
share of college graduates among emigrants as well as the average emigration
rate. Nevertheless O has an uncertain effect on the emigration stock, since
increasing the mobility of workers can be offset by smaller populations.
2.4 Double decomposition: aspirations and realization
In this section, we check whether the limited effect of financial constraints is
confirmed when using the Gallup proxies for migration aspirations and realiza-
tion rates. We hypothesize that the role of financial constraints is reflected by
the effect of income per capita on the capacity to realize migration aspirations.
We proceed as in the previous section, but now exploit the double decompo-
sition in Eq. (2.2) and compute its total derivative with respect to the log of
income per capita. This gives:
dmi
dyi
=
dσhi
dyi
(
mhi −mli
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Skill Composition
+ σhi r
h
i
dphi
dyi︸ ︷︷ ︸
HS Aspiration
+ σhi p
h
i
drhi
dyi︸ ︷︷ ︸
HS Realization
+ σlir
l
i
dpli
dyi︸ ︷︷ ︸
LS Aspiration
+ σlip
l
i
drli
dyi︸ ︷︷ ︸
LS Realization
.
(2.7)
The total derivative can be expressed as the sum of five additive components,
labeled as Skill Composition, HS Aspiration, HS Realization, LS Aspiration
and LS Realization. Using non-parametric Epanechnikov kernel regressions, we
estimate the relationship between the log of income per capita and the size of
each of these five components. The results are depicted in Figure 2.5.a. In line
with our intuition and with Figure 2.5.a, it shows that the Skill Composition
and LS Realization components explain approximately half of the positive slope
of the mobility transition curve at levels of income per capita below $6,000,
although the LS Realization component slightly dominates between $2,000 and
$3,500. As far as migration aspirations of low-skilled and high-skilled workers
are concerned, they have negligible effects on the slope of the mobility transition
curve at lower levels of development (i.e. below $6,000).
To identify the roles of microeconomic and macroeconomic drivers, we imple-
ment simple OLS regressions of dyadic potential migration rates and realization
rates using the same determinants as in the previous section. Our regression
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models can be written as:
psij = γ
s
pXij + a
s
pyi + b
s
py
2
i + ε
s
ij , (2.8)
rsij = γ
s
rXij + a
s
ryi + b
s
ry
2
i + ε
s
ij , (2.9)
assuming that income per capita is a good proxy for the financial incentives
and constraints of both types of workers. In Appendix E, we re-estimate the
regression models (2.8) and (2.9) using separate proxies for low-skilled and
high-skilled income levels (ysi ). The results are provided in Tables 2.A2 and
2.A3.
Once estimated, the model implies that:
psi ≡
Js∑
j=1
psij = γ
s
p
Js∑
j=1
Xij + J
saspyi + J
sbspy
2
i , (2.10)
rsi =
Js∑
j=1
psijr
s
ij
psi
= γsr
Js∑
j=1
Xijp
s
ij
psi
+ asryi + b
s
ry
2
i , (2.11)
where Js stands for the average number of destinations with positive migrant
flows from each origin country.
To illustrate the role of microeconomic drivers, the derivative of the mobility
transition curve in Eq. (2.7) can now be rewritten as:
dmi
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=
dσhi
dyi
(
m
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i −mli
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dOi
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Others
,
(2.12)
where
∂psi
∂yi
and
∂rsi
∂yi
can be replaced by the analytical expressions of the partial
derivatives of Eqs. (2.10) and (2.11) with respect to yi.
The total derivative can now be rewritten as the sum of six additive compo-
nents. The skill-specific partial derivatives of the potential migration rates
(referred to as HS Incentive and LS Incentive) proxies for the financial incen-
tives to emigrate; the skill-specific partial derivatives of the realization rates
(referred to as HS Constraint and LS Constraint), proxies for the financial
constraints for high-skilled and low-skilled natives, respectively. The residual
term captures the effect of macroeconomic drivers (referred to as Others).
Empirical results. – Regression results for migration aspirations and realiza-
tion rates are presented in Tables 2.2 and 1.3. As in Table 2.1, all estimations
include both destination fixed effects and variables controlling for multilateral
resistance to migration. The standard errors are clustered by country of origin.
Columns (L1) and (H1) include the full set of controls and the linear specifica-
tion in income. Columns (L2) and (H2) present the results obtained with the
quadratic specification. Columns (L3) and (H3) represent our parsimonious
specifications comprising significant controls only (in addition to the log level
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of income) and minimizing collinearity issues.19
Table 2.2: Determinants of migration aspirations by dyad
Less educated College Graduates
(L1) (L2) (L3) (H1) (H2) (H3)
Network (% pop.) 1.3483∗∗∗ 1.3477∗∗∗ 1.3482∗∗∗ 1.2354∗∗∗ 1.2599∗∗∗ 1.2516∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37)
Geo. Dist. (log) -0.0034∗∗∗ -0.0034∗∗∗ -0.0027∗∗∗ -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0112∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Contiguity -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.0291∗∗∗ -0.0322∗∗∗ -0.0296∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Com. Lang. 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0380∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Colonial Link 0.0050 0.0051 0.0811∗∗∗ 0.0773∗∗∗ 0.0821∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Genetic Dist. 0.0013 0.0013 0.0180∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0175∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Population (log) 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pop 15-24 (% pop.) -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0017
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Import Tariff 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0008
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Educ. Quality -0.0003∗∗ -0.0003∗∗ -0.0006 -0.0005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pol. restr. -0.0012 -0.0012 0.0006 -0.0006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP/cap -0.0009 0.0007 -0.0028∗∗∗ -0.0043 -0.1093∗∗ -0.0109∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00)
GDP/cap Sq. -0.0001 0.0061∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.0360 0.0297 0.0363∗ 0.1164 0.5260∗∗ 0.1358∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.13) (0.26) (0.06)
Dest. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MRM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.5681 0.5680 0.5632 0.4422 0.4504 0.4368
N. of obs 1409 1409 1409 1067 1067 1067
Partial R-squared 0.8725 0.8725 0.8751 0.8854 0.8859 0.8864
F-stat 377.4963 376.6303 382.0562 163.1120 166.1433 160.3231
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 . OLS
regressions estimted on the restricted sample of dyads with realization rates of strictly be-
tween 0 and 1 (see Section 2.3). The sample consists of 1,409 observations for low-skilled
migration rates and 1,067 observations for high-skilled migration rates. All regressions in-
clude destination fixed effects and variables to control for multilateral resistance to migration.
Our network variable is instrumented using its 10-year lag. Standard errors are clustered by
country of origin.
Focusing first upon migration aspirations, Table 2.2 reveals that migration as-
pirations of the low-skilled monotonically decrease with the log of income per
capita and the magnitude of the coefficient is small.20 In addition, pli increases
with the size of the network and with linguistic proximity and decreases with
geographic distance and contiguity (see footnote 17 above). Our parsimonious
model explains 56.3% of the overall variability in potential low-skilled migra-
tion. As for college graduates, their aspirations to emigrate monotonically
decrease with the log of income per capita and this effect is larger than for
the low-skilled.21 The aspirations of the high-skilled increase with the size of
19In each regression, we instrument the network variable in 2000 by its ten-year lag. Partial
R-squared and F-statistics of the first stage IV regressions show a high correlation between
the migration stocks of these two periods.
20Similar results are obtained when using proxies for the income level of the low-skilled
(see Table 2.A2).
21When using proxies for the income level of the high-skilled, migration aspirations be-
come independent of income (see Table 2.A2). This is in line with the results of the simple
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the network, with linguistic proximity, colonial links and with genetic distance
and they decrease with geographic distance and contiguity. The results on
population size are negative, which might be indicative of the fact that larger
countries usually exhibit lower (international) emigration rates since their cit-
izens have access to better opportunities at home. Our parsimonious model
explains 43.7% of the overall variability in the migration aspirations of the
highly skilled.
Table 2.3: Determinants of realization rates by dyad
Less educated College Graduates
(L1) (L2) (L3) (H1) (H2) (H3)
Network (% pop.) 2.5594∗∗∗ 2.4139∗∗∗ 2.4921∗∗∗ 2.8480∗∗∗ 2.7494∗∗∗ 2.7874∗∗∗
(0.450) (0.467) (0.443) (0.507) (0.470) (0.487)
Geo. Dist. (log) -0.0152∗∗ -0.0156∗∗ -0.0218∗∗∗ -0.0287∗∗∗ -0.0285∗∗∗ -0.0365∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Contiguity -0.0131 0.0076 0.0193 0.0319
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
Com. Lang. 0.0050 0.0178 0.0807∗∗∗ 0.0937∗∗∗ 0.0866∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)
Colonial Link 0.0067 0.0212 0.1390∗∗∗ 0.1543∗∗∗ 0.1459∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Genetic Dist. -0.0263∗∗ -0.0146 -0.0065 -0.0004
(0.011) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017)
Population (log) -0.0142∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗ -0.0168∗∗∗ -0.0311∗∗∗ -0.0322∗∗∗ -0.0315∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Pop 15-24 (% pop.) 0.0028 -0.0030 -0.0049 -0.0098
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Import Tariff -0.0014 -0.0013 0.0033 0.0031
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Educ. Quality 0.0017 0.0016 0.0033∗ 0.0028
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Pol. restr. 0.0120 0.0161 0.0048 0.0095
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
GDP/cap -0.0186∗ 0.3826∗∗∗ 0.3529∗∗∗ -0.0448∗∗ 0.3788∗∗∗ 0.3383∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.090) (0.082) (0.018) (0.146) (0.123)
GDP/cap Sq. -0.0237∗∗∗ -0.0209∗∗∗ -0.0245∗∗∗ -0.0207∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Constant 1.0946∗∗∗ -0.4917 -0.2464 1.5606∗∗∗ -0.0916 0.3783
(0.315) (0.415) (0.370) (0.398) (0.764) (0.665)
Dest. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MRM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.2167 0.2494 0.2345 0.3715 0.3879 0.3733
N. of obs 1409 1409 1409 1067 1067 1067
Partial R-squared 0.8725 0.8725 0.8778 0.8854 0.8859 0.8886
F-stat 377.4963 376.6303 384.7583 163.1120 166.1433 163.0592
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. OLS
regressions estimted on the restricted sample of dyads with realization rates of strictly be-
tween 0 and 1 (see Section 2.3). The sample consists of 1,409 observations for low-skilled
migration rates and 1,067 observations for high-skilled migration rates. All regressions in-
clude destination fixed effects and variables to control for multilateral resistance to migration.
Our network variable is instrumented using its 10-year lag. Standard errors are clustered by
country of origin.
The determinants of realization rates are presented in Table 2.3. Interestingly,
both the linear and squared terms of the log of income per capita are now
highly significant for both low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The relationship
between realizing migration and financial capacity is non-linear, implying that
economic progress is likely to increase the capacity of workers to financially
meet the cost of international movement during early stages of development.
After computing the turning points of these quadratic relationships, we find
that low-skilled realization rates tend to increase with development in countries
decomposition in Table 2.A1.
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where income per capita is below $4,640;22 high-skilled realization rates increase
with development when income per capita is below $3,540.23 In addition,
low-skilled realization rates increase with the network size and decrease with
distance and population size. As for the highly skilled, their realization rates
respond to the same determinants, as well as to linguistic proximity and colonial
links. Overall, the gravity channels play an important role in determining
the realization of migration. Migrant networks mitigate these costs related to
long-distance movement and have sizable effects on the success of migration.
The magnitude of network effects is globally similar across skill groups. Our
parsimonious models explain 23.5% and 37.3% of the overall variability in the
realization rates of the low-skilled and high-skilled, respectively.
Double decomposition: a synthesis. – Figures 2.5.b describes the results of
our double decomposition Eq. (2.12). The HS Incentive and HS Constraint
components are always zero or negative and of low amplitude (due to the low
level of σh at low income levels). Globally, the LS Incentive component is also
negative, meaning that migration aspirations of the low-skilled are decreasing
with income after controlling for the macroeconomic drivers. Conversely, the
LS Constraint component is positive when income per capita is smaller than
$5,000. Below $1,500, the LS Constraint component effect is the largest positive
component. For income levels between $1,500 and $6,000 however, the LS
Constraint component is smaller than the Skill Composition one. These results
are very much in line with those of the simple decomposition. As before,
a large portion of this curve is explained by the macroeconomic drivers (i.e.
predominantly by gravity and network effects) and by the skill composition of
the population.
2.5 Conclusion
In his seminal paper, Zelinsky (1971) was the first to hypothesize an inverted U-
shaped relationship between emigration and development, a relationship that
he termed the mobility transition; which has subsequently been observed in a
variety of settings. Neo-classical explanations have been unable to explain the
upward segment of the curve wherein migration increases with development at
origin for countries at low or intermediate levels of income per capita. The ex-
istence of this upward sloping segment of the curve has therefore constituted a
decades-old puzzle for which several potential explanations have been proposed
in numerous geographical and historical contexts. Overall, the most common
explanation is the existence of financial constraints that prevents the poorer
workers from poor countries to realize their migration aspirations. If the exis-
tence of financial constraints is the major explanation, improving the economic
situation of the bottom million is likely to result in large migration pressures
22When using proxies for the income level of the low-skilled, the turning point equals $5,120
(see Table 2.A3).
23When using proxies for the income level of the high-skilled, the realization rate mono-
tonically decreases with income (see Table 2.A3).
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towards industrialized countries.
Figure 2.5: Double decomposition: aspirations and realization rates
2.5.a. Total derivative with respect to income (as in Eq. (2.7))
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2.5.b. Proxying financial constraints and incentives (as in Eq. (2.12))
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In this paper we analyze rich aggregated micro-data on individual’s aspirations
and realization rates in a decompositon framework with two skill groups. Hav-
ing confirmed the existence of the mobility transition non-parametrically, we
subsequently decompose it into migration rates of more and less skilled and
their proportions in the population. We then use regression analyses to run a
horse race between several competing theories underpinning the observed rela-
tionship for the first time. Having identified statistically significant variables
from this analysis, we explore the roles of microeconomic drivers (i.e., finan-
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cial incentives and constraints), skill composition and macroeconomic drivers
in generating the upward segment of the mobility transition curve.
Our key result is that the contributions of microeconomic drivers are limited.
With the exception of the poorest countries (representing less than 10% of
the world population), a large fraction of the increasing segment is explained
by macroeconomic drivers and by the skill composition of the population. The
latter effect is particularly important in countries where GDP per capita in PPP
value is between $1,500 and $6,000. While our conclusion is somewhat at odds
with many pre-existing explanations, it is rather intuitive. Emigration increases
with development, because the proportion of college graduates in the native
population increases and it is precisely this group that has highest propensity
to emigrate abroad. Hence, our results suggest that in the short term, a rise
in income induces small effects on low-skilled and average emigration rates.
In the long-run, a rise in income may increase the share of college graduates
among emigrants and the average emigration rate. Nevertheless, the effect on
emigration stocks is uncertain since the increasing mobility of workers can be
offset by smaller populations.
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2.6 Appendix
A. OECD vs non-OECD destination countries
Our paper focuses solely upon OECD destinations. It relies on the DIOC data,
which documents skill-specific emigration stocks and rates to OECD member
states in 2000 and 2010. On Figure 2.1.a, we identify a turning point around
$6,000. Clemens (2014) includes all destination countries of the world and finds
a turning point around $5,000. His database does not include information on
the educational level of migrants however. The DIOC-E database provides
information on skill-specific emigration stocks to 70 destination countries (i.e.,
33 OECD member states and 37 non-OECD countries) by education level for
the years 2000 and 2010. Figure 2.A1 compares the mobility transition curves
obtained when the set of destination countries includes OECD member states
only, or else 70 destination countries.
Figure 2.A1: Development and emigration to OECD versus non-OECD coun-
tries
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
Av
er
ag
e 
em
ig
ra
nt
 ra
te
s
600 1600 6000 16000 60000
GDP/capita (US$) log scale
Reduced−sample non−parametric mean − 33 destinations
Full−sample non−parametric mean − 70 destinations
Reduced−sample Confidence interval (95%) − 33 destinations
Full−sample Confidence interval (95%) − 70 destinations
Notes: The reduced sample consists of 1,409 observations for the low-skilled, and 1,067 ob-
servations for the high-skilled populations from 123 origin to 33 OECD destination countries.
The detailed sample choice is explained in section 2.3. The larger sample consists of all cor-
ridors between 123 origin and 70 destination countries available in the OECD-DIOC-E data
set.
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C. Macroeconomic drivers and income
Figure 2.A3 depicts the cross-sectional relationships between the main potential
drivers of emigration rates and the level of income per capita in origin countries.
These relationships are obtained using the non-parametric Epanechnikov kernel
density estimation (see Epanechnikov, 1969). On average, population size is
poorly correlated with development (fig. 2.A3.a). Conversely, the share of the
population aged 15 to 24 (fig. 2.A3.b), the average geographic distance from the
nearest OECD country (fig. 2.A3.c) and the level of income inequality in the
origin country (fig. 2.A3.f) are all negatively correlated with income per capita.
As far as the network size (fig. 2.A3.d) is concerned, it first increases with
development before decreasing when income per capita exceeds $7,000. Finally,
education quality (fig. 2.A3.e) is positively correlated with development.
Figure 2.A3: Nonparametric regressions of main drivers on income per capita
2.A3.a. Population (in logs) 2.A3.b. Pop aged 15-24 (as percent of pop.)
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2.A3.c. Distance from OECD (in logs) 2.A3.d. Network size (as percent of pop.)
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2.A3.e. Education quality 2.A3.f. Income inequality
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D. Validity of the decomposition methods
Figure 2.A4 compares the total derivative of m on y (estimated using the
non-parametric Epanechnikov kernel regression), with the sum of the three
components in Eq. (2.3) for the simple decomposition (Fig A4.a), or with the
sum of the five components in Eq. (2.7) for the double decomposition (Fig
A4.b).
Figure 2.A4: Total derivative and sum of all components
2.A4.a. Simple decomposition
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E. Regressions with skill-specific wage proxies
In supplementary regressions, we replace income per capita by proxies for skill-
specific levels of income, yhi and y
l
i and include their logged levels and their
squares. Our measures of income proxy for income inequality. We use GDP
per capita data at destination (PPP in 2005) international USD (Chain series)
in 2000 (yi) from the Penn World Tables 7.0 and data on the wage ratio
between college educated and less educated workers (ωi) from Hendricks (2004).
We combine these values with the proportions of high-skilled and low-skilled
workers from Artuc¸ et al. (2015). Skill-specific income levels are computed as
yli = yi/
(
σhi ωi + σ
l
i
)
and yhi = ωiyi/
(
σhi ωi + σ
l
i
)
.
Table 2.A1: Determinants of migration rates with skill-specific wage proxies
Less educated College Graduates
(L1) (L2) (L3) (H1) (H2) (H3)
Network (% pop.) 0.4537∗∗∗ 0.4508∗∗∗ 0.4505∗∗∗ 0.8553∗∗∗ 0.8519∗∗∗ 0.8596∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Geo. Dist. (log) -0.0005∗ -0.0005∗∗ -0.0038∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0036∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Contiguity -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0122∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Com. Lang. 0.0003 0.0005 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Colonial Link -0.0023∗∗ -0.0020∗∗ 0.0489∗∗∗ 0.0493∗∗∗ 0.0490∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Genetic Dist. -0.0001 0.0000 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population (log) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0013∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0014∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pop 15-24 (% pop.) 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0002 0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Import Tariff -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006∗∗ 0.0005∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Educ. Quality -0.0000 -0.0000∗ -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pol. restr. -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0020 0.0021
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Low-Skill Wage -0.0004∗ 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0065∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Low-Skill Wage Sq. -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
High-Skill Wage 0.0015 0.0469
(0.00) (0.04)
High-Skill Wage Sq. -0.0023
(0.00)
Constant 0.0104 -0.0207∗∗ -0.0297∗∗∗ 0.0349 -0.1759 0.0340
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.19) (0.04)
Dest. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MRM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.6075 0.6103 0.6048 0.4572 0.4583 0.4560
N. of obs 1409 1409 1409 1067 1067 1067
Partial R-squared 0.8727 0.8724 0.8827 0.8852 0.8855 0.8868
F-stat 376.1988 376.0130 397.1648 162.9635 164.5837 162.3549
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. OLS
regressions are estimate on the restricted sample of dyads with realization rates
strictly between 0 and 1 (see Section 2.3). The sample consists of 1,409 observa-
tions for the low-skilled migration rates, and 1,067 observations for high-skilled
migration rates. All regressions include destination fixed effects and variables
to control for multilateral resistance to migration. The network variable is in-
strumented using its 10-year lag. Standard errors are clustered by country of
origin.
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Table 2.A2: Determinants of migration aspirations with skill-specific wage
proxies
Less educated College Graduates
(L1) (L2) (L3) (H1) (H2) (H3)
Network (% pop.) 1.3479∗∗∗ 1.3477∗∗∗ 1.3463∗∗∗ 1.2088∗∗∗ 1.2179∗∗∗ 1.1824∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38)
Geo. Dist. (log) -0.0034∗∗∗ -0.0034∗∗∗ -0.0027∗∗∗ -0.0129∗∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Contiguity -0.0124∗∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.0298∗∗∗ -0.0308∗∗∗ -0.0301∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Com. Lang. 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0337∗∗∗ 0.0358∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Colonial Link 0.0050 0.0050 0.0822∗∗∗ 0.0810∗∗∗ 0.0841∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Genetic Dist. 0.0013 0.0013 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0188∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Population (log) 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pop 15-24 (% pop.) -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0012 0.0015 0.0036∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Import Tariff 0.0001 0.0001 0.0008 0.0008
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Educ. Quality -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗ -0.0009∗∗ -0.0009∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pol. restr. -0.0012 -0.0012 0.0017 0.0015
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Low-Skill Wage -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0030∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Low-Skill Wage Sq. -0.0000
(0.00)
High-Skill Wage 0.0019 -0.1181
(0.00) (0.09)
High-Skill Wage Sq. 0.0060
(0.00)
Constant 0.0374 0.0356 0.0370∗ 0.0757 0.6323 0.0360
(0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.13) (0.47) (0.05)
Dest. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MRM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.5680 0.5680 0.5627 0.4410 0.4428 0.4345
N. of obs 1409 1409 1409 1067 1067 1067
Partial R-squared 0.8727 0.8724 0.8753 0.8852 0.8855 0.8871
F-stat 376.1988 376.0130 382.1835 162.9635 164.5837 160.2113
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. OLS regres-
sions are estimate on the restricted sample of dyads with realization rates strictly between
0 and 1 (see Section 2.3). The sample consists of 1,409 observations for the low-skilled mi-
gration rates, and 1,067 observations for high-skilled migration rates. All regressions include
destination fixed effects and variables to control for multilateral resistance to migration. The
network variable is instrumented using its 10-year lag. Standard errors are clustered by
country of origin.
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Table 2.A3: Determinants of realization rates with skill-specific wage proxies
Less educated College Graduates
(L1) (L2) (L3) (H1) (H2) (H3)
Network (% pop.) 2.5739∗∗∗ 2.4086∗∗∗ 2.5024∗∗∗ 2.7941∗∗∗ 2.7496∗∗∗ 2.9001∗∗∗
(0.451) (0.466) (0.438) (0.515) (0.496) (0.529)
Geo. Dist. (log) -0.0152∗∗ -0.0164∗∗ -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0309∗∗∗ -0.0300∗∗∗ -0.0322∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Contiguity -0.0100 0.0087 0.0165 0.0213
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
Com. Lang. 0.0066 0.0172 0.0786∗∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗ 0.0782∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)
Colonial Link 0.0057 0.0195 0.1449∗∗∗ 0.1508∗∗∗ 0.1410∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Genetic Dist. -0.0262∗∗ -0.0177∗ 0.0019 0.0038
(0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016)
Population (log) -0.0147∗∗∗ -0.0156∗∗∗ -0.0176∗∗∗ -0.0308∗∗∗ -0.0329∗∗∗ -0.0284∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Pop 15-24 (% pop.) 0.0020 -0.0030 -0.0014 -0.0026
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Import Tariff -0.0013 -0.0012 0.0037∗ 0.0035
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Educ. Quality 0.0019∗ 0.0016 0.0023∗∗ 0.0019 0.0020
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Pol. restr. 0.0119 0.0166 0.0086 0.0093
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Low-Skill Wage -0.0251∗∗ 0.4068∗∗∗ 0.3775∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.106) (0.093)
Low-Skill Wage Sq. -0.0242∗∗∗ -0.0221∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
High-Skill Wage -0.0308∗ 0.5550 -0.0289∗∗
(0.018) (0.421) (0.013)
High-Skill Wage Sq. -0.0293
(0.021)
Constant 1.1656∗∗∗ -0.6447 -0.5424 1.4725∗∗∗ -1.2447 1.7170∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.481) (0.433) (0.400) (2.035) (0.378)
Dest. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MRM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.2207 0.2473 0.2377 0.3627 0.3677 0.3565
N. of obs 1409 1409 1409 1067 1067 1067
Partial R-squared 0.8727 0.8724 0.8781 0.8852 0.8855 0.8876
F-stat 376.1988 376.0130 388.3746 162.9635 164.5837 160.1732
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.OLS regressions
are estimate on the restricted sample of dyads with realization rates strictly between 0 and 1
(see Section 2.3). The sample consists of 1,409 observations for the low-skilled migration rates,
and 1,067 observations for high-skilled migration rates. All regressions include destination
fixed effects and variables to control for multilateral resistance to migration. The network
variable is instrumented using its 10-year lag. Standard errors are clustered by country of
origin.
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F. Alternative regression techniques
In a last set of supplementary regressions, we use the full sample (including
realization rates equal to 0 or 1) and alternative regression techniques. Table
2.A4 revisits the determinants of dyadic migration rates using IV Poisson re-
gressions. Table 2.A5 further examines the determinants of dyadic migration
aspirations using IV Poisson regressions.
Table 2.A4: Determinants of migration rates IV-PPML (full sample)
Less educated College Graduates
(L1) (L2) (L3) (H1) (H2) (H3)
Network (% pop.) 28.7631∗∗∗ 25.5574∗∗∗ 25.4243∗∗∗ 12.3577∗∗∗ 12.3069∗∗∗ 10.8831∗∗∗
(2.63) (2.75) (2.56) (2.49) (2.18) (2.57)
Geo. Dist. (log) -0.7083∗∗∗ -0.7147∗∗∗ -0.7191∗∗∗ -0.4938∗∗∗ -0.4655∗∗∗ -0.4155∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Contiguity -0.5810∗∗ -0.0559 -0.5034 -0.1324
(0.29) (0.26) (0.33) (0.31)
Com. Lang. 1.0039∗∗∗ 1.2745∗∗∗ 1.3244∗∗∗ 0.8192∗∗∗ 0.9928∗∗∗ 0.9326∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.20) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16)
Colonial Link 0.4160∗ 0.3351 1.5410∗∗∗ 1.4900∗∗∗ 1.5557∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Genetic Dist. -0.1553 0.0628 0.2619∗ 0.3234∗∗
(0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13)
Population (log) -0.2341∗∗∗ -0.2692∗∗∗ -0.2567∗∗∗ -0.2360∗∗∗ -0.2812∗∗∗ -0.2323∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Pop 15-24 (% pop.) 0.0725 -0.0086 0.0219 -0.0297
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Import Tariff -0.0330∗ -0.0311∗ -0.0342∗∗ 0.0331∗ 0.0344∗ 0.0346∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Educ. Quality 0.0228 0.0151 0.0141 0.0166
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Pol. restr. -0.2557 -0.1952 -0.0413 -0.0194
(0.22) (0.20) (0.18) (0.17)
GDP/cap -0.3038∗∗∗ 7.7822∗∗∗ 7.6574∗∗∗ -0.1801 3.2276∗∗ -0.2164∗∗
(0.11) (1.30) (1.14) (0.15) (1.30) (0.10)
GDP/cap Sq. -0.4729∗∗∗ -0.4606∗∗∗ -0.2075∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant 7.7415 -25.5742∗∗∗ -23.5825∗∗∗ -4.3917 -15.4041∗∗ -7.7513
(6.38) (9.01) (7.98) (7.82) (7.15) (9.65)
Dest. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MRM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs 3359 3359 3359 3522 3522 3522
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.IV-PPML
regressions (equivalent IV Poisson GMM) regressions are used on the full sample of dyads
with positive total migration flows. The sample consists of 3,359 observations for low-skilled
migration rates and 3,522 observations for the high-skilled migration rates. All regressions
include destination fixed effects and variables to control for multilateral resistance to mi-
gration. The network variable is instrumented using its 10-year lag. Standard errors are
clustered by country of origin.
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Table 2.A5: Determinants of migration aspirations with IV-PPML (full sample)
Less educated College Graduates
(L1) (L2) (L3) (H1) (H2) (H3)
Network (% pop.) 17.4628∗∗∗ 16.8709∗∗∗ 17.5941∗∗∗ 8.2830∗∗∗ 8.2215∗∗∗ 8.4859∗∗∗
(2.19) (2.17) (2.21) (2.26) (2.19) (2.23)
Geo. Dist. (log) -0.5454∗∗∗ -0.5526∗∗∗ -0.5695∗∗∗ -0.4868∗∗∗ -0.4849∗∗∗ -0.4971∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Contiguity -0.5619∗∗ -0.4597∗∗ -0.6133∗∗ -0.6280∗∗ -0.5519∗∗ -0.7454∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27)
Com. Lang. 1.1278∗∗∗ 1.1700∗∗∗ 1.1268∗∗∗ 0.7990∗∗∗ 0.8345∗∗∗ 0.8430∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Colonial Link 0.3087∗∗ 0.3101∗∗ 0.2896∗∗ 0.9102∗∗∗ 0.9044∗∗∗ 0.9174∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
Genetic Dist. -0.0045 0.0306 0.0662 0.0818
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Population (log) -0.0827 -0.0909∗ -0.0672 -0.0746
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Pop 15-24 (% pop.) -0.0112 -0.0307 0.0331 0.0206
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Import Tariff 0.0082 0.0091 0.0123 0.0128
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Educ. Quality -0.0069 -0.0066 -0.0015 -0.0008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pol. restr. -0.2324 -0.2256 -0.2172 -0.2085
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
GDP/cap -0.2209∗∗∗ 1.0742 -0.2306∗∗∗ -0.1497∗∗ 0.6288 -0.2309∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.75) (0.05) (0.07) (0.77) (0.06)
GDP/cap Sq. -0.0780∗ -0.0472
(0.04) (0.05)
Constant 0.5316 -4.2474 -3.2832 -0.8241 -3.6088 -2.5789
(4.37) (5.11) (2.60) (4.10) (4.86) (2.73)
Dest. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MRM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs 3359 3359 3359 3522 3522 3522
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.IV-PPML
regressions (equivalent IV Poisson GMM) regressions are used on the full sample of dyads
with positive total migration flows. The sample consists of 3,359 observations for low-skilled
migration rates and 3,522 observations for the high-skilled migration rates. All regressions
include destination fixed effects and variables to control for multilateral resistance to mi-
gration. The network variable is instrumented using its 10-year lag. Standard errors are
clustered by country of origin.
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G. Sample structure and descriptive statistics
The sample structure is decribed as following:
• Our 33 OECD destinations are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Switzerland, Chile, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Estonia,
Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, United
States.
• Our 123 countries of origin are: Angola, Albania, United Arab Emirates,
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Benin,
Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus,
Bolivia, Brazil, Central African Republic, Canada, Switzerland, Chile,
China, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo. Rep. of the, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, United King-
dom, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Greece, Guatemala, China. Hong Kong
SAR, Honduras, Croatia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iran, Iraq,
Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan,
Cambodia, Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Sri Lanka, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Morocco, Moldova, Madagascar, Mexico, Mali, Burma (Myan-
mar), Mauritania, Malaysia, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Netherlands, Norway,
Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Papua New
Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Paraguay, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Ro-
mania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Senegal, Singapore, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Syria, Chad, Togo, Thailand, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, United
States, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, South Africa, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
• The 37 non-OECD destination countries included in Figure 2.A1 (Ap-
pendix A) are: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Burkina Faso, Belarus,
Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, Hong Kong, China, Croatia, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Cambodia, Lithuania, Mali, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philip-
pines, Paraguay, Romania, Rwanda, Sudan, Togo, Thailand, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Uruguay, South Africa, Zambia.
Table 2.A6 provides descriptive statistics on migration intensity variables and
explanatory variables.
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Chapter 3
Forecasting future
migration and the potential
impact of policy
intervention: insights from
a micro-founded behavioral
model
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Abstract1
This study proposes a theoretical framework to forecast future migration in the
dynamic context of development. It takes into consideration three factors af-
fecting migration, including income, population size, and skill composition. In
particular, I built a micro-founded model to characterize the effects of income
on migration based on the theory of the mobility transition, distinguishing
between the effects on migration incentives and constraints. This framework
further allows to envision the potential outcomes of two types of policy intend-
ing to govern migration that are border restriction at destination and fostering
development at origin. An illustrative exercise is conducted to foresee future mi-
gration flows to OECD countries in the upcoming decade. The results indicate
a large increase in the future number of potential migrants from sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) to OECD countries. However, the number of effective migrants
will be much more limited due to the fact that slow growth in SSA will retain
the capacity of potential migrants to realize their migration plan. Border re-
striction will affect the world migration both in size and direction. Moreover,
only substantial growth in SSA could succeed to reduce future outmigration
intensity from the region.
JEL codes: F22, O15
Keywords: Migration, Development, Aspirations, Credit constraints
1I am grateful to Fre´de´ric Docquier and to Joe¨l Machado for their helps in conducting this
study. I acknowledge the financial support by the European Commission in the framework of
the European Doctorate in Economics Erasmus Mundus (EDEEM). Special thanks to Ro-
muald Me´ango, Daniel Mirza, Christiane Clemens, Timothy Hatton, Gonzague Vannooren-
berghe, Gerald Willmann, and the participants of the following workshops and conferences for
their useful feedbacks and comments: the 2016 Macro Lunch in Louvain-la-neuve, the 2016
Doctoral Workshop in Namur, the 2017 Workshop on Understanding voluntary and forced
migration in Lille, and the 2017 Graduate Conference of Migration and Mobility Studies in
Neuchaˆtel. Finally, I would like to thank Jessie Fagan for her diligent proofreading of this
paper. Any errors which remain are my own.
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3.1 Introduction
Forecasting migration could be considered to be the most difficult component
of population projection. The multitude of factors influencing migration makes
this task particularly complex. To date, existing official projections have been
criticized to not rely on any transition theory to predict migration (Sander et
al., 2017). The methodology often relies on simplified and ad hoc assumptions.
For instance, the UN world population prospects only assume constant future
migration flows. The Wittgenstein database uses constant migration rates of
the period of 2005-2010 estimated from a bi-regional model to project migration
for the entire 21st century (Lutz et al., 2014). They also do not provide predic-
tion of bilateral migration. While at the same time, the public has increasing
interest in knowing whether future development will foster or reduce migration,
and whether policies intending to govern migration could be effective. Answer-
ing to these questions requires a projection methodology that accounts for the
bilateral structure of migration, for economic and demographic characteristics,
and for the ambiguous effect of income on migration. This paper provides such
methodology that can be used to project future country-to-country migration
under different socio-politico-economic scenarios.
The methodology consists of simultaneously plugging in three exogenous factors
including income, demographic growth, and skill composition of the population
into a partial equilibrium behavioral model of migration. In particular, in order
to model the impact of income on migration behavior, the paper relies on the
theory of the hump-shaped relationship between emigration and development.
Until now, no study has considered this well-established theory to forecast
future migration. More precisely, the micro-founded model builds upon the
findings of Dao et al. (2016) which is the most recent analysis on the determi-
nants of the migration hump. The model endogenizes two steps of migration
decision. First, individuals develop the willingness to migrate based on income
differentials as well as their relative positions in each society. Once decided to
migrate, individuals prepare for migration by saving part of their earnings to
pay for the migration costs. The migration response to income differs between
skill groups.
The theoretical model developed in this paper relates to two previous studies
by Lopez and Schiff (1998) and Djajic and Vinogradova (2014). The first one
is a static model while the second one is dynamic. Both consider income differ-
entials as a motive to migrate. Fixed migration cost and financial constraints
explain the rise of emigration in low-income countries when economies develop.
Lopez and Schiff (1998)’s model uses linear utility function and two separate
equations of migration incentives and constraints. However, it does not allow
the generation of a smooth inverted-U shape relationship between migration
and income. It also can only explain the downward slope of the inverted U by
allowing migration incentives to decrease with the squeezing wage gaps, but not
due to the rising opportunity costs of migration preparation. While Djajic and
Vinogradova (2014) develop a dynamic model endogenizing the age at which
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migration takes place and the opportunity cost of migration that depends on
the amount of time of preparation for migration. Nevertheless, these models
are purely theoretical and have not been confronted with empirical findings.
For the sake of simplicity, the micro-founded model of this study is chosen to be
static like the one by Lopez and Schiff (1998). However, the utility function is
refined to accommodate facts drawn from real data. It is augmented by using
a non-linear specification, accounting for relative deprivation, and explicitly
modeling the time cost of preparing for migration. The model identifies a clear
first step where individuals develop a desire to migrate and a second step where
they realize this intention. The paper defines “potential migrants” as those who
express a desire to migrate and, among which, “effective migrants” as those who
actually manage to do so.2 For this model, migration aspirations depend on
the absolute level of income and the relative position that people have in each
society. The realization of migration is a function of the capacity of financing
migration, which depends on income at origin country and the cost of migration.
One of the noticeable contributions of this paper relies on the fact that the cost
of migration is modeled to vary with income in the origin country. The common
assumption of fixed migration cost in the majority of existing studies does not
help to explain why with higher financial capacity the realization of migration,
already conditional on the declining incentive to migrate, decrease. The choice
of having migration cost dependent on income within this model is compatible
with the empirical finding that migration realization rate diminishes with higher
level of development found in Dao et al. (2016).
In the illustrative exercise, the model is calibrated to fit the bilateral patterns of
potential and effective migration from 175 countries to 33 OECD destinations
in 2010. It is then used to predict the indirect and direct migration pressure3
on OECD countries between 2010 and 2020. The indirect pressure refers to the
volume of potential migrants who desire and attempt to migrate. Among these
would-be migrants, those who have the capacity to turn their migration project
into reality represent the direct migration pressure. The calibration makes use
of the Gallup database that provides the information on individuals’ willingness
for migration for a large majority of countries in the world. It also employs the
backsolving technique developed by Docquier et al. (2015) to quantify the cost
of migration, which is assumed to be the gap between potential and effective
migration.
The results of simulation suggest that between 2010 and 2020 immigration
volume to OECD countries will rise by 18.69%. This predicted number cor-
responds to the 1.7% yearly increase observed between 2010 and 2015. The
combination of demographic transition, income evolution and human capital
growth gives rise to numerous patterns of future migration around the world.
Declining migration due to aging population and higher income will be expe-
rienced in China, Eastern Europe and Mexico. Population boom coupled with
2“Potential”, “desiring” and “intending” can be used interchangeably. “Effective” and
“actual” can be used interchangeably.
3This word simply refers to the high intensity of immigration.
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high economic growth weighing down credit constraint will stimulate migration
from South Asia. While in SSA, youth bulge and persistently large income dif-
ferentials between that region and OECD destinations will enlarge the pool of
potential migrants (those who would like to migrate). This represents a rising
indirect migration pressure on OECD countries. However the slow economic
growth in SSA could not lift up the problem of credit constraint therefore the
volume of effective migrants (i.e. the direct pressure) will still be limited.
The results of this study could be compared to the most recent papers by
Hatton and Williamson (2003), Hanson and McIntosh (2016), Docquier and
Machado (2017) and Dao et al. (2017). All the four papers provide projec-
tions of future migration in the 21st century and come to the same conclusion
of a high migration pressure from SSA. Hanson and McIntosh (2016) call the
Mediterranean sea the “new” Rio Grande. The authors predict a fall of immi-
gration to the US because of demographic stagnation in Mexico, while Europe
would face high migration pressure from the neighboring SSA and Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) because of their bulging population and low growth
prospect. In comparison with these four papers, this study provides a short-
term projection of the period 2010-2020 due to the lack of accurate prediction
of income of a longer period. Even though the considered period of time is
short, the conclusion of this paper is somewhat in line with those studies. By
the end of this decade, migration volumes from Mexico and Latin America and
the Caribbean (LAC) to the US are still high however the sign of sluggishness
is apparent. Migration pressure from SSA and MENA will be on the rise at
very high speed. In addition, one extra element developed in this study will
help to refine this conclusion in the existing literature. The four aforemen-
tioned papers only consider the wage gap as the main driver of migration and
consequently reach the conclusion that migration pressure from SSA will be
the most intensive. This paper however also brings into play the capacity to
realize migration. Due to the fact that population growth will not go hand in
hand with economic growth in SSA, the volume of its people who would like
to emigrate will increase but at the same time these individuals will continue
to face high financial constraint to realize their migration intention. Therefore,
the direct migration pressure (i.e. the volume of effective migrants) will be
lower than the indirect migration pressure (i.e. the volume of potential mi-
grants) from SSA at least in the short and medium terms when its economy
does not show any sign of taking off.4
After determining where migration pressure will arise and the destinations on
which the pressure will exert under the “business-as-usual” scenario, this paper
also projects migration under another plausible scenario of rising protectionism
and stricter border control. It is inspired by the most recent political events.
The first one is Brexit where Britain voted to leave the European Union. The
second one is the victory of Donald Trump in the 2017 US presidential election.
Both events could have consequences on migration. Based on these events, we
4It could possibly mean that the intensity of irregular migration from Africa will be more
pronounced.
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expect that migration to the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States
(US) will be more restricted in the next coming years. With the technique
used in this paper, it is possible to estimate how the world migration will be
hypothetically affected by a border closing in these two major destinations.
This scenario is called the “Brexit-Trumpism” scenario. The results indicate
that border restrictions have various implications on the world migration. The
world volume of migrants would be more than halved and Mexican migrants
would be mostly affected. Migration would intensify in other OECD countries,
especially in Canada.
Additionally, the microfounded model of this paper can serve as a tool to sim-
ulate the effect of development policies on migration flows. The attempt to
manage migration flows has always been a major concern of governments. Ex-
amples of policies aiming at reducing migration can be easily found in many in-
ternational cooperation agendas, from the biggest trade deal such as NAFTA5
to the world’s largest workfare program India’s National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act intending to reduce rural-urban migration (Imbert and Papp,
2016). Very recently the European Union has initiated a New Migration Part-
nership framework that tailors compacts of development aid, trade and other
economic areas to lower-income peripheral countries.6 The purpose of these
“EU compacts” is to help bordering low- and middle-income countries develop
in order to address the root causes of irregular migration. The measures are
stimulating employment, bringing in private investors and innovative financing
mechanisms. The budget is estimated up to 62 billion Euros. The question
raised in this study would be whether these developmental measures will be ef-
fective in limiting migration. Using the model developed, this paper estimates
the levels of economic growth in SSA and MENA countries that are required to
suppress emigration flows from these regions to the EU15.7 The result of this
simulation exercise suggests that developmental measures intending to limit
migration could fail to prove their effectiveness. Because of the current low
development levels in the targeted countries, rising income in the medium run
would only free up potential migrants from financial constraint and further
intensify out-migration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the literature on the
developmental determinants of migration and the assumptions to build the
behavioral model of migration in section three. Section four describes the
calibration strategies. From the benchmark scenario, results on future potential
and effective migration will be commented in section five. It later presents
the predictions on the consequences of the “Brexit-Trumpism” scenario and
estimation of the development levels in developing countries that are required
to reduce migration intensity. Finally section six concludes the study.
5At the wake of which the former Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari made a
clear statement: “Mexico wants to export goods, not people.”
6The countries are Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Morocco, Tunisia,
Libya and Ethiopia.
7The EU15 comprised the following 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom.
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3.2 Development and migration: Review and empirical
facts
In order to predict future migration, one must address two questions: (i) why
do people migrate? and (ii) under which conditions? The first question refers to
the causes that drive individuals to migrate. The second question refers to the
constraints that retain people from moving and the favorable conditions that
allow migration to take place. These are the two basic elements contained in
the majority of migration models. This section will first review the literature
on the developmental determinants of migration and presents the empirical
facts that will be used to develop the micro-founded model in the next section.
Studies on the causes of labor mobility constitutes the building block of re-
search on migration (e.g. Lewis, 1954; Ranis and Fei, 1961; Sjaastad, 1962;
Lee, 1966; Todaro, 1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Stark and Bloom, 1985).
According to the neoclassical theory, migration is driven by income differen-
tials between places. Migration therefore linearly decreases with lower income
gap. This gives rise to a common belief among policy makers that combat-
ing poverty in less-developed countries would reduce migration pressure. Real
data however reveal a paradox that emigration intensity in poor countries is
rather low and the relationship between migration and income is hump-shaped.
Thus, income differentials may well determine the desire or intention to mi-
grate, but migration is also affected by a set of conditioning factors that may
constrain or facilitate migration. These factors are mostly attributed to the
existence of migration cost (Carrington et al., 1996) and liquidity constraints
especially among the very poor (Dustmann and Okatenko, 2014; Hatton and
Williamson, 2003; Massey et al., 1993; Phan and Coxhead, 2010), which are
barriers to migration. The interplay between migration incentives and con-
straints helps to explain the rise and fall of the migration hump characterizing
the relationship between development and emigration (Zelinsky, 1971). Em-
igration first rises with development because greater income relaxes financial
constraints limiting migration. When the economy reaches a certain level of
development, the willingness to migrate falls because the opportunity cost of
migrating increases. Besides these two factors characterizing the response of
migration to income, the literature also identifies other macroeconomic drivers
of the migration hump, which are demographic transition, economic structural
change, accumulation of migrant network, education, policy and geography. A
complete literature review can be found in Clemens et al. (2014).
This current paper is built on the new empirical findings found in Dao et
al. (2016) on the mechanisms that govern the effects of income on migration
willingness and realization.8 It also uses the same conceptual framework by
8The authors collect the information on individuals’ willingness to migrate from the Gallup
World Poll survey available for the majority of countries in the world. Until now, a number
of studies rely on this dataset to investigate the patterns and determinants of migration
intentions. Specifically, Docquier et al. (2014) study the determinants of potential and
actual migration; Manchin et al. (2014) analyze the effect of life satisfaction on the desire to
migrate; Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) provide evidence of the relationship between the
99
On The Fundamental Drivers of International Migration
considering two migration variables that are potential migration and effective
migration. Potential migrants are the ones who desire to migrate and prepare
to do so. However, not all potential migrants can succeed. Those who can
actually migrate are called effective migrants. The basic theoretical frame-
work and empirical facts are presented in the following paragraphs. They will
subsequently be used throughout the rest of the paper.
Bilateral effective or actual migration stock is denoted by nijs from country
of origin (i = 1, ..., I) to destination country (j = 1, ..., J). We distinguish
between two types of migrants by their skill groups s, one with college education
(denoted by h, which stands for the high skill), and the other with less education
(denoted by l, which stands for the low skill). The aggregated numbers of
emigrants from each country of origin i to all destinations is the aggregated
M is =
∑
j nijs. To compute actual migration intensities we divide the number
of actual migration by the origin resident population Nis. Actual migration
intensities can be measured as mijs ≡ nijs/Nis at the bilateral level, and as
mis ≡M is/Nis on the aggregate.
The number of bilateral potential migrants is denoted by Nijs. The total poten-
tial emigrants of each origin country is therefore N is =
∑
j Nijs. Additionally,
the intensity of potential migration can be measured as pijs ≡ Nijs/Nis at
the bilateral level and as pis ≡ N is/Nis on the aggregate. Potential migrants
can unsuccessfully realize their migration intention, therefore bilateral and ag-
gregate realization rates are defined as the share of effective migration over
potential migration rijs ≡ mijs/pijs and ris ≡ mis/pis.
Dao et al. (2016) use a decomposition equation of actual emigration rates to
investigate whether the effect of economic development on emigration is driven
by the skill composition, migration aspirations or realization. The decompo-
sition equation of average emigration rate of each sending country writes as
follows:
mi ≡ δihmih + δilmil, (3.1)
with δih the proportion of college educated and (δil) the proportion of low-
skilled in the population. By definition, δil+δih = 1. According to the formula,
the average emigration rate is the sum of the emigration rates of the two skill
groups weighted by the share of each skill groups in the population. It can
then be decomposed as:
mi = δihpihrih + δilpilril. (3.2)
The actual migration rate of each skill group is equal to the product of the
potential migration rate and realization rate. In other words, the probability
of a person being a migrant is equal to the probability of this person belonging
to the pool of potential migrants multiplied by the probability that he can
realize his migration plan.
intention to move and satisfaction with amenities; Docquier et al. (2015) and Delogu et al.
(2014) use the proportion of individuals who intend to move to analyze the efficiency gains
of a removal of the legal restrictions to migration.
100
Chapter 3
Using cross-sectional data on effective and potential migration flows between
2000 and 2010 from 123 countries to 33 OECD destinations, Dao et al. (2016)
find that the observed average effective emigration intensity follows a inverted-
U relationship with development. They subsequently quantify relative con-
tributions of all potential drivers that could affect migration willingness and
realization for the two skill groups. The explanatory variables represent all the
channels that are hypothesized to shape the migration transition curve, namely,
the gravity drivers (proxied by geographic, genetic, and linguistic distances),
migrant networks, macroeconomic drivers (share of young population, economic
openness, and education quality), income inequality, change in restrictiveness of
migration policies, skill-specific wages and destination fixed effects. Once con-
trolled for all other non-behavioral drivers, the coefficients of the skill-specific
wages, linear and quadratic, give the upper bounds of individual’s behavioral
responses to income.9 They will later be used to calibrate the model developed
in this paper.
Dao et al. (2016)’s results suggest that potential migration is negatively af-
fected by geographical distance. Skill-specific income linearly decreases the will-
ingness to migrate among the less-educated. While the aspirations of college-
graduates do not seem to be affected by absolute income but instead by relative
status. As for the results of migration realization, both linear and quadratic
terms of income have significant impacts among the less-educated. The linear
terms is positive while the quadratic one is negative. This suggests that dur-
ing early stages of development, economic progress increases the capacity of
the less-educated to financially meet the cost of international movement. The
effect of income on migration realization of the highly-skilled is significantly
negative. This can be explained by the fact that the highly-skilled face more
increasing opportunity cost of migration when income rises.
These results provide important bases to build the microfounded model to
predict future migration in development process. To summarize, the behavioral
model of migration is designed to match 4 findings in Dao et al. (2016):
• F1: The migration aspirations of the college graduates do not vary with
development.
• F2: The migration aspirations of the less-educated decrease with devel-
opment.
• F3: The realization rates of the college graduates decrease with develop-
ment.
• F4: The realization rates of the less-educated follow an inverted-U rela-
tionship with development.
From the data used in this paper, Figure 3.1 illustrates the non-parametric
9These coefficients should be considered as upper bounds because the endogeneity bias
could not be properly removed from the estimations.
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trend of the current emigration rates we observe in 2010 over the full range
of income level proxied by GDP/worker. The relationship between emigration
and development follows an inverted-U curve. The same pattern is found in
Dao et al. (2016).
Figure 3.1: Nonparametric regressions of aggregate emigration rates on GDP
per worker
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3.3 Micro-foundations of aspirations and realization rates
To predict the impact of future development on migration prospects, a partial
equilibrium behavioral model is developed based on the findings presented in
the previous section. The model highlights major economic mechanisms under-
lying migration aspirations and realization. The willingness to migrate of an
individual depends on the wage differentials between countries, his relative po-
sition in each society, and a random component that captures the heterogeneity
of individuals’ preferences. The realization of migration is determined by the
cost of migration netted from the help of social network and other favorable
conditions;10 and the capacity of an individual to afford this cost of migration.
The migration cost is estimated as the gap between the number of people who
want to migrate and those who can actually do so.
10The favorable conditions facilitating migration are for example the skill attraction policies
in destination countries such as the EU Blue Card, the point-based systems in Canada,
Australia and New Zealand.
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3.3.1 General structure of the model
Each country is characterized by a representative individual of type-s who lives
two periods of unequal length. This two-period structure is developed in order
to identify two clear steps in the migration process. They are assumed to
correspond to the distinction between migration aspirations and realization in
the data. Existing studies using Gallup (Docquier et al., 2015, 2017) show that
aspirations are likely to reflect after-migration net utility gains when living
in destination country. These gains and costs are reflected in the utility of
the second period. The first period corresponds to the one in which moving
costs are incurred without inducing benefits. During the first period of life,
the individual lives in his country of birth i, decides to migrate or not to
country j and prepares for the move if he wishes to leave. Migration happens
at the end of the first period. In the second period or in the mature stage
of life, individual lives in the destination country if he manages to realize his
migration plan. Those who stay in origin country in the second period are
the sum of the number of people who initially did not want to migrate and
the potential migrants who did not succeed in migrating. The unsuccessful
migrants are individuals whose ex-ante realization costs exceed the ex-post
net benefits. The instantaneous random utility function of our representative
individual born in country i writes as:
Uijs = ρu
1
ijs + u
2
ijs + ε
2
ijs, (3.3)
where u1ijs is the utility in the early stage of the working life when the individual
prepares to migrate, weighed by a preference parameter ρ, which captures
impatience and the relative length of the first period. u2ijs is the utility in the
mature stage of life and ε2ijs is the random component of utility. The latter
varies among individuals, capturing the heterogeneity of preferences. If the
individual decides not to migrate, his utility in his first period is u1iis and in
the second period is u2iis. The utilities of a potential migration are u
1
ijs in the
early stage and u2ijs in the mature stage of life.
The probability that a type-s individual born in country i will develop a will-
ingness to migrate to country j is given by:
Nijs
Nis
= Pr
[
u2ijs + ε
2
ijs = max
k
u2iks + ε
2
iks
]
, (3.4)
where Nis is the native population of type s of country i and Nijs is the number
of potential migrants from country i to country j. Niis denotes the potential
number of non-migrants or natives staying in i. The formula states that the
probability that an individual is willing to move from his origin country i to
destination j is the probability that he perceives that country j would offer him
the highest utility among all possible destinations k including his own country
i. We use the McFadden theorem (McFadden, 1984) to analytically solve this
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problem. According to the theorem where the random term εijs is assumed to
follow an i.i.d. extreme-value distribution of type I of mean 0 and standard
deviation 1, the probability that a type-s individual born in country i will
develop a desire to move to country j is given by the following logit expression:
Pr
[
u2ijs + ε
2
ijs = max
k
u2iks + ε
2
iks
]
=
exp
[
u2ijs
]∑
k
exp [u2iks]
.
We then derive the log ratio of desiring emigrants from country i to country j
to total desiring stayers expressed by the following linear expression:
ln
[
Nijs
Niis
]
= u2ijs − u2iis ≡ Bijs. (3.5)
In this expression, we define Bijs as the net utility differential in the second
period of life that drives the individual’s willingness to migrate.
In the same manner, the probability that a type-s individual born in country i
will move to country j is given by:
nijs
Nis
= Pr
[
Uijs = max
k
Uiks
]
, (3.6)
where Nis is the native population of type s originates from country i and
nijs is the number of migrants from country i to country j. niis denotes the
number of non-migrants or natives staying in i. As previously mentioned, the
random term εijs is assumed to follow a Type I Extreme Value Distribution.
The probability that a type-s individual born in country i will move to country
j is given by the following logit expression:
Pr
[
Uijs = max
k
Uiks
]
=
exp
[
ρu1ijs + u
2
ijs
]∑
k
exp [ρu1iks + u
2
iks]
.
We can thus equate the log-ratio of the number of actual emigrants nijs and
actual stayers niis to the net utility gain from realizing migration bijs:
ln
[
nijs
niis
]
=
[
ρu1ijs + u
2
ijs
]− [ρu1iis + u2iis] ≡ bijs. (3.7)
As illustrated, the individual’s actual migration decision is governed by the
difference in lifetime utilities of moving and not moving.
The proportion of actual migrants among the total potential migrants defines
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our concept of realization rate, which is:
Rijs =
nijs
Nijs
. (3.8)
A less-than-unity bilateral realization rate could be explained by two potential
reasons: either people change to other foreign destinations or they remain at
origin.
The total number of natives of each country is:
Nis =
∑
j
nijs = niis +
∑
j 6=i
nijs =
∑
j
Nijs = Niis +
∑
j 6=i
Nijs.
In order to generate the observed U-shape patterns, u1ijs and u
2
ijs must belong
to a family of utility function that is increasing in its first order (u′(.) > 0) and
decreasing in its second order (u′′(.) < 0) of its argument. The utility of our
representative individual can take the form of a simple log-utility function.
3.3.2 Aspirations for migration
In line with the interpretation of Dao et al. (2016), I introduce relative utility
concept and the log-specification for u2ijs. The mature-stage utility levels are
dependent on the absolute income gain and the relative position gain of an
individual in a society:
u2ijs = lnyjs − αlnyjm − ln(1 + dijs), i 6= j
u2iis = lnyis − αlnyim
diis = 0
If the individual chooses to migrate, he also takes into account in his utility
dijs, which is the disutility of living abroad. The latter could be emotional
cost, assimilation cost that potential migrants expect to face once being at
destination. The parameter α represents the intensity of utility or disutility
related to the individual’s relative position in the society. We assume that
the individual compares his living standard to the average one in the society
he lives in. This assumption is common in the macroeconomic literature on
social comparison (Clemens, 2004, 2006; Fershtman et al., 1996; Boskin and
Sheshinski, 1978). Relative status is assumed to only affect utility in the second
stage of life when the individual reach a certain level of maturity. They are also
assumed to be fully aware of the income distribution in their own countries as
well as in destination countries.
In the Gallup World Poll, individuals were asked whether ideally they want to
migrate. We can thus assume that when answered to this question individuals
disregard the preparation burden of migration and only consider the net ben-
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efits of emigrating after crossing the border. I.e. in the mature stage of their
working life, emigrating induces an average net utility gain that is:
Bijs ≡ u2ijs − u2iis = [lnyjs − lnyis]− α [lnyjm − lnyim]− ln(1 + dijs). (3.9)
The first term [lnyjs − lnyis] reflects the absolute gain in income after migrating
to higher-income country. It corresponds to the well-known income differential
that effects negatively migration in neoclassical models. This subfunction in-
creases with the average income at destination yjs, and decreases with that at
origin yis. While the second component α [lnyjm − lnyim] shows the individ-
ual’ relative utility loss from living in richer surroundings. This status function
increases with income of reference group at destination yjm, and decreases with
that at origin yim. This specification is common in the existing literature on
social comparisons (Clark and Oswald, 1998). In all countries in our sample,
the average-income individual belongs to the low-skill group,11 thus yim = yil
and yjm = yjl later in the numerical exercise. The parameter α will be chosen
such that the model will be compatible with the findings F1 and F2, according
to which absolute income only negatively affects the willingness to migrate of
the low-skilled and relative income matters more for the migration decision of
the highly-skilled. We define the country-specific skill premium σi which is the
ratio of high- over low-skill wages σi =
yjh
yjl
. Proposition 1 in the Appendix
describes how aspirations for migration will change with the average incomes
per worker at origin and/or destination.
3.3.3 Realization of migration
Once decided to migrate, the would-be migrant will prepare for the move. He
takes into account the bilateral pecuniary cost of moving cijs, which is totally
incurred in the early stage of the working life. Individual cannot borrow to
finance the cost. In order to successfully realize migration, he needs to save up
to the amount of this migration cost cijs, which is assumed to be discovered
only when the individual starts preparing for migration, and not to influence
his willingness to migrate. The early-stage utility levels in log-specification are
given by: 
u1ijs = ln(yis − cijs), i 6= j
u1iis = lnyis
ciis = 0
Following Equation 3.7, the net lifetime utility can be re-written as:
bijs = Bijs + ρGijs, (3.10)
where Gijs = ln(yis − cijs) − lnyis. Since Gijs is always equal to zero or
negative, the net utility gained when realizing migration bijs is lower than or
equal to the utility that potential migrants expected Bijs.
11In fact, the low-skill group accounts for more than 90% of the population in developing
and less-developed countries (see for example Figure 3.2.a in Dao et al. (2016)).
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A common practice in migration studies to estimate the migration cost cijs is
to use variables that affect migration negatively such as geographical distance,
cultural distance, mobility restrictions, or positively such as migrant network,
etc. It is worth noting that these migration costs have, in most of the case,
been estimated as fixed. This induces that migration will always increase with
higher income. Therefore, a fixed cost of moving does not allow us to replicate
the findings F3 and F4 according to which the realization of migration decreases
with higher level of development.
To clearly illustrate this point, the following paragraphs develop the argument
in mathematical terms. Starting with the college graduates, the two empirical
facts are that their realization rate decreases with income or, in other words, the
net utility gain from realizing migration declines with income
∂bijh
∂lnyih
< 0 (F3),
while income does not have significant impact of their aspirattions for migration
∂Bijh
∂lnyih
= 0 (F1). Since bijh = Bijh + ρGijh where Gijh = ln(yih− cijh)− lnyih,
taking derivative of both sides of bijh, we should obtain that
∂Gijh
∂yih
< 0:
∂bijh
∂yih︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
=
∂Bijh
∂yih︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ ρ︸︷︷︸
>0
∂Gijh
∂yih︸ ︷︷ ︸
⇒<0
.
However, if cijh is fixed, the derivative of Gijh with respect to yih should be
positive rather than negative:
∂Gijh
∂yih
=
+cijh
yih (yih − cijh) ≥ 0.
Therefore the migration cost should vary with income and the elasticity should
be higher than unity:
∂Gijh
∂yih
=
1− ∂cijh∂yih
yih − cijh −
1
yih
< 0⇔ ∂lncijh
∂lnyih
> 1.
For the less educated, income decreases significantly their aspirations to migrate
∂Bijl
∂yil
< 0 (F2), while their realization rate first increases then decreases with
income (F4)
∂bijl
∂lnyil
> 0 and
∂2bijl
∂(lnyil)2
< 0. The critical point z can always be
determined as:
∂bijl
∂yil
=
∂Bijl
∂yil
+ ρ
∂Gijl
∂yil
=
− (1− α)
yil
+ ρ
[
1− ∂cijl∂yil
yil − cijl −
1
yil
]
= 0
∂lncijl
∂lnyil
= 1 +
(α− 1) (yil − cijl)
ρcijl
As the result of these facts, I adopt the choice of modeling that makes cijs
explicitly dependent on yis. With this strategy, we can obtain the pattern
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that when cijs increases at lower rate than yis migration will rise and when
cijs increases at faster rate, migration will decline. More specifically to be
compatible with F3 and F4, the migration cost will take the following form:
cijs = kijsyis + vijs, (3.11)
in which kijs represents the time cost. And kijsyis represents the forgone
consumption or the opportunity cost that potential migrant needs to sacrifice
in order to prepare to migrate. The residual vijs could be interpreted as a
fixed cost or benefit of migration that would-be migrants do not spend time
to prepare for.12 If the individual stays in his country of origin i he faces no
migration cost cijs = 0. Note that because of the use of log-utility function,
the migration cost cannot be equal to or exceeds the level of home income, i.e.
cijs must satisfy that cijs < yis.
In Docquier et al. (2015), the gap between desired and actual migration rates
is the cost of migration and it is totally attributed to the cost induced by visa
restrictions. Based on this model setting I can identify the functional form of
the migration gap gijs as follows:
gijs = Bijs − bijs = ρ (lnyis − ln(yis − cijs)) . (3.12)
This migration gap is the difference between the potential migration rate and
the actual migration rate. If the migration gap is equal to zero, all individuals
who desire to migrate can effectively realize it. It has positive correlation with
the pecuniary migration cost cijs. Its derivative with respect to income of group
s in country i is
dgijs
dyis
= ρ
[ −vijs
yis(yis−cijs)
]
. It thus decreases with income at origin
if vijs > 0 and increases if vijs < 0. Since bijs = Bijs−gijs, we can differentiate
6 scenarios for the future migration realization where Bijs and gijs evolve
differently with changes in incomes at origin and destination. Proposition 2 in
the Appendix details how migration will respond to convergence or divergence
of development between countries. On the one hand, increasing income relaxes
the budget constraint and allows migration to take place. On the other hand,
spending time preparing migration when income increases also means foregoing
better opportunities in the current location, migration willingness will therefore
decrease.
3.3.4 Data and parameter identifications
To illustrate the functionality of the developed model, in this subsection I first
calibrate it using data of the year 2010 available for 175 countries. The following
paragraphs explain how I identify the common, country-specific and bilateral
parameters of the model.
12cijs embeds migration costs related to policy, for example migration quotas, which are
equivalents to monetary and non-monetary costs in the utility function (similar to tariff
equivalent of non-tariff barriers in trade (Facchini and Willmann, 2005)).
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Actual migration is measured by taking the data on effective migration stocks
in 2010 from OECD-DIOC database (OECD, 2014).13 The DIOC database
provides bilateral migration stocks nsij by education level s from all countries
of origin i to 33 OECD destination countries j. I only consider working-age pop-
ulation with age from 25 and above. The data are sorted into two skill groups,
college-educated (h) and less-educated (l). These data have been recorded be-
fore the start of the refugee crisis in 2015, therefore mostly capture economic
migrants who are the subject of this study. To compute actual migration inten-
sities in 2010, I divide the migration stocks by the origin resident population
aged 25 and above Nsi in 2010. Data on N
s
i is taken from Artuc¸ et al. (2015).
The log-ratio of migrants to stayers is then computed as ln
[
nijs
niis
]
.
For the information on potential migration, I first consider the same variable
used in Docquier et al. (2014) that is collected from the Gallup World Poll
surveys. Available in 142 countries representing 97 percent of the world pop-
ulation, the question that identifies the proportion of non-migrants expressing
a desire to emigrate is (i) Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to
move to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this coun-
try?.14 The bilateral migration intention is captured by the next following
question (ii) To which country would you like to move?. In line with actual
migration and population data, I only consider respondents aged 25 and above
and distinguish between individuals with college education or and less educated.
Since observations are not available for all 175 countries in 2010, the variable
is aggregated over four waves of poll, i.e. from 2007 to 2010, and considered as
one unified observation in 2010. Next, adding this stock of desiring migrants
from the Gallup World Poll to actual migrants, I obtain an approximation of
the number of potential migrants Nijs. This number represents the migra-
tion stocks that would have been observed in 2010 if all desiring migrants had
been able to emigrate. Once having the number of potential migrants of each
country-pair, I obtain the log-ratio of potential migrants to potential stayers
ln
[
Nijs
Niis
]
. Albeit many critics about the small sample sizes15 and the reliabil-
ity in capturing migration willingness, the Gallup dataset is a unique source
of information that allows comprehensive cross-country comparison. Empirical
13In fact, the findings from Dao et al. (2016) are drawn from empirical analyses that use
net migration flows. While here I use these findings to predict variation in migration stocks.
Supposing that the relationship between net migration flows and development is stable over
time, the same relationship should be reflected in the migration stocks, which by definition
are the accumulated flows. In addition, migration processes are heterogeneous in terms of
duration of stay, entry track, etc. The OECD-DIOC database however does not contain
such details of migration. These migration stock data are assumed to reflect the aggregate
long-run migration equilibrium.
14This question does not exactly capture the number of people who actually take an action
to realize migration. The Gallup World Poll also asks two other relevant questions about
the preparation for migration that are (i) Are you planning to move permanently to another
country in the next 12 months, or not? and (ii) Have you done any preparation for this
move? For example, have you applied for residency or a visa, purchased the ticket, etc.?.
These questions however contain very few observations that do not allow to conduct robust
analyses.
15The sample size is about 1000 individuals in each surveyed country.
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studies also prove that it offers relevant information about migration aspira-
tions as it permits to obtain intuitive results. Its migration intention variable
is found to be significantly affected by individuals’ wealth level and content-
ment with local amenities (Dustmann and Okatenko, 2014), by social networks
(Manchin et al., 2014); and there is a high correlation between migration aspi-
rations at year t and actual migration flows at year t+1 (Bertoli and Ruyssen,
2017).
In order to identify the relative length of the first period ρ, I use the statistics
on the age of first-time immigrants in major receiving countries.16 The median
age of new immigrants to the EU-28 in 2013 was 28 years (Eurostat, 2015).
In Canada, the median age of newcomers in 2011 was 31.7 years (Chui et al.,
2014). Age increases the likelihood of an individual migrating to the US until
age 32.5, after which point age decreases the likelihood (Quinn, 2006). Based
on these facts, I set the age at which individuals migrate abroad is 30 years
old. From the beginning of adulthood at age 18 to the retirement age of 65,
successful migrant lives 12 years in his country of origin, and 35 years in country
of destination. The discount factor of a quarter is set to 0.99. Thus the relative
weight of the first period is ρ =
12∑
t=1
0.994t/
65∑
t=13
0.994t equal to 0.8.
Based on the fact found in Dao et al. (2016) according to which the effect of
income on aspirations is not significant for the highly-skilled, the parameter of
relative income α is calibrated such that the derivative of Bijh with respect to
income is equal to zero. In developing countries, the average income is close to
the one of the less-educated group, yjm is therefore proxied by yjl. Replacing yjl
in Equation 3.9 by yihσi and taking the derivative of Bijh with respect to income,
we obtain a relationship between α and the elasticity of skill premium relative to
high-skill wages α−1α =
dlnσ
dlnyh
. The latter is estimated to be equal to −0.22. α is
thus equal to 0.82. This value of α is close to the estimated coefficient attached
to average income variable in the utility function in the existing empirical
literature. The common regression is typically H = βY Y + βY Y + controls
where H is happiness or life satisfaction, Y is absolute income/consumption
and Y is the average income/consumption of the reference group. For the US,
using the 1987-88 and the 1992-94 waves of the National Survey of Families
and Households Luttmer (2005) found βY equal to −0.24; while Layard et al.
(2009) using the General Social Survey of the period 1972-2006 found βY equal
to −0.69, and a βY of −1.552 if H is financial satisfaction. They also found that
in West Germany the elasticity of life satisfaction on average income is equal
to −0.648 based on the longitudinal German Socio-Economic Panel beginning
in 1984.
Next, I compute the emotional cost dijs as a residual of (9). This variable is
specific to each corridor. Estimations reveal that it is strongly correlated with
bilateral distance.
16Many requests have been sent to main statistical offices such as Eurostat, Statistics
Canada in order to obtain skill-specific ages of new immigrants. Unfortunately, none of these
agencies are able to provide such data.
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The two parameters kijs and vijs are calibrated in order to match two moments:
first, the real level of aspirations rates and actual migration rates in Equation
3.10 and second, the change in realization rate with respect to income. From
Equations 3.5, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 3.11 the function of the realization rate is
derived as:
Rijs =
niis
Niis
(
1− kijs − vijs
yis
)ρ
. (3.13)
The time cost kijs and residual vijs are the roots of the following system of two
equations of each country pair:bˆijs = Bˆijs + ρ [ln(yˆis(1− kijs)− vijs)− lnyˆis] (1)ˆdRijs
dyis
= nˆiis
Nˆiis
ρ
(
1− kijs − vijsyˆis
)ρ−1 (
vijs
yˆ2is
)
(2)
The roots of the system are:kˆijs = 1− exp
(
Gˆijs
)
−
ˆdRijs
dlnyis
Nˆiis
nˆiis
ρ(exp(Gˆijs))
ρ−1
vˆijs = yˆis (1− kijs)− yˆisexp
(
Gˆijs
)
with Gˆijs =
bˆijs−Bˆijs
ρ .
17
The semi-elasticities of realization rate to income are obtained from Dao et
al. (2016). For the highly-skilled
ˆdRijh
dlnyih
= −0.0292 and for the less-educated
ˆdRijl
dlnyil
= 0.375− 0.044lnyil.
The results of the calibration of kijs and vijs are shown in Figure 3.2. The
majority of values of kijs lie between 0 and 1. For both skill groups, the
mass point of kijs concentrates on the top right of each graph, meaning that
individuals from higher-income groups face larger opportunity costs of realizing
migration. For the low skill group, the increasing trend of kijl is clearly visible.
This reflects the opportunity costs of the less educated that increase faster
with income than the ones of the college-educated. This allows to obtain after
a certain level of income the downward trend of the realization rate of the
17It is important to note that the cases where the bilateral number of potential migrant
equal to the bilateral number of effective migrants nijs = Nijs and different from zero, i.e.
where success rate is theoretically equal to unity or all who want to migrate can do so, create
inconsistency with the setup model. It is because even though nijs = Nijs bilaterally, the
aggregate numbers of actual and potential stayers can be different niis 6= Niis, thus the net
utility of realizing migration bijs (= ln (nijs/niis)) is different from the net utility of aspiring
for migration Bijs (= ln (Nijs/Niis)). This induces that in these cases the migration cost
cijs cannot be null and the realization rate is not equal to unity. As a result, the simulation
exercise based on these calibrated results could underestimate the number of future migrants.
One solution would be to set Gˆijs to zero in these cases to avoid this theoretical inconsistency.
However, this artificially truncates the calibrated kijs and vijs. Additionally, a zero cost of
migration is hard to be justified in reality. I decide to keep Gˆijs as they are. This concerns
many small corridors, namely 53.38% of the low-skill and 68.26% observations of the highly
skilled. They however only account for 4.34% and 10.58% of the total effective migrants of
the low- and high-skill groups respectively.
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less educated. All values of vijs are negative, representing benefits rather than
costs of migration. The less educated obtain a bigger range of vijl, which means
that they receive higher non-monetary benefits to migrate, probably because
the network effect facilitating migration is stronger for this skill group. This
is in line with common findings in the migration literature (see for example
McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010).
Figure 3.2: Calibrated values of kijs and vijs
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Notes: The figures show the calibrated values of bilateral variables kijs and vijs in relation
with the log GDP/capita in 2010 of 175 origin countries.
The skill-specific incomes of 2010 and 2020 are calculated using the relationship
between GDP per capita yi, the share of working-age population, the share of
each skill groups in the working-age population δis and the wage premium σi.
The 2010 and projected 2020 GDP per capita based on purchasing-power-parity
(PPP) are collected from the IMF World Economic Outlook dataset (2016).18
The projected population growth of the two skill groups college-graduates and
less educated between 2010 and 2020 are calculated based on the projection of
the Wittgenstein centre database (Samir et al., 2010). For the baseline analysis,
I use the medium scenario of population growth, which can be considered as
the most likely with assumptions on medium fertility, mortality and average
18The IMF only provides income projection until 2021. Therefore the simulation in this
paper only limits to 2020.
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path of school expansion.19 Data on the wage ratio between college-educated
and less educated are from Hendricks (2004).
It is important to note that an extension of projection beyond 2020 is possible.20
However, this task requires additional assumptions on income and population
growth prospects. Hanson and McIntosh (2016), for instance, assume the same
growth rates of GDP for all countries for the entire period of half a century,
which is a very strong hypothesis. The scope of this current paper is rather
to propose a migration model and illustratively calibrate it using the most
plausible future observations. Moreover, focusing on short horizon allows to
mitigate the problem of endogeneity between income and demography.
Table 3.1 presents the average annual growth in GDP/cap (PPP) between 2010
and 2020, the actual levels of income per worker in 2010 and the new levels
of income per worker in 2020, on average and of each skill group. Data are
presented for the full sample of 175 countries ranked by the World Bank in-
come classification of 2010, and then for 128 developing countries (defined as
upper-middle-income countries and below) by geo-political groups. In 2010,
SSA experienced the lowest GDP/cap, followed by South Asia and East Asia
and the Pacific. The annual GDP/cap growth rates are forecasted to linearly
decrease with development level between 2010 and 2020. On average, high-
income countries will exhibit the lowest rate of income growth with the level
around +2.66% per year. While low-income countries will experience the high-
est rate of income growth, which is around +4.33% per year. On average, there
will be clearly a trend of convergence in future development. Asian countries
show particularly high growth rates. The highest level of growth rate will be
reached in the two biggest economies China and India, followed by South Asia.
In the developing world, lowest income growth will be found in MENA. Six
countries that are Central African Republic, East Timor, Equatorial Guinea,
Libya, Venezuela, and Yemen show negative rates of GDP/cap growth due to
political economic turmoil. After a decade of growth, SSA will still be the
poorest region. While with its highest income growth, China and India will
catch up in level with MENA countries and even overpass LAC countries.
19The population projection data being used exclude the numbers of migrants predicted by
the Wittgenstein centre database. They thus represent the estimation of natural population
growth.
20For example, Hatton and Williamson (2003) offer projection of African emigration until
2025; Hatton and Williamson (2011) predict immigration trends in the US up to 2034;
and Hanson and McIntosh (2016) forecast migration to OECD countries until the mid-21st
century.
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Table 3.1: Average annual GDP growth and skill-specific incomes
GDP/worker LS income HS income
%∆ 2010 2020 2010 2020 2010 2020
/year
By income groups 2010
Low-income (n=33) 4.33 1,587 2,547 1,390 2,219 6,186 9,892
Lower-middle-income (n=50) 4.17 5,233 8,088 4,079 6,284 15,635 24,021
Upper-middle-income (n=45) 3.73 14,247 20,550 11,203 16,166 34,039 48,718
High-income (n=47) 2.66 41,220 53,175 34,107 43,930 66,228 84,127
By geo-political groups
Middle East and North Africa (n=12) 2.38 11,405 13,829 8,714 10,533 29,925 36,592
Sub-Saharan Africa (n=43) 4.00 3,499 5,236 3,004 4,506 12,897 19,298
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (n=20) 4.76 11,494 18,065 9,019 14,036 22,256 35,138
South Asia (n=7) 5.46 5,065 8,818 4,297 7,435 16,242 28,682
East Asia and the Pacific (n=17) 4.35 5,943 9,509 4,489 7,134 17,136 27,392
Latin America and the Caribbean (n=25) 3.50 10,265 14,496 7,925 11,207 25,432 35,641
China (n=1) 8.23 9,157 20,190 8,821 19,450 13,338 29,408
India (n=1) 7.38 4,445 9,060 3,464 7,060 14,143 28,826
Mexico (n=1) 3.19 15,054 20,605 10,001 13,688 45,902 62,828
Turkey (n=1) 4.53 16,193 25,213 13,013 20,262 44,688 69,580
High-income (n=47) 2.66 41,220 53,175 34,107 43,930 66,228 84,127
Average (n=175) 3.68 16,528 22,357 13,468 18,169 32,174 43,850
Notes: The 2010 and project 2020 GDP per capita based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP)
are collected from the IMF World Economic Outlook dataset of 2016. The skill-specific in-
comes of 2010 and 2020 are calculated using the relationship between the GDP per capita,
the share of working-age population, the share of each skill groups in the working-age pop-
ulation (25+) and the wage premium. The projected populations of college-graduates and
less educated of 2010 and 2020 are from the Wittgenstein centre database. Data on the wage
premium are from Hendricks (2004).
Table 3.2 details the average annual growth of population in working age be-
tween 2010 and 2020. On average, the working age population will grow at
the rate of +2.12% per annum. The growth rate will be highest in low-income
countries (+3.17%) and lowest in high-income countries (+1.15%). The regions
that exhibit the highest rates of population growth are SSA (+3.06%), MENA
(+2.93%) and South Asia (+2.91%). The high-skill population will grow faster
than the lower-skill population, +4.02% against +1.75% on average. This trend
in growing educated population will be observed in all income groups across all
regions.
The world maps in Figures 3.3a, 3.3b and 3.3c depict the GDP/cap (in PPP),
working population and human capital growth rates in the 175 countries in our
sample. Fastest income growth will be found in Asia. While MENA and SSA
regions will experience very high population growth however lowest income
growth. This is a signal of higher emigration pressure from these regions in the
near future. Additionally, population boom will go hand in hand with human
capital growth. This suggests that future migration pattern will become more
skill-intensive.
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Table 3.2: Average annual growth of native population in working age
%∆/year Total pop. % of HS
(million)
Total LS HS 2010 2020 2010 2020
By income groups 2010
Low-income (n=33) 3.17 3.04 5.73 307 414 4.57 5.73
Lower-middle-income (n=50) 2.63 2.38 4.52 1,230 1,553 11.90 13.96
Upper-middle-income (n=45) 1.78 1.38 3.65 1,531 1,775 16.06 19.17
High-income (n=47) 1.15 0.52 2.66 710 760 25.72 29.82
By geo-political groups
Middle East and North Africa (n=12) 2.93 2.42 5.71 174 230 13.64 17.67
Sub-Saharan Africa (n=43) 3.06 2.94 5.26 303 409 4.69 5.76
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (n=20) 1.11 0.76 2.23 231 244 20.19 22.54
South Asia (n=7) 2.91 2.69 5.68 185 245 7.02 9.00
East Asia and the Pacific (n=17) 2.42 2.13 4.52 330 403 12.65 15.07
Latin America and the Caribbean (n=25) 2.34 1.96 4.22 258 315 15.80 18.78
China (n=1) 1.39 1.06 4.80 858 985 7.56 10.53
India (n=1) 2.25 1.99 4.48 619 773 9.48 11.76
Mexico (n=1) 2.18 1.84 4.20 69 86 13.23 16.08
Turkey (n=1) 1.95 1.69 4.13 42 51 9.86 12.18
High-income (n=47) 1.15 0.52 2.66 710 760 25.72 29.82
Average (n=175) 2.12 1.75 4.02 389 453 15.30 18.01
Notes: The projected populations of college-graduates and less educated aged 25+ of 2010
and 2020 are from the Wittgenstein centre database.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Benchmark results
This sub-section presents the benchmark results of future development on mi-
gration for a one-decade period. The results distinguish between potential and
actual migrants. Potential migrants are those who will develop a willingness
to live permanently in one of the 33 OECD countries, which is not their coun-
tries of birth. These potential migrants will attempt to realize their migration
project. The volume of potential migrants thus represents the indirect migra-
tion pressure to OECD countries. While actual migrants in 2020 are those who
can fully meet the migration requirement and can realize their migration in the
similar socio-political context as in 2010. The volume of actual migrants could
be considered as the direct migration pressure to OECD countries.
Table 3.3a, 3.3b and 3.3c show the volume of potential and actual emigrants
to OECD countries in 2010 and 2020, in total and by skill groups. According
to the benchmark simulation, in 2010, there were more than 367 million people
expressing a desire to migrate, this number will increase by about +19.12%
to reach 437 million in 2020. Of those who would like to migrate, only one
fourth to one fifth could actually turn their willingness into reality. In 2020,
only 99.6 million among 437 million potential migrants could become actual
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migrants. This number will increase by +18.69% compared to the volume in
2010. The increase in actual migrants is highly correlated with the rise in
potential migrants. The increase of the volumes of high-skill potential and
actual migrants will be at higher speed than the ones of the lower-skilled.
The following lines in Table 3.3 present the contribution of each factor in shap-
ing future migration pattern. They correspond to three counterfactual simula-
tions:
• CF 1: only population growth rates vary between 2010 and 2020. The
other two factors, income level and skill composition, are kept constant
at the levels of 2010.
• CF 2: only skill composition in the population varies between 2010 and
2020. The other two factors, population size and income level, are kept
constant at the levels of 2010.
• CF 3: only income varies between 2010 and 2020. The other two factors,
population size and skill composition, are kept constant at the levels of
2010.
Table 3.3: Migration flows to OECD countries, in volume (x1000) and percent-
age change between 2010 and 2020
Total Less-educated College-educated
2010 2020 %∆ 2010 2020 %∆ 2010 2020 %∆
Benchmark
Potential 367,695 437,986 19.12 274,506 308,384 12.34 93,188 129,602 39.08
Actual 83,973 99,671 18.69 56,836 62,444 9.87 27,137 37,226 37.18
Counterfactual 1
Potential 367,695 436,792 18.79 274,506 328,624 19.71 93,188 108,169 16.08
Actual 83,973 98,492 17.29 56,836 66,810 17.55 27,137 31,682 16.75
Counterfactual 2
Potential 367,695 377,474 2.66 274,506 263,583 -3.98 93,188 113,890 22.22
Actual 83,973 87,410 4.09 56,836 54,525 -4.07 27,137 32,885 21.18
Counterfactual 3
Potential 367,695 359,103 -2.34 274,506 267,949 -2.39 93,188 91,153 -2.18
Actual 83,973 81,294 -3.19 56,836 55,049 -3.14 27,137 26,244 -3.29
Notes: The benchmark scenario considers future development as a continuation of the 2010
situation, incorporating demographic, income and human capital growth between 2010 and
2020. The counterfactual 1 keeps constant the demographic growth. The counterfactual 2
keeps constant the income growth. The counterfactual 3 keeps constant the growth in the
share of the college-educated in total population.
The results of the counterfactual simulations show how each factor taken sep-
arately can affect migration. Growth in population size predominantly de-
termines the magnitude of future migration. It contributes positively to the
surge in potential migration by +18.79% and in actual migration by +17.29%.
These numbers are very close to the percentage increases in the benchmark
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Figure 3.3: Growth rates of GDP/cap (PPP), total population and high-skill
population, 2010-2020
Figure 3.3.a. Growth rates of GDP/cap (PPP), 2010-2020
(4.4673247,8.6052009]
(2.9065182,4.4673247]
[−6.1368718,2.9065182]
Figure 3.3.b. Growth rates of total population, 2010-2020
(2.8397105,4.2924174]
(1.676513,2.8397105]
[−.33124048,1.676513]
Figure 3.3.c. Growth rates of high-skill population, 2010-2020
(4.9419427,8.7777286]
(3.0078883,4.9419427]
[.77394573,3.0078883]
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scenario when all factors are at play. This proves the essential role of demo-
graphic transition in shaping future migration. This finding is in line with
Dao et al. (2017) which concludes that the long-run trends of past and future
migration are mainly affected by the volume of world population. In the sec-
ond counterfactual, human capital growth alone helps to explain a relatively
smaller portion or migration surge. This counterfactual predicts a decrease in
migration of the low-skilled group with a stark increase of the higher-skilled
group. Taking both factors of population size and human capital growth to-
gether would generate a bigger boost in migration among the college-educated.
The third counterfactual reveals the negative impact of income on migration
on average across our sample. What may help to explain this pattern is that
when income increases incentive to migrate declines and opportunity cost rises.
The interplay of these three factors, which this study takes into account, gener-
ates the bell-shape relationship between migration and development. Countries
that lie along this curve experience different combinations of the three factors
and exhibit distinctive levels of migration intensity.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 report respectively the potential and actual migration vol-
umes from each sending group of countries classified by income and geo-political
characteristics as percentages of the total potential and actual migrants in 2010
and 2020. Citizens from upper-middle-income countries constitute the major-
ity in both the potential and actual pools of migrants in this decade. The
percentage increases are positive in the low- and lower-middle-income groups.
While the higher-income countries exhibit the opposite trend. In the develop-
ing world, potential migrants mostly come from SSA (around 13− 14% of the
total potential migrants) and from the LAC (more than 11% of the total po-
tential migrants) at both the beginning and the end of this decade. Declining
shares in the world potential migrant population will be experienced by high-
income countries (−2.71 percentage point), Eastern Europe and Central Asia
(EECA) (−1.15 percentage point) and China (−0.34 percentage point) due to
squeezing wage differential. The biggest increases in proportion in total po-
tential migrants will stem from the Southern border of Europe, i.e. in MENA
(+0.83 percentage point) and SSA (+1.60 percentage point). Considering the
actual migration flows, we still observe the highest shares from upper-middle-
income countries. In the developing world, the share of Mexico, a single country
alone, accounts for about 11% of the total actual migrants in OECD countries.
Equivalent shares are contributed by LAC (about 12−13%) and EECA (about
10 − 12%). Higher-income countries such as EECA and China will see their
shares reduce because of low demographic and high income growth.
Effective migrants originated from Africa constitute a relatively small propor-
tion in total actual migrants (4.82% in 2010 to 6.50% in 2020), in contrast with
its important share among potential migrants as shown above. This means that
there is a big number of people who would like to migrate out of Africa, but
they are still largely constrained by poor financial condition, therefore only a
small fraction of them could effectively migrate. However, this small fraction is
growing very fast (+1.68 percentage point between 2010 and 2020). Compared
to the rest of the world, this shows that the future indirect and direct migration
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pressure will be most intensive from SSA. Migration pressure from this region
will come mostly from the low-skilled group. The second highest speed of in-
crease in emigration will be found in MENA countries, particularly from the
high-skilled population. This could be due to the current high unemployment
rate among the young and well-educated population of the region.
Table 3.4: Share of each origin group in total volume of potential migrants
Total Less-educated College-educated
2010 2020 %∆ 2010 2020 %∆ 2010 2020 %∆
By income groups 2010
LI (n=33) 10.41 11.57 1.17 12.22 13.90 1.68 5.07 6.05 0.99
LMI (n=50) 26.79 28.54 1.75 27.02 28.74 1.72 26.09 28.06 1.97
UMI (n=45) 34.98 34.77 -0.21 36.14 35.81 -0.34 31.55 32.29 0.74
HI (n=47) 27.83 25.12 -2.71 24.62 21.56 -3.06 37.29 33.60 -3.69
By geo-political groups
MENA (n=12) 6.31 7.14 0.83 6.63 7.27 0.64 5.37 6.83 1.47
Sub-Saharan Africa (n=43) 13.15 14.75 1.60 15.69 18.05 2.37 5.68 6.89 1.21
EECA (n=20) 8.90 7.75 -1.15 8.62 7.69 -0.93 9.72 7.89 -1.83
SA (n=7) 4.61 4.94 0.33 5.00 5.36 0.36 3.46 3.93 0.47
EAP (n=17) 7.00 7.49 0.49 6.22 6.39 0.17 9.32 10.11 0.78
LAC (n=25) 11.25 11.84 0.59 12.14 12.93 0.79 8.63 9.25 0.62
China (n=1) 7.67 7.33 -0.34 7.28 6.52 -0.76 8.84 9.27 0.43
India (n=1) 6.49 6.68 0.18 5.89 5.89 -0.01 8.26 8.55 0.29
Mexico (n=1) 5.05 5.24 0.19 5.88 6.26 0.38 2.61 2.82 0.20
Turkey (n=1) 1.73 1.72 -0.01 2.04 2.08 0.04 0.82 0.86 0.04
High-income (n=47) 27.83 25.12 -2.71 24.62 21.56 -3.06 37.29 33.60 -3.69
Notes: The potential emigration volumes of 2010 are calculated as the sum of the number
of non-migrants expressing a willingness to emigrate to OECD countries (data from Gallup
World Poll 2007-2010) and actual emigration stock of 2010 (data from OECD-DIOC ). Hence-
forth, LI: Low-income, LMI: Lower-middle-income, UMI: Upper-middle-income, HI: High-
income, MENA: Middle East and North Africa, SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa, EECA: Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, SA: South Asia, EAP: East Asia and the Pacific, LAC: Latin
America and the Caribbean.
Table 3.5: Share of each origin group in total volume of actual migrants
Total Less-educated College-educated
2010 2020 %∆ 2010 2020 %∆ 2010 2020 %∆
By income groups 2010
LI (n=33) 4.26 5.98 1.71 4.10 6.02 1.92 4.61 5.90 1.29
LMI (n=50) 23.63 26.18 2.54 21.27 23.82 2.55 28.57 30.13 1.56
UMI (n=45) 40.95 40.32 -0.63 45.65 45.49 -0.17 31.10 31.66 0.56
HI (n=47) 31.16 27.53 -3.63 28.98 24.67 -4.30 35.72 32.31 -3.41
By geo-political groups
MENA (n=12) 7.71 8.85 1.14 8.14 8.89 0.75 6.81 8.79 1.98
SSA (n=43) 4.82 6.50 1.68 4.20 6.02 1.81 6.12 7.31 1.19
EECA (n=20) 12.15 10.50 -1.65 12.55 11.19 -1.36 11.30 9.33 -1.97
SA (n=7) 2.66 3.28 0.62 2.35 2.97 0.62 3.31 3.79 0.48
EAP (n=17) 7.45 8.19 0.75 6.33 6.87 0.53 9.78 10.41 0.63
LAC (n=25) 12.58 13.53 0.94 13.59 14.76 1.17 10.48 11.46 0.98
China (n=1) 3.47 3.11 -0.36 2.76 2.08 -0.68 4.96 4.83 -0.14
India (n=1) 3.83 4.26 0.43 2.00 2.27 0.27 7.68 7.61 -0.07
Mexico (n=1) 11.40 11.59 0.20 15.39 16.56 1.17 3.04 3.27 0.23
Turkey (n=1) 2.77 2.66 -0.11 3.71 3.72 0.02 0.80 0.88 0.08
High-income (n=47) 31.16 27.53 -3.63 28.98 24.67 -4.30 35.72 32.31 -3.41
The share of immigrants relative to the number of working-age residents in
each OECD country is shown in Table 3.6. On average, immigrants account
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for 13.48% in 2010 and 14.16% in 2020 in the total residents aged 25+ of the re-
ceiving countries - a small increase of 0.68 percentage point after a decade. This
trend will be attenuated by the small increase in low-skilled immigrant shares
among total working-age residents in the majority of countries, +0.38 percent-
age point on average. Meanwhile, the share of the highly skilled will increase
more significantly by +1.10 percentage point on average. This fact suggests
that the future composition of immigrants will become more skill-intensive.
This is in line with the worldwide increasing trend of education expansion.
The highest shares of immigrants will still be found in Luxembourg (47.07%),
Israel (33.14%), Australia (29.13%), Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland
(around 25%).
Table 3.6: Immigration rates in OECD countries
Total Less-educated College-educated
2010 2020 %∆ 2010 2020 %∆ 2010 2020 %∆
Australia 29.52 29.13 -0.39 27.39 26.15 -1.24 33.86 33.96 0.11
Austria 13.07 12.74 -0.32 14.37 14.31 -0.06 8.86 8.78 -0.09
Belgium 16.00 17.41 1.40 19.79 22.45 2.66 8.17 9.47 1.30
Canada 24.97 26.60 1.63 25.13 26.17 1.04 24.85 26.89 2.04
Chile 1.53 1.63 0.11 1.09 1.09 -0.01 4.02 4.08 0.06
Czech Republic 7.83 8.01 0.18 7.92 7.93 0.01 7.36 8.35 0.99
Denmark 9.22 10.07 0.85 9.21 9.66 0.44 9.24 11.08 1.84
Estonia 20.05 22.40 2.35 18.67 20.01 1.34 22.63 26.06 3.43
Finland 3.41 3.65 0.25 4.72 4.87 0.14 1.82 2.29 0.47
France 14.21 15.81 1.60 14.29 16.12 1.83 13.95 15.11 1.15
Germany 8.58 8.77 0.19 10.27 10.83 0.56 4.68 4.83 0.15
Greece 12.14 12.66 0.51 12.19 12.97 0.78 11.96 11.70 -0.27
Hungary 4.48 4.96 0.48 3.71 3.91 0.20 9.01 10.29 1.28
Iceland 10.74 11.43 0.69 11.33 11.83 0.49 9.58 10.81 1.23
Ireland 19.24 21.43 2.19 19.85 20.41 0.55 18.41 22.41 4.00
Israel 33.39 34.14 0.76 25.50 25.18 -0.32 49.12 51.49 2.37
Italy 8.26 8.66 0.39 7.99 8.35 0.36 10.35 10.56 0.21
Japan 1.09 1.21 0.11 1.21 1.40 0.19 0.87 0.94 0.07
Luxembourg 46.62 47.07 0.45 46.44 46.06 -0.38 47.16 49.44 2.28
Mexico 0.46 0.43 -0.03 0.33 0.28 -0.05 1.21 1.13 -0.08
Netherlands 11.02 12.34 1.31 10.87 11.75 0.88 11.44 13.66 2.22
New Zealand 25.92 25.28 -0.64 24.06 22.33 -1.73 29.47 30.04 0.57
Norway 12.38 12.86 0.48 11.96 12.17 0.22 13.29 14.01 0.71
Poland 2.00 1.98 -0.01 2.06 2.04 -0.01 1.76 1.79 0.03
Portugal 8.81 10.72 1.91 7.55 9.00 1.45 17.53 19.83 2.30
Slovakia 3.32 3.59 0.26 3.16 3.34 0.18 4.28 4.88 0.60
Slovenia 13.03 13.15 0.12 14.09 14.28 0.19 8.24 8.85 0.61
Spain 12.28 13.24 0.96 11.34 12.16 0.83 16.16 16.57 0.41
Sweden 14.50 15.40 0.90 15.61 16.29 0.67 12.43 14.13 1.69
Switzerland 25.04 25.01 -0.03 21.57 20.57 -1.00 36.30 36.99 0.69
Turkey 1.50 1.33 -0.17 1.33 1.14 -0.20 2.96 2.70 -0.26
United Kingdom 14.28 16.49 2.20 9.77 10.80 1.02 26.79 28.97 2.17
United States 15.94 17.62 1.67 16.65 18.24 1.59 14.69 16.66 1.96
Average 13.48 14.16 0.68 13.07 13.46 0.38 14.92 16.02 1.10
Notes: The share of immigrants is equal to the volume of immigrants relative to the total
number of residents in each OECD destination country.
The share of youth population, usually considered those between 25-34, is
widely shown to significantly affect a country’s emigration intensity (Hatton
and Williamson, 1998, 2003, 2005, 2011). This fact is captured in this exercise
by choosing 30 years old as the age at which migration takes place. Figure
3.4 shows that when migration takes place at older ages, i.e. the weight at-
tached to the first period is higher, the total volume of migration decreases.
Additionally, it would be interesting to obtain information of future migration
trends broken down by different age groups. However, we only possess one
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semi-elasticity of realization rate to income for the entire working-age popu-
lation of each skill group. Therefore, we have no choice but to assume that
all age groups have the same propensity to migrate. The fact of using the
growth rate of the working-age population does, to some extent, account for
the growth of youth population because a higher growth rate of a working-age
population also means higher entry rate of the youth cohort to this group of
population. Overall, we can only demonstrate in a clear manner the impact of
age on migration through the effect of the relative length of the first period in
the utility function.
Figure 3.4: Total migration with different ages at which migration takes place
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Notes: This graph shows how the total volume of migration varies with different ages at
which migration takes place. The values of the relative length of the first period ρ which
correspond to the discrete ages of 30, 35, 40, 45, 50 are respectively 0.8, 1.35, 2.15, 3.34, 5.29.
Among the 33 OECD destination countries, immigration mostly concentrates
in eight countries including the US, Canada, the UK, France, Australia, Spain,
Germany and Italy. These eight countries are the most preferred destination of
around 83% of potential migrants worldwide (see Table 3.A1 in the Appendix)
and they host around 82% of the total effective migrants in OECD countries
(see Table 3.A2 in the Appendix). The US remains by far the most preferred
destination and largest receiving country. This country alone hosts close to 40%
of the total migrants in the dataset. Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 provide the
details of potential and actual migration flows to those 8 biggest destinations.
Table 3.7 depicts the share in 2010 of each sending group in the total immi-
grant volume in each of the eight major destinations. Mexico tops the list of
sending countries to the US, followed by the LAC region. The biggest immi-
grant communities in France are originated from MENA; in the UK, Canada
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and Australia from high-income countries; in Germany and Italy from EECA;
and in Spain from LAC countries. The proportions of immigrants from SSA in
all of the major host countries remain relatively low in 2010.
Table 3.7: Share of each origin group in total volume of immigrants in the top
eight destinations in 2010
US France UK Germany Spain Italy Canada Australia
MENA 2.72 40.18 4.32 0.09 13.81 12.61 6.35 4.32
SSA 2.59 11.42 15.01 0.00 2.94 5.70 3.83 4.45
EECA 3.61 3.41 4.79 38.29 17.31 35.23 5.43 3.15
SA 1.50 0.88 12.85 0.00 0.73 3.90 5.12 3.47
EAP 10.86 3.78 3.97 0.21 0.74 2.79 11.39 14.44
LAC 20.17 2.83 4.90 0.00 36.67 9.90 9.19 2.04
China 3.86 1.01 2.91 0.53 1.33 3.17 7.96 5.89
India 4.70 0.60 10.20 0.13 0.54 2.03 8.27 5.37
Mexico 28.89 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.83 0.15 1.07 0.06
Turkey 0.30 3.45 1.26 24.18 0.05 0.32 0.37 0.68
High-income 20.81 32.31 39.66 36.58 25.04 24.19 41.02 56.13
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 3.8 reports the future actual migration flows between 2010 and 2020
from each geo-political groups as percentage of total actual migration flows
to each destination country. Immigrants from SSA will constitute the largest
group of newcomers to the UK and Italy. Overall in all receiving countries, the
shares of actual migration flows from SSA and MENA will increase substantially
compared to other sending regions.
Table 3.8: Share of each origin group in the total flows of actual migrants to
the top eight destinations, between 2010 and 2020
US France UK Germany Spain Italy Canada Australia
MENA 5.70 58.25 8.24 0.29 26.48 36.08 14.86 11.86
SSA 9.03 29.26 30.24 0.00 12.05 37.06 14.57 13.03
EECA 0.79 -0.66 -0.39 23.61 -4.28 -6.04 1.04 1.07
SA 4.18 1.00 20.28 0.00 2.12 19.55 10.69 10.54
EAP 14.55 6.74 4.84 -0.38 1.28 6.54 18.31 32.43
LAC 24.27 3.71 9.14 0.00 57.56 23.49 13.17 3.90
China 0.82 -1.13 1.83 1.33 0.75 -4.08 4.22 5.18
India 7.16 0.23 11.18 1.63 0.91 3.48 11.52 12.41
Mexico 25.46 -0.04 0.08 0.00 0.92 -0.36 0.29 0.07
Turkey 0.28 1.57 1.36 73.40 0.18 0.28 0.02 0.27
High-income 7.76 1.08 13.20 0.12 2.03 -16.01 11.30 9.25
Table 3.9 displays a remarkable trend that the growth rates of immigration
stemming from SSA will be highest compared to the numbers from other send-
ing regions in all major destinations.21 In other words, SSA, which in 2010
occupied a very small share in the total immigration volume, will send out
migrants with the highest speed toward all destinations in the future. This ris-
ing trend of effective migration could be explained by the strong willingness to
outmigrate from SSA to most of the major destinations as shown in Table 3.10.
Table 3.11 reveals that in the top preferred destinations, the growth rates of
the potential migration volumes from SSA will be among the most important,
along with MENA.
21Except Germany whose the data on immigration from many origin countries are missing
in OECD-DIOC dataset.
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Table 3.9: Growth rates of actual migration flows to the top eight destinations,
between 2010 and 2020
US France UK Germany Spain Italy Canada Australia
MENA 49.77 30.03 49.99 14.28 26.21 20.65 48.35 34.13
SSA 82.72 53.09 52.80 56.01 46.98 78.47 36.48
EECA 5.21 -4.01 -2.13 2.83 -3.38 -1.24 3.95 4.21
SA 65.94 23.39 41.37 39.53 36.14 43.14 37.84
EAP 31.78 36.91 31.96 -8.50 23.54 16.89 33.21 27.94
LAC 28.54 27.19 48.91 21.46 17.14 29.56 23.76
China 5.03 -23.20 16.43 11.56 7.67 -9.30 10.94 10.94
India 36.16 7.85 28.75 56.98 23.26 12.35 28.76 28.77
Mexico 20.89 -6.22 16.24 15.07 -17.54 5.65 14.51
Turkey 22.25 9.43 28.35 13.92 48.07 6.22 1.06 4.89
High-income 8.84 0.69 8.72 0.02 1.11 -4.78 5.69 2.05
Table 3.10: Share of each origin group in the total flows of potential migrants
to the top eight destinations, between 2010 and 2020
US France UK Germany Spain Italy Canada Australia
MENA 5.89 35.85 9.64 16.85 9.55 21.69 15.41 7.40
SSA 24.34 28.57 45.09 14.87 14.71 23.57 16.67 7.49
EECA 0.89 1.09 0.84 13.43 0.46 1.63 0.92 1.48
SA 5.93 1.86 13.45 5.32 0.52 12.63 8.61 8.24
EAP 12.74 3.16 6.65 5.34 0.84 5.77 11.68 21.81
LAC 17.54 8.03 2.80 1.99 58.64 18.22 9.54 3.96
China 5.15 3.45 1.08 1.62 0.11 4.76 8.58 8.68
India 10.64 1.83 8.77 1.48 0.11 2.45 7.57 9.97
Mexico 10.79 3.44 0.80 0.00 5.97 2.79 5.70 0.48
Turkey 0.56 3.01 0.69 17.99 0.02 0.53 1.20 1.38
High-income 5.53 9.71 10.19 21.10 9.07 5.96 14.10 29.11
Table 3.11: Growth rates of potential migration flows to the top eight destina-
tions, between 2010 and 2020
US France UK Germany Spain Italy Canada Australia
MENA 41.33 29.87 42.75 34.16 24.81 23.62 43.06 33.76
SSA 32.32 35.22 36.18 27.28 34.81 28.74 35.49 32.28
EECA 5.75 3.07 3.40 3.57 0.89 1.08 4.61 4.65
SA 27.17 28.61 29.53 34.22 46.73 14.37 36.87 29.19
EAP 26.36 22.05 35.16 29.61 30.90 20.68 35.33 30.15
LAC 26.96 26.92 25.81 26.38 22.80 18.66 28.90 24.79
China 10.61 12.12 9.28 12.27 6.82 16.51 17.31 14.22
India 22.60 36.63 22.39 13.32 17.83 28.02 21.71 31.26
Mexico 21.90 33.59 29.98 27.05 23.37 28.26 25.20
Turkey 26.41 17.91 18.50 15.94 31.88 12.33 26.67 17.08
High-income 10.08 6.83 11.19 6.78 5.41 3.22 7.91 7.42
3.4.2 Results from Brexit-Trumpism scenario
This sub-section describes how the world migration would change as a conse-
quence of the surging anti-immigration policies in major receiving countries.
It presents a second set of simulations that consist of a complete immigration
halt to the US and the UK between 2010 and 2020. This extreme scenario is
unrealistic but allows to illustrate in a clear manner how these coercive poli-
cies will reallocate migrants across OECD countries and what is the expected
utility cost for poorer sending countries.22
22For simplicity, we assume that there is neither coordination nor interaction between
countries, i.e. those policy choices are made independently by each country. While under a
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The results of the “Brexit-Trumpism” scenario suggest that as a consequence
of the restriction policies in these two major receiving countries, migration in
the world would only increase by +7.27% by the end of this decade (Table
3.12), which is much smaller compared to +18.69% in the benchmark sce-
nario. The difference of 10 percentage points correspond to the increase in
the volume of potential migrants who will remain home as the consequence of
the restrictive policy. As being designed, the actual immigration flows to the
US and UK between 2010 and 2020 will be nil or negative23 shown in Table
3.13. The rest of the migrants who could effectively move will redirect them-
selves toward other destinations. A comparison between the migration flows
of the benchmark scenario and the counterfactual “Brexit-Trumpism” scenario
show that immigration will rise in all other destinations after the UK and US
close their borders. Overall, the highest increase in immigration will be found
in Canada. Migrants from MENA and SSA will migrate more to France and
Canada. Immigration flows from LAC will increase in Canada and Spain. More
Asian migrants will move to Canada and Australia. Mexico will be the sending
country the most affected by this border restriction from the US. The results
further reveal that Mexicans will not redirect themselves massively to other
destinations, there will only be a small volume of them ending up in Canada.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the effects of this policy on the volume and welfare of
migrants in each sending region. Overall, the largest decrease in volume of
emigrants will be experienced in Mexico and LAC. While the biggest welfare
losses will be suffered by intending migrants from SSA, MENA and South Asia
because the utility gains from income differentials between these regions and
main richer destinations will become unachievable.24
Table 3.12: Volume (in thousand) and percentage changes of migration in
Brexit-Trumpism scenario
Total Less-educated College-educated
Actual volume of migrants 2010 2020 %∆ 2010 2020 %∆ 2010 2020 %∆
Benchmark scenario 83,973 99,671 18.69 56,836 62,444 9.87 27,137 37,226 37.18
Brexit-Trumpism scenario 83,973 90,079 7.27 56,836 58,029 2.10 27,137 32,050 18.10
cooperative or interactive setting, the direct and spillover effects of those policies could be
very different (Facchini and Willmann, 2006).
23Because some are already negative in the benchmark scenario.
24The percentages of deviation in welfare are calculated based on the deterministic level
of utility in Equation 3.3.
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Table 3.13: Percentage change in actual immigration flows between 2010 and
2020 in Brexit-Trumpism scenario in comparison to the benchmark scenario,
by corridors
US France UK Germany Spain Italy Canada Australia
MENA -100 1.06 -100 0.28 1.04 1.27 4.13 3.27
441079 745619 133049 714 153058 98991 182740 64869
SSA -100 1.54 -100 1.61 1.98 5.18 8.63
698668 374613 488009 0 69662 101688 179192 71317
EECA -100 -2.51 -100 0.59 0.12 -7.32 6.77 3.40
61478 -8456 -6285 57614 -24742 -16557 12773 5834
SA -100 2.17 -100 1.65 0.91 4.33 3.86
323308 12790 327233 0 12279 53639 131445 57692
EAP -100 7.00 -100 -0.02 4.66 4.93 6.74 5.48
1126292 86224 78145 -935 7387 17939 225180 177415
LAC -100 12.24 -100 4.36 4.80 44.37 10.49
1878841 47480 147553 0 332728 64453 161874 21325
China -100 -0.40 -100 1.72 0.54 0.12 1.66 1.57
63291 -14509 29477 3238 4330 -11192 51842 28320
India -100 2.33 -100 1.72 0.89 0.83 1.71 2.03
554531 2910 180502 3989 5280 9548 141700 67920
Mexico -100 -30.98 -100 21.92 -13.22 52.13 22.93
1970305 -492 1312 0 5293 -978 3586 375
Turkey -100 0.84 -100 0.32 1.28 2.40 38.45 3.84
21668 20118 21964 179151 1065 755 235 1470
High-income -100 19.66 -100 873.68 17.95 -1.63 18.55 15.62
600430 13821 212965 302 11755 -43929 138998 50608
Notes: The percentage changes are calculated as ((Brexit-Trumpism flow - Benchmark
flow)/Benchmark flow) x100. The “Brexit-Trumpism” scenario is a complete border clos-
ing in the US and the UK. Small numbers in italic are the volume of actual immigration
flows between 2010 and 2020 in the benchmark scenario.
Figure 3.5: The effects of the Brexit-Trumpism scenario on the volume and
welfare of migrants by sending regions
3.5.a. Decrease in volume of out-migration flows 3.5.b. Percentage decrease in utility
Turkey
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Notes: The decreases in volume of out-migration flows and in utility are calculated from the
comparison between the Brexit-Trumpism scenario and the benchmark scenario. LAC: Latin
America and the Caribbean, EAP: East Asia and the Pacific, SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa, HIC:
High-income countries, MENA: Middle East and North Africa.
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3.4.3 The effectiveness of developmental policies
The benchmark results indicate that there will be a rising migration intensity
from Africa and MENA to OECD countries over the coming decades. This
seems to feed the current EU’s concern about how to limit migration. The
New Migration Partnership framework is the response to this concern. In this
framework, the EU is collaborating with several countries in MENA and SSA
to address the root causes of irregular migration by increasing investment in
these regions. The objective of the policy is in line with other well-known in-
ternational cooperation programs that target the problem of rising migration
pressure. For example the Maquiladora program which established a manu-
facturing zone along the US-Mexican border with the objective of fostering
employment and increasing Mexican wages. This would ultimately contribute
to limiting illegal migration from Mexico. To assess the effectiveness of a mea-
sure that intends to limit migration, this analysis determines the development
levels that poorer sending countries should experience in order to reduce their
migration pressure on richer destinations. To do so, a counterfactual is de-
signed keeping the stocks of immigrants from MENA and SSA countries in
eight major receiving OECD countries constant between 2010 and 2020. The
corresponding expected wages25 are then computed by minimizing each of the
following equations, in which bCFijs is the counterfactual level of the log ratio
of bilateral migrants over total stayers and yCFis the expected wage to keep
migrant stock constant.{
bCFijl − lnyjl + ln(1 + d∗ijl) + αlnyjl = ρln((1− kijl)yCFil − vijl)− (1 + ρ) lnyCFil + αlnyCFil
bCFijh − lnyjh + ln(1 + d∗ijh) + αlnyjl = ρln((1− kijh)yCFih − vijh)− (1 + ρ) lnyCFih + αlnyCFil
Figures 3.6 summarizes the results of the average yearly growth rates in GDP
per capita of 12 MENA and 41 SSA countries which would keep the volumes of
low and high skill emigrants constant as in 2010. The results clearly show that
the projected annual GDP/cap growth rate between 2010 and 2020, which we
will most likely observe, are not enough to keep migration constant. For the
migration pressure to the OECD countries to be stable or even reduced, the
GDP/cap annual growth rates are expected to be twice or three times larger
on average in relatively well-off sending countries. Most of these countries are
located in MENA region such as Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia; and in
the upper-middle-income group of Africa like Botswana, Mauritius and South
Africa. For the poorer countries, the growth rates are expected to be of double-
digits. Some are just unimaginably high. It is because these countries are at
the very beginning of the left wing of the bell-shaped migration curve, their
emigration will only intensify with development in the foreseeable future. These
countries can only reach the other end of the emigration curve in the very long
term. According to the result of this simulation, the corresponding amount of
development aid to keep migration in 2020 as constant as in 2010 is enormous,
25Only the levels of wages that are higher than the ones we observed today are presented.
There is another solution from my algorithm is to reduce the wages, i.e. to tax potential
migrants making them even poorer and not to be able to migrate.
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it is equivalent to more than 20% of the OECD’s total GDP in 2010.
Figure 3.6: Counterfactual average annual wage growth rates between 2010
and 2020 to keep emigration constant at the 2010 levels
3.6.a. Less educated 3.6.b. College-educated
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Notes: The figures compare the observed average annual growth rates of skill-specific wages
between 2010 and 2020 and the needed average levels to keep emigration from MENA and
SSA constant at the level of 2010.
The answer of this study is in line with previous existing research that di-
rectly test the impact of development policies on migration. Many studies
have failed to justify the negative relationship between risings in income and
out-flow migration. This is the case of NAFTA which is proven to increase
Mexican migration to the US (Martin, 1993); of a rural development policy
that further encourages migration to cities in Burkina Faso (Beauchemin and
Schoumaker, 2005), and of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) that
has positive significant effect on migration outflows in SSA (Belloc, 2015).
Similarly, Berthe´lemy et al. (2009) show that aid stimulates out-migration by
24% in countries with income per capita lower than US $7, 300 (PPP 2000
prices). Or to a lesser extent, the conditional cash transfers of Mexico’s pri-
mary poverty-reduction program reduce rural out-migration to the U.S. but
not domestic migration (Stecklov et al., 2005).
3.5 Conclusion
This paper provides projection of future migration under different scenarios.
It incorporates three factors of development that affect migration: the demo-
graphic transition, income change and human capital accumulation. The com-
binations of these three factors give rise to different patterns of migration. To
study the impact of income on migration, this paper proposes a microfounded
behavioral model of migration, in which migration decision and realization are
the two building elements. The model is conceptually based on the empirical
facts found in Dao et al. (2016) on the determinants of the migration hump.
Decision to migrate is governed by wage differential between origin and destina-
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tion, as well as that within the society of origin country. Migration realization
depends on the willingness to migrate, financial capacity and migration cost.
The latter is modeled to vary with income to explicitly reflect the opportunity
cost of migrating. The model is calibrated using data on real and potential
bilateral migration stocks, GDP, average income, skill composition and wage
premium. Once being properly calibrated, it is then used to predict future
migration flows from 175 countries to 33 OECD destinations between 2010 and
2020. This is done using projections on future GDP/cap and demographic
growth.
The results of the benchmark simulation exercise suggest that after a decade
of development, immigration volume to OECD countries will rise by +18.69%,
which is equivalent to +1.7% per year. Because of this short period of time,
we will still observe big migration volumes from Mexico and LAC into the
US. However, their speeds of change are becoming smaller. Even though the
current migration volumes from SSA and MENA are small, they will increase
very rapidly in the future. Due to the high burden of financial constraint, the
direct migration pressure from SSA will be however limited compared to the
indirect pressure. Overall future migration will shift toward being more skill-
intensive. The contribution of demographic growth to migration intensity is
shown to be sizeable.
A counterfactual scenario of a complete immigration ban to the UK and US
is analyzed. It suggests that as a consequence of such circumstance, the world
migration will be more than halved, Mexican migrants will be most affected and
migration flows will increase in other main destinations, especially in Canada.
Any development policy would encounter difficulty in reducing migration pres-
sure from SSA and MENA in the short and medium term, as suggested by the
last sets of simulation in this paper. It would take very long time for SSA to
reach a level of development that would reduce its emigration intensity.
This paper does not aim to provide the most comprehensive method to project
migration, nonetheless it contributes to enhance the methodologies used in the
existing literature.
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3.6 Appendix
A. The impacts of income changes on migration aspirations
Proposition 1 details the responses of migration aspirations to changes in skilled
average incomes at origin and destination.
Proposition 1
1. If average incomes per worker in origin and destination countries grow
at the same pace, aspirations for migration of both skill groups remain
unchanged.
2. If α - the parameter of feeling attached to relative position - is lower
than 1, aspirations for migration of both skill groups increase with aver-
age incomes per worker in destination, and decrease with that in origin
countries. And vice versa if α is larger than 1.
3. If α is lower than 1, a faster increase in income per worker at destination
relative to that at origin country boosts migration willingness. On the
contrary, a slower increase in income per worker at destination relative
to that at origin country reduces migration willingness. And vice versa
if α is larger than 1.
Proof. 1. We denote yi the average income per worker in country i. The
skill-specific incomes are computed as yil = yi/(δihσi + δil) and yih =
σiyi/(δihσi + δil) where σi is the skill premium. Therefore, an increase
in yi will change proportionally yih and yil, keeping the level of skill
premium σi intact.
The two subfunctions in the Equation 3.9 of Bijs are homogenous of
degree zero ln(ayjs/ayis) = ln(yjs/yis) ∀a ∈ R, i.e. they are unaffected
by a similar increase in incomes at origin and destination.
2. The expected average net utility gain when less-educated individuals want
to migrate writes: Bijl = (1− α) [lnyjl − lnyil] − ln (1 + dijs). The par-
tial derivatives
∂Bijl
∂yjl
> 0 and
∂Bijl
∂yil
< 0 if α < 1. We obtain opposite
results if α > 1.
The expected average net utility gain when college-educated individu-
als want to migrate writes: Bijh = [lnyjh − lnyih] − α [lnyjl − lnyil] −
ln (1 + dijs). With yjl =
yjh
σj
and yil =
yih
σi
,
∂Bijh
∂yjh
> 0 and
∂Bijh
∂yih
< 0 if
α < 1. We obtain opposite results if α > 1.
3. We denote ai, aj ∈ R the percentage changes in income per worker in
origin i and destination j respectively. The new expected net utility gain
when aspiring to migrate after changes in incomes in the two countries is
B
′
ijs = (1− α) (lnaj − lnai) +Bijs. When α < 1, B
′
ijs > Bijs if aj > ai,
B
′
ijs < Bijs if aj < ai. And vice versa if α > 1.
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B. The impacts of income changes on migration realization
Proposition 2 details the effects of development on migration, through migra-
tion aspirations and realizations, under the interplay between incentive and
financial constraints.
Proposition 2
1. If aspirations for migration decrease, i.e. the total derivative dBijs < 0
with dBijs =
∂Bijs
∂yis
dyis +
∂Bijs
∂yjs
dyjs,
(a) and if the migration gap increases due to increasing opportunity cost
dgijs
dyis
> 0 (case where vijs < 0), migration realization decreases.
(b) and if the migration gap decreases due to higher financial capacity
to afford migration
dgijs
dyis
< 0 (case where vijs > 0), then
i. migration realization decreases if the effect of decreasing migra-
tion aspirations dominates the effect of higher financial capacity
|dBijs| >
∣∣∣dgijsdyis ∣∣∣.
ii. migration realization increases if the the effect of higher financial
capacity to afford migration dominates the effect of decreasing
migration aspirations
∣∣∣dgijsdyis ∣∣∣ > |dBijs|.
2. If aspirations for migration increase, i.e. dBijs > 0,
(a) and if the migration gap decreases due to higher financial capacity
to afford migration
dgijs
dyis
< 0 ()case where vijs > 0), migration
realization increases.
(b) and if the migration gap increases due to increasing opportunity cost
dgijs
dyis
> 0 (case where vijs < 0), then
i. migration realization decreases if the effect of increasing oppor-
tunity cost dominates the effect of increasing migration aspira-
tions
∣∣∣dgijsdyis ∣∣∣ > |dBijs|.
ii. migration realization increases if the effect of increasing migra-
tion aspirations dominates the effect of increasing opportunity
cost |dBijs| >
∣∣∣dgijsdyis ∣∣∣.
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C. Top eight destinations of migration
Table 3.A1: Potential Immigration to OECD countries 2010-2020: Top eight
destinations
2010 2020
Rank
2010
Destination Geo.-pol. group Total
pot.
mi-
grants
(x1000)
% of
All
pot.
mi-
grants
in
data
%
Cum.
Total
pot.
mi-
grants
(x1000)
% of
All
pot.
mi-
grants
in
data
%
Cum.
1 United States United States 128529 34.96 34.96 157597 35.98 35.98
2 Canada CANZ 39379 10.71 45.67 47588 10.87 46.85
3 United Kingdom EU15 29465 8.01 53.68 36917 8.43 55.28
4 France EU15 25527 6.94 60.62 30737 7.02 62.29
5 Australia CANZ 23323 6.34 66.96 26709 6.1 68.39
6 Spain EU15 21678 5.9 72.86 25380 5.79 74.19
7 Germany EU15 20420 5.55 78.41 22526 5.14 79.33
8 Italy EU15 16099 4.38 82.79 18172 4.15 83.48
Notes: The potential immigration stocks of 2010 are from OECD-DIOC and the Gallup
World Poll.
Table 3.A2: Actual Immigration to OECD countries 2010-2020: Top eight
receiving countries
2010 2020
Rank
2010
Destination Geo.-pol. group Total
mi-
grants
(x1000)
% of
All
mi-
grants
in
data
%
Cum.
Total
mi-
grants
(x1000)
% of
All
mi-
grants
in
data
%
Cum.
1 United States United States 32643 38.87 38.87 40382 40.52 40.52
2 France EU15 6180 7.36 46.23 7460 7.48 48
3 United Kingdom EU15 6157 7.33 53.56 7771 7.8 55.8
4 Canada CANZ 5955 7.09 60.66 7184 7.21 63.01
5 Germany EU15 5323 6.34 66.99 5567 5.59 68.59
6 Australia CANZ 4396 5.24 72.23 4944 4.96 73.55
7 Spain EU15 4229 5.04 77.27 4807 4.82 78.37
8 Italy EU15 3801 4.53 81.79 4075 4.09 82.46
Notes: The actual immigration stocks of 2010 are from OECD-DIOC.
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